Ohio Court Emphasizes Need for Flexibility in Administrator Contracts

Ohio Court Emphasizes Need for Flexibility in Administrator Contracts

by | Jun 19, 2024 | Labor and Employment

State ex rel. Ruble v. Bd. of Edn. of Switzerland of Ohio Local School Dist., 2024-Ohio-1542

The Switzerland of Ohio Local School District was sued by four administrators after their contracts were suspended by the Board of Education in July 2021. The Superintendent announced to the Board that he was recommending the suspensions due to the “reorganization and consolidation” of their administrative functions. After giving the administrators the required notice, the recommendation was adopted at the next board meeting listing the “financial condition of the school district” as a basis for the suspension of their contracts.

In a case argued by Ennis Britton’s own Michael Fischer, the Ohio 7th District Court of Appeals upheld the suspension of the administrators’ contracts on April 11, 2024 after determining the school board’s policy did not violate R.C. 3319.171. According to the court, Ohio’s administrative personnel suspension policy was meant to be construed broadly to give school boards the flexibility they need to adjust their administrative staff according to the needs of the school district.

In its decision, the court held that a district’s policy pursuant to R.C. 3319.171 needs to include the following:

  • One or more reasons that the board may consider for suspending any contract,
  • Procedures for determining the order of suspension of contracts, and
  • Provisions requiring a right of restoration for employees whose contracts of employment are suspended.

Additionally, school boards need to consider input from other administrators when developing its administrative personnel suspension policy.

However, the court noted that the statute does not require detailed lists of criteria for suspension, nor does it preclude the board from considering the overall needs and interests of the district when making staffing decisions. While the policy may not have been as detailed as the administrators argued it needed to be, the court noted that as long as the board’s policy meets the minimums established above as well as considering the administrators for other openings for which they may be properly qualified, the district is in compliance with the statute.

It is worth noting that the court suggested that the board’s policy, which was sourced from a third-party provider, may have been invalid for failing to consider the input from other administrators as required by R.C. 3319.171(C). But the court did not review this issue on appeal, since the argument never was properly raised by the administrators.

What does this mean for your district? Administrators do not have the same level of protection as teachers under Ohio law with regard to reductions in force. District policies still are required to meet certain statutory minimums, but R.C. 3319.171 is broadly construed to consider the best interests of the district and give boards of education the flexibility they need to adjust their administrative staff in response to changing circumstances. 

Ohio Court Emphasizes Need for Flexibility in Administrator Contracts

EEOC Releases New Guidance on Workplace Harassment

by | May 23, 2024 | Board Policy & Representation, Labor and Employment

On April 24, 2024, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) released new guidance on harassment in the workplace (“the Guidance”). The Guidance takes effect immediately. The Guidance sets forth the EEOC’s position on harassment that constitutes unlawful discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”). Some of the major changes in the Guidance are as follows:

  • Sex-based harassment includes harassment based on sexual identity and sexual orientation.
  • Unlawful harassment based on pregnancy or childbirth may include issues such as lactation and decisions regarding contraception and abortion.
  • Harassment based on “color” (including skin color pigmentation considerations) is prohibited
  • Conduct on video meetings can contribute to a hostile work environment
  • Conduct on non-work-related platforms, such as social media accounts, may contribute to creating a hostile work environment
  • A hostile work environment may be established by a single incident
  • Title VII prohibits “intraclass harassment,” (meaning harassment based on a protected characteristic but conducted by a member of the same protected class).

Why New Guidance? The Guidance was released to address the transformation in workplace environments due to the advent of the internet. Certain technological innovations, such as email and video conferencing, have become indispensable tools for business operations. In addition, the Guidance was released after the Supreme Court’s 2020 decision in Bostock v. Clayton County, in which the Court held that harassment based on gender identity or sexual orientation constitutes unlawful sexual harassment under Title VII. After the Court issued the Bostock decision, the EEOC convened a Select Task Force on Harassment in the Workplace and issued a report detailing its recommendations. This Guidance applies Bostock to the harassment context, explaining that harassment based on gender identity or sexual orientation constitutes unlawful sexual harassment under Title VII.

