Matthews v. Springfield-Clark CTC Bd. of Edn., 2023-Ohio-1304.

Springfield Clark CTC terminated a custodial supervisor for a variety of reasons, including, going into his supervisor’s office and reviewing, copying, and removing documents, all of which were supported by video.  The employee had been the subject of prior discipline and had been placed on an improvement plan which was never started.

During the termination process, the employee was given a pre-disciplinary hearing where he was provided with details of all of the allegations.  He was also given an opportunity to provide evidence in his defense.  Following this meeting, the Superintendent recommended termination, and a hearing was held before the Board of Education from which a transcript was created.  The employee did not call any witnesses.   Following the hearing, the Board of Education terminated the employee.

The employee appealed to the Common Pleas Court which overruled the termination.  As the basis for this reversal, the trial court made several findings.  First, the trial court ruled that an employee had a “presumption of innocence” and that the process violated “fundamental fairness” citing that it was the employer’s burden of proving the misconduct.  In support, the trial court cited a passage from the letter from the Superintendent that stated “because the allegation of misconduct has not been disproven” and thus it is “determined to be an act of malfeasance”. 

The trial court also took issue with the fact that the employee’s supervisor did not testify at the hearing, denying the employee his fundamental right of cross-examination.

Lastly, the trial court gave little to no deference to the Board of Education’s findings and decision, despite the wealth of evidence introduced at the hearing regarding past discipline, the video evidence provided, the Superintendent’s testimony, and the lack of credible evidence in the employee’s defense.  Of note, the trial court stated that the Superintendent’s testimony was unreliable hearsay, despite accepting the employee’s introduction of unsupported hearsay testimony. The Board appealed the trial court’s decision.

The Court of Appeals found that all required due process was provided.  He was given a pre-disciplinary hearing where he was presented with all allegations against him.  He was given the chance to call witnesses and to be represented by an attorney.  The Court of Appeals further stated that the standard applied by the trial court of a presumption of innocence was in error, stating the only burden on an employer is to provide evidence sufficient to justify termination.  The trial court’s characterization of the language in the Superintendent’s letter was described as flawed reasoning.

Regarding the lack of testimony and ability to cross-examine, the Court of Appeals specifically stated that cross-examination is not an absolute requirement for due process.

As to the lack of deference, after reviewing the record, the Court of Appeals found the trial court gave no deference to the Board of Education’s credibility decisions and resolution of evidentiary conflicts, instead expressing the court’s view of what the discipline should have been.  Thus, the Court of Appeals found the trial court erred and reversed the decision.

What this means to your district:  It is absolutely pertinent that the appropriate process is followed.  In this instance, that adherence allowed the District to obtain a positive result even after receiving a decision from the trial court that relied on “flawed reasoning.”

Waln v. Dysart Sch. Dist., 54 F.4th 1152 (9th Cir. 2022).

In 2019, Dysart School District prohibited a student from decorating her graduation cap. The school district had a graduation policy that prohibited students from decorating their graduation caps; however, the student had requested a religious exemption. The student, a member of the Sisseton Wahpeton Oyate tribe of the Sioux Nation, wanted to decorate her cap with an eagle feather that had been blessed in a religious ceremony and was to be worn “in times of great honor.” The district, however, rejected her request. When the student showed up to graduation with the decorated cap, school officials did not let her inside the venue. However, school officials permitted other students into the venue who had decorated caps that also violated the dress code. For example, the district allowed one student who decorated their cap with a breast cancer sticker inside the venue.

The student subsequently brought claims against the district, alleging that the district violated her freedom of speech and religion. Specifically, the student claimed that prohibiting her from wearing the non-secular decorated graduation cap, while other secular decorated caps were permitted, violated the free exercise and speech clause of the United States Constitution.

The Ninth Circuit first analyzed the free exercise claim. The court noted that if the district did not enforce the policy to exclude a student’s secular message, such as the breast cancer sticker, then, without some appropriate justification, the district could not enforce its policy against the plaintiff. The court thus held that because the school district did not apply the policy “to the same degree” towards all students but rather executed the policy in a “selective manner,” the district potentially violated the free exercise clause of the U.S. Constitution.

The Ninth Circuit then turned to the free speech claim. The court emphasized that school districts may not engage in viewpoint discrimination, which occurs when the government restricts speech on the basis of the specific “ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker.” The court ultimately found that the school’s general policy of prohibiting decorated caps was not viewpoint discrimination. The court held that on its face, the policy is viewpoint neutral because “it prohibits all speech from all students on all graduation caps at the ceremony.” However, even if a policy is viewpoint neutral on its face, it can still violate the Constitution when not applied uniformly. Because the school district, in this case, applied the viewpoint neutral policy in a selective way, the school did infringe on the student’s freedom of speech.

Thus, the Ninth Circuit ultimately determined that the school district’s actions were likely a violation of the free exercise and speech clauses of the Constitution, holding that “general applicability requires, among other things, that the laws be enforced evenhandedly.” The case was remanded to the trial court.

What does this mean for your district? There remains support for the conclusion that a court would find that a policy that bans all decorations from all caps is viewpoint neutral and thus not an infringement on students’ first amendment rights. However, if your district intends to have such a policy, officials should be trained to apply the policy evenhandedly in order to refrain from violating a student’s rights.