by Gary Stedronsky | Feb 22, 2021 | General, Student Education and Discipline
Written by: Liz Hudson
The U.S. Supreme Court recently agreed to hear a First Amendment case about student social media use related to extracurricular activities. In June, 2020, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court’s ruling in favor of a student who was removed from the cheer team after making offensive social media posts.
Frustrated with her lack of advancement on the cheer squad, the freshman student posted to Snapchat “F*** school f*** softball f*** cheer f*** everything” to her 250 followers.When peers on the cheer team reported the message to a coach, the student was removed from the team, but later told she could try out again the following year. Her parents filed suit in a federal court on her behalf arguing that MAHS violated her First Amendment rights.
The school district contends that U.S. Supreme Court precedent justified its disciplinary action, especially a school’s prerogative to discipline students’ use of vulgar or plainly offensive speech established in Fraser.1 School policy elevated expectations of behavior for student athletes, preventing them from tarnishing the school’s image. Furthermore, cheer team rules discouraged “foul language” and required students to act with respect for the school, coaches, and others on the team. Negative internet posts about cheer were also prohibited.
The Third Circuit decided for the student because the Snapchat post was off-campus speech, and, thus, Fraser did not apply. It refused to give schools discretion to regulate vulgar speech in extracurricular activities while outside of school. The court also extended previous precedent — ultimately concluding that Tinker, which allows schools to discipline disruptive speech, “does not apply to off-campus speech.” The court determined that students’ vulgar social media posts about school or school activities fall outside parameters of school discipline. Though the court recognized possible discipline for violent posts, it punted that question to another day.
On January 8, 2021, The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case. The question certified by the Court was:
“Whether Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), which holds that public school officials may regulate speech that would materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school, applies to student speech that occurs off campus.”
Legal arguments have yet to be filed, and oral arguments have not been scheduled. Look for updates from Ennis Britton as this case progresses.
What does this mean for your district?
Schools struggle to determine appropriate student social media regulation, and courts have offered conflicting First Amendment guidance. While the Third Circuit decision is not binding for schools in Ohio, the Supreme Court decision will be, and Ohio schools will have to abide by it when it is issued. In the meantime, Ohio schools should consider using restraint when disciplining students for social media posts outside of school, even those that could potentially disrupt the education environment or extracurricular activities.
by Gary Stedronsky | Jan 15, 2021 | General, Labor and Employment
The Ohio Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Appellate District recently addressed a dispute between the Portage County Educators Association for Developmental Disabilities-Unit B, OEA/NEA and the Portage County Board of Developmental Disabilities. During a labor dispute, members of the union picketed on sidewalks outside the private residences of six Board members and outside the employer of one Board member. The State Employment Relations Board (SERB) determined that was an unfair labor practice based on language in R.C. 4117.11(B)(7), which makes picketing related to a labor relations dispute at the residence or place of private employment of any public official an unfair labor practice.
The union argued that the statute was an unconstitutional restriction on speech because the picketing in question took place on public sidewalks and streets. Those are quintessential public forums where speech enjoys a great deal of protection.
The court of appeals needed to first determine if the unfair labor practice statute was “content-based” or “content-neutral.” Content-neutral restrictions enjoy intermediate scrutiny and are presumed valid. Content-based restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny review and are presumed invalid. In this case, the court found that the statutory restriction was content-based because it prohibited picketing in certain locations only when that picketing was related to a labor relations dispute.
Given the determination that the statute was a content-based restriction on speech, the presumption of unconstitutionality could only be overcome by a showing that the regulation is (a) necessary to serve a compelling state interest; and (b) narrowly tailored to achieve that interest by the least restrictive means. Ultimately, the court found that SERB failed to show that the statute served a compelling state interest or that it was narrowly tailored. As a result, the court held that the statutory language was unconstitutional, and the union did not commit an unfair labor practice.
What this means for your District?
Picketing outside the homes or places of employment of school board members is permissible in certain counties in Ohio. The Eleventh Appellate District has jurisdiction over Ashtabula, Geauga, Lake, Portage and Trumbull Counties. This decision is binding in those counties. The Eighth Appellate District, which serves Cuyahoga County, previously reached the same conclusion in 1998. At least in those counties, an unfair labor practice will not be found if union members picket on public streets or sidewalks in front of board of education members’ homes or places of employment.