What Does This Mean for Your District? School districts should reevaluate their harassment policies considering the new Guidance. The Guidance itself encourages employers to have clear harassment policies and implement a safe and effective system for employees to report harassment. In addition, all employees should receive updated training on the new Guidance.

FLSA Final Rule Changes Salary Threshold

FLSA Final Rule Changes Salary Threshold

by | May 23, 2024 | Labor and Employment, School Finance

In April 2024, The Department of Labor (DOL) announced a Final Rule increasing the threshold level salary minimum for the “salary test”.  (See the DOL document entitled Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, Professional, Outside Sales, and Computer Employees).

Generally, under the FLSA, employees are exempt from minimum wage and overtime protections if they are employed in an executive, administrative, or professional capacity (EAP) and meet three tests set out by the department which include payment of a specified weekly salary level and performing executive, administrative, or professional duties.

The new rule takes effect on July 1, 2024. On that date, the new salary amount threshold for a nonteaching, salaried supervisor or administrator increases to $844 week/$43,888 annual salary (up from $684 week/$35,568/annual salary.)

Then, in January 2025, the method used to calculate the salary will change again- and the amounts will increase a second time to $1,128week/ $58,656 annual salary.  After that, the salary threshold will be raised every three years after July 1, 2027. 

Whether an employee can be exempted from the payment of overtime by meeting the EAP exception depends upon meeting the “salary and duties tests” set out by the Department of Labor in the law. 

To be eligible for the exemption, the employee 1.) must earn a fixed salary, 2.) that salary is at least equal to the amount in the Final Rule, and 3.) that the employee performs functions that meet the executive, administrative, or professional duties as defined by the DOL. 

The salary amount will increase twice- on July 1, 2024, and then again in January 2025.  Due to that increase, some nonteaching administrative employees’ salaries may likely be lower than the new salary threshold amount. 

The “duties” part of the test must then be applied to the employee’s job duties to determine whether a nonteaching administrator/supervisor is exempt from overtime requirements.

Administrative employees will meet the duties test if they primarily perform office or non-manual work directly related to the operations of the school district.  Their duties must involve the exercise of discretion and independent judgment on matters of significance.

Executive employees are also eligible for the exemption. To meet the “duties test” for these employees means that their primary duty must be managing a particular department or division of school operations.  They must regularly direct the work of at least two full-time (or their equivalent) employees and must have the authority to hire and fire, or have their recommendations for promotion, termination, hiring, or other actions given particular weight.

Teachers are specifically exempt from the FLSA overtime rules as professionals, so this rule change will not affect certificated administrators. 

For highly compensated employees subject to the FLSA, the salary threshold is going up to $132,964 on July 1, 2024, and then up to $151.164.  It is likely some employees formerly covered by this exception may no longer meet the salary threshold.   Even if those employees still meet the requirements for exemption under the highly compensated employee test, the salary threshold to be eligible for the exemption must be met.  If this is no longer the case due to the increases planned to the salary threshold, it is well possible these employees could qualify using the EAP exception. 

Actions to take now:

Survey the salaries of nonteaching administrative employees to determine if any might fall below the new salary thresholds.  Employees that may be affected by this change include supervisors and directors such as technology directors, transportation and cafeteria supervisors, facilities managers, and other similar positions.

If the new salary threshold exceeds a nonteaching administrative employee’s current annual salary, school districts may need to adjust upwards or recognize these employees are eligible for overtime pay.  This means the employees would need to keep track of their time.  Consult with Ennis Britton to review specific situations. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Ohio Court Emphasizes Need for Flexibility in Administrator Contracts

Court Clarifies When SERB has Exclusive Jurisdiction

by | Apr 24, 2024 | Board Policy & Representation, Labor and Employment

Tipp City Edn. Assn. v. Tipp City Exempted Village School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 2023-Ohio-4000

 After a district issued an unpaid suspension to a teacher following several parental complaints, the Tipp City Education Association (TCEA) filed a grievance alleging that the district violated the collective bargaining agreement. The TCEA alleged that the district violated the agreement when it failed to encourage the parents to first discuss their complaints with the teacher, disciplining the teacher without good and just cause, and then failing to discipline in a progressive manner. The district and the TCEA proceeded through the grievance process, however they were unable to resolve the issue. Unlike the typical collective bargaining agreement that concludes the grievance process with binding arbitration, the agreement in this case provided that a grievant “may seek resolution through legal options.” As a result, the TCEA filed their complaint in the trial court. The school district argued that the complaint was improper because the court lacked jurisdiction, and that these claims fall exclusively under SERB’s jurisdiction.

 The 2nd Appellate District noted that there are two general areas in which SERB has exclusive jurisdiction to resolve unfair labor practice charges: 1. Where the parties file charges with SERB alleging an unfair labor practice; and 2. Where a complaint brought before the common pleas court alleges conduct that constitutes an unfair labor practice. Otherwise, under the Ohio Revised Code Section 4117.09(b)(1) a party may bring a suit for violation of a CBA in the court of common pleas. The 2nd District specifically noted that “nowhere in the Revised Code does the general assembly assign SERB exclusive jurisdiction over all issues touching on that chapter’s provisions.” Moreover, the Supreme Court of Ohio has expressly acknowledged that a plaintiff may bring a claim in common pleas court when that claim exists independently of the revised code, even if the claim may touch on the collective bargaining relationship.

 The court concluded by stating that in determining whether SERB has exclusive jurisdiction over a claim, the test is whether the claim is arising from or depends on the collective bargaining rights created by RC 4117, rather than the collective bargaining agreement.

 What does this mean for your district? If a party advances claims to a common pleas court and that claim arises from or depends on CBA rights created by the Revised Code, SERB has exclusive, original jurisdiction. However, if the party advances claims that are independent of the Revised Code and your collective bargaining agreement does not mandate binding arbitration, the case may proceed in common pleas court.

Ohio Court Emphasizes Need for Flexibility in Administrator Contracts

Ohio Supreme Court Upholds Appellate Decision Overturning Industrial Commission

by | Feb 19, 2024 | Labor and Employment, Workers’ Compensation

State ex rel. Quest Diagnostics, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-2213

In this appeal, the employer won at the Staff Level Hearing Officer level and was overturned by the Workers’ Compensation Review Commission, a rare occurrence. The employer appealed to Court and was successful before both the 10th District Court of Appeals and The Ohio Supreme Court.

Stone, a phlebotomist (draws samples of blood), began her employment with the employer in 1991. In 2018, Stone notified her supervisor that she would be moving to California with her husband, who was taking a new position there. Stone expressed her desire to transfer her employment within the company and, according to her affidavit, was told that she would be permitted to transfer.

Stone submitted multiple transfer requests with the employer in California, which were signed and dated by her supervisor.

Three days later, Stone was injured at work when she fell from a stepladder. Her workers’ compensation claim was allowed for various shoulder injuries. She was released to work with temporary restrictions. For the next few days, Stone’s responsibilities consisted of greeting patients as they entered the office.

Stone informed her supervisor that she was moving to California. Stone had not received any response to her transfer requests. Stone and her supervisor called the employer’s recruiting office, which informed them that Stone could not transfer her employment because she was not certified as a phlebotomist in California.

This new information did not change Stone’s plans to relocate, and Stone’s supervisor asked for a resignation letter. Stone sent her supervisor an email saying, “I am putting in my resignation with Quest Diagnostics due to moving to California this Saturday,” and she moved shortly thereafter. In an affidavit, Stone refers to the resignation letter as a “transfer document” because she intended to become certified and continue to work for the employer.

Stone became certified as a phlebotomy technician in California the following spring. She was not reemployed by the employer. That summer, she applied for temporary total disability (TTD) benefits. She was denied at the District and Staff hearing officer levels. The hearing officers found that she had abandoned the job by resigning with no indication that there was further work for her when she did so.

Stone appealed to the Review Commission for reconsideration. It determined that in denying compensation, the SHO had misapplied the law of voluntary abandonment. The Commission concluded that Stone was entitled to TTD compensation because she did not intend to abandon the workforce and did not voluntarily remove herself from her former position of employment.