The Seventh Appellate District reached the opposite conclusion in 2016. Given the conflict among these courts, it is not clear throughout Ohio whether it is an unfair labor practice to picket outside the homes or places of employment of public officials. It is possible that this decision will be appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court where a definitive answer can be had. We will certainly update our clients if this case is appealed and decided by the Ohio Supreme Court.
by Gary Stedronsky | Oct 14, 2020 | Construction & Real Estate, COVID-19 (Coronavirus), General
The COVID-19 pandemic has impacted our lives and businesses in ways we never envisioned. The real estate market has certainly not been spared. Office space, hotels, restaurants and retail establishments have been particularly hard hit. Demand for office space is likely to decline given our adaptation to working at home. As of July 30th, the American Hotel and Lodging Association reported that more than half of hotel rooms were empty across the country with many hotels being completely closed.1 Many of our favorite restaurants and retail establishments have also been forced to close during the pandemic. All of this is likely to affect real estate values for years to come.
Starting in January, property owners will have the option to file complaints with their county boards of revision seeking to lower the county auditor’s value assigned to their properties (and their tax bills). We anticipate that many property owner’s will take advantage of this opportunity. However, their complaints may be premature. That is because real estate taxes are paid one year in arrears. Thus, any complaint filed next year is for valuation during the 2020 tax year. By law, boards of revision must establish value next year as of January 1, 2020. As of that date, the COVID-19 pandemic had not greatly impacted our lives or the real estate market. Nonetheless, many property owners will not realize this distinction and will file anyway.
County boards of revision understand and appreciate this aspect of the law. However, the individuals who sit on those boards, which sometimes include elected officials, are often empathetic toward property owners who face significant challenges with their commercial businesses or properties. For that reason, it is not uncommon for boards of revision to grant relief even though they technically should not do so under law. They are easily able to do so when property owners are unopposed.
Faced with similar issues during the great recession, the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals made it clear that general references to decreased real estate values will not be enough to sustain a reduction in property value. In Price v. Summit County Board of Revision, 2012 WL 440783 (February 7, 2012), a property owner sought to reduce the value of his properties due to the recession and foreclosure crisis. The BTA rejected his request because it “has consistently rejected the notion that real property values must necessarily rise or fall commensurate with some preconceived notion of ‘historical trending’ or inflationary/deflationary rates.”
To help ensure county boards of revision uphold the law, school districts are advised to strongly consider filing counter-complaints against requests for reduction that appear unwarranted. Under R.C. 5715.19, boards of education are entitled to notice of all valuation complaints that seek to decrease the value of real property by $50,000 or more. Boards of education have the option to file counter-complaints contesting those decrease requests within 30 days of receipt of that notification.
What this means for your district?
Decreases in value through the county board of revision process directly impact the tax revenue received by school districts. Any decrease in valuation will result in a refund issued to the property owner. Those refunds are directly taken from school funding via the county treasurer settlement statements. We anticipate that school districts will face many decrease complaints next year, some of which are sure to be unwarranted. Ennis Britton attorneys can help school districts determine when it is appropriate to file counter-complaints to contest unwarranted decrease complaints to help maintain the tax valuation of the district.
1https://www.ahla.com/covid-19s-impact-hotel-industry
by Gary Stedronsky | Sep 8, 2020 | General
The U.S. District Court in the Southern District of New York recently denied a request for a preliminary injunction to prevent new Title IX regulations from becoming effective on August 14, 2020.
In general, Title IX prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in schools. It is often used in sexual harassment claims of students involving teacher-on-student harassment or student-on-student harassment. Since 1997, the U.S. Department of Education (the “DOE”) issued guidance discussing how schools should resolve allegations concerning sexual harassment and sexual violence.
The DOE adopted formal regulations in 2020 after publishing a notice of proposed rulemaking in 2018. The regulations contain several provisions that depart from past guidance. The plaintiffs, the State of New York and New York City School District, requested an injunction alleging that the regulations exceed the DOE’s authority; that they are arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, and otherwise not in accordance with federal law; and that the DOE failed to follow procedures required by law in issuing the regulations.