The Supreme Court noted that the “question is whether [the] circumstances demonstrate a voluntary abandonment of the workforce—permanent or temporary—such that the injured worker’s wage loss is not the result of the work injury. In other words, do the circumstances indicate that the injured worker would be working—somewhere—but for the injury?” Hence, an injury-induced departure from the workforce (involuntary abandonment) and a departure based on the claimant’s intentional conduct (voluntary abandonment) are mutually exclusive. The former is compensable; the latter is not.

Had Stone not been injured, she would have experienced the same wage loss upon relocating to California without the proper certification. Had Stone remained employed by Quest in Ohio, she would not have experienced any wage loss. Accordingly, Stone’s industrial injury was not the “but for” cause of her lost earnings. Albeit understandable, Stone’s reasons for abandoning the workforce and experiencing lost wages lack the necessary causal relationship to her industrial injury.

What this means for your District
We must always carefully analyze the circumstances of an employee’s departure in the context of a workers’ compensation claim to determine the true cause of the employee’s lost wages. If the loss is due to something other than the injury itself, we may have a defense against liability for TTD payments. Eligibility for TTD compensation has always depended on whether the separation from employment was injury-induced.

FLSA Final Rule Changes Salary Threshold

Appeals Court Upholds Denial Of Benefits for Employee who Resigned Without Just Cause.

by | Feb 19, 2024 | General, Labor and Employment

Gbortoe v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2023-Ohio-4844

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals (Franklin County) upheld a denial of benefits to an employee who quit work after receiving only a written disciplinary letter.

According to the employee, he resigned his position after “an incident regarding another individual’s gender preferences.” In his telling, he had a phone conversation in which he welcomed a newly promoted member of the team. The employee testified there was no discussion of gender preferences during that call, and it was not until the following week that a different coworker informed the employee about the newly promoted employee’s gender pronouns. The employee responded to this coworker’s comment, expressing he was “not interested” in that topic and he “[does not] believe in that.” That comment led to corrective action meetings with company leadership. In one of the meetings, the employer informed the employee he would receive a disciplinary warning for his conduct.

The manager testified that the employer received a complaint about the employee after he audibly opined the newly promoted employee was not capable of succeeding in their new role. The employer accused the employee of violating the code of conduct by vocalizing his opinion loudly enough to be audible around the office. The manager explained that the employee was issued a written warning, but his job was not in jeopardy at the time of his resignation. In part, the written warning admonished the employee as follows: “You must demonstrate consistently appropriate behavior in the workplace going forward in accordance with [employer’s] Code of Conduct. Failure to do so may result in further corrective action, up to and including termination of employment.”

The employee lost at all levels before the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission and then filed an appeal to the Court of Common Pleas. To no one’s surprise, except perhaps the employee, the Court upheld the Commission’s denial. The employee appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that the employee failed to prove he was entitled to unemployment benefits. “Although he contends his employer created a hostile work environment and threatened to fire him, the record shows employer merely issued [employee] a written warning admonishing him for his behavior. Although the warning noted the employer could impose future sanctions up to and including firing for continued inappropriate workplace behavior, it did not threaten [employee’s] employment status.

What this means for your District
From time to time to time, employees quit and then claim they were threatened with termination or were “constructively discharged,” essentially leaving them with no choice but to resign.

An employee who resigns from employment with good case to do so can obtain unemployment benefits. Such good cause might be the existence of work conditions that are a danger to health and safety when the employer refuses to fix the conditions after being notified (constructive discharge), or the employee was given the option to resign or be fired, and resigned under circumstances where the employer had no cause to terminate employment, If an employee resigns in lieu of being terminated, the Unemployment Commission will analyze whether the employer had just cause to terminate in the first place.

Where here, the employer is not threatening to terminate the employee unless he resigns, and did not refuse to mitigate unsafe working conditions, the employer will be able to defend against the claim for benefits. Make sure you are always documenting the circumstances of an employee’s separation so that you will have evidence to establish what the truth is.