In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must show a clear or substantial likelihood of success on the merits of the underlying claim. The court found that it is undisputed that DOE has the authority to promulgate rules and regulations implementing Title IX. It also found that the DOE had the authority to define the operations of a school to which Title IX applies and to specify how the grievance procedure contained in the regulations would apply to both the alleged victim and the alleged perpetrator of harassment. Further, the DOE regulations were not determined to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. Therefore, the court determined that the plaintiffs did not have a clear or substantial likelihood of success on the merits so the request for a preliminary injunction was denied.
What this means for your district: The new Title IX regulations became effective on August 14, 2020. Districts should have adopted a revised Title IX policy to comply with the new regulations. In addition, it is recommended that all K-12 employees be trained on the new Title IX regulations because a school district will be presumed to have actual knowledge of sexual harassment if any employee has knowledge of such conduct. To assist our clients with this training, Ennis Britton has recorded a training module that is available to clients for employee training purposes. If you wish to utilize those training modules, please contact Barb Billow via email at bbillow@ennisbritton.com.
State of New York v. United States Department of Education, U.S. Dist. S. NY, 20-CV-4260 (August 9, 2020).
by Gary Stedronsky | May 14, 2020 | General, Legislation, School Management
On May 13, 2020, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld House Bill (HB) 70, which was passed in 2015 by the 131st General Assembly. HB 70 is a school takeover bill that gave sweeping powers to an appointed CEO in districts that struggled to meet overall state report card requirements.
The Youngstown City School District Board of Education argued that HB 70 was unconstitutional. HB 70 originally authorized schools to create community learning centers where academic performance was low. It was considered by the House on three separate days, after which it was ultimately passed by the House and went to the Senate for consideration.
The Senate considered the bill on three separate days also but made two amendments, one of which modified the structure of academic-distress commissions. Among other items, the amendment included a requirement that for any district that has received an overall grade of “F” on its state report card for three consecutive years, a commission must appoint a CEO who has “complete operational, managerial, and instructional control” over the school district. The Senate passed the amended bill and the House quickly concurred in the Senate amendments. The Governor signed the bill into law.
The Board of Education (along with its employee unions) sought a declaratory judgment and permanent injunction by challenging the constitutionality of the bill and the legislative process in enacting it. The Board of Education argued that the law violated an Ohio Constitutional provision that requires that every bill “be considered by each house on three different days,” and another provision that states that a city school district has the power “by referendum vote to determine for itself the number of members and the organization of the district board of education.”
The trial court ruled against the Board of Education, as did the Tenth District Court of Appeals. The Ohio Supreme Court agreed to hear the Board of Education’s appeal.
The Supreme Court found that the three-consideration provision in the Ohio Constitution was not violated. The Board of Education argued that the bill was substantially changed in the Senate from its original purpose of creating community learning centers. The Board of Education claimed that the amended bill must also satisfy the three-consideration provision of the Constitution. The Supreme Court disagreed. It found that a bill need not contain the exact same language in each of its three readings to be valid. “[A]mendments which do not vitally alter the substance of a bill do not trigger a requirement for three considerations anew of such amended bill.” Only where the subject or proposition of a bill is wholly changed must an amended bill satisfy the three-consideration provision.
In this case, the House and Senate each considered HB 70 on three different days. The Supreme Court found that the amended bill had a common purpose to the original bill of seeking to improve underperforming schools. Therefore, the amended bill that included the additional academic-distress commission provisions did not also need to satisfy the three-consideration provision of the Constitution.
As for the Board of Education’s other argument, the Supreme Court found that the Ohio Constitution governs the size and organization of school boards, not the power and authority conferred to them. Although HB 70 removed most of the Board of Education’s power, the Supreme Court found that the Constitution does not prevent that. Accordingly, the Supreme Court upheld HB 70 and affirmed the judgments of the lower courts that ruled against the Board of Education.
HB 70 does not apply to the vast majority of Ohio school districts. However, it has been declared constitutional and will remain valid Ohio law until such time as the legislature amends it. Recent legislation has been proposed seeking to end school takeovers such as this (SB 89) or dissolve the academic-distress commission overseeing Lorain City Schools (HB 9). Neither of those legislative attempts have become law. Members of the General Assembly have indicated that they will continue to address the status of academic-distress commissions and school takeover. We will monitor those efforts and keep you updated.
