State ex rel. Zimmerman v. Avon Lake, 2026-Ohio-1090 (March 31, 2026)

On March 31, 2026, the Supreme Court of Ohio reaffirmed that committees and subcommittees of a public body are also public bodies under Ohio’s Open Meetings Act, and the City of Avon Lake was required to turn over the meeting minutes of an advisory committee that collected information related to the city’s redevelopment projects. The Court’s full opinion is available at the link provided above.

The city created the Avon Lake Community Improvement Corporation (“Avon Lake CIC”) to oversee economic-development activities within its jurisdiction. Avon Lake CIC then created the Brownfield funding Committee (“Brownfield committee”) to collect and evaluate information related to the CIC’s redevelopment projects.

A public records request was submitted to the city on October 29, 2024 requesting the Brownfield committee’s meeting minutes. The city’s law director denied the original records request, claiming that there were no meeting minutes for the Brownfield committee. The city went on to argue that the Brownfield committee was not a “public body” under Ohio’s Open Meetings Act because it was merely an “advisory group without delegated authority to act” on behalf of the Avon Lake CIC and it lacked decision-making authority.

The Court concluded that the lack of delegated authority by a public body is only one factor considered when evaluating whether a particular entity was a committee of a public body. The Brownfield committee was directly created by Avon Lake CIC, which itself is a public body under O.R.C. 121.22. The Court also noted that O.R.C. 121.22(B)(1)(b) does not require that a committee be a formal decision-making body, and several appellate courts had previously held that advisory committees may be a public body under Ohio’s Open Meetings Act. Citing to State ex rel. Mohr v. Colerain Twp., 2022-Ohio-1109 (1^st Dist.); Kanter v. Cleveland Hts., 2021-Ohio-4318 (8^th Dist.); Thomas v. White, 85 Ohio App. 3d 410 (9^th Dist. 1992).

After concluding that the Brownfield committee was a public body subject to Ohio’s Open Meetings Act, the Court ordered the city to prepare and produce the minutes for previously held committee meetings attended by a majority of its members at which public business was discussed.

What does this mean for your district? Any committees or subcommittees of the Board, even if they lack decision-making authority, are still considered “public bodies” under Ohio’s Open Meetings Act. As such, districts must ensure that these smaller committees continue to comply with the requirements of the Open Meetings Act.

Remember that a “public body” is any board or similar decision-making body of any school district, AND any committee or subcommittee of said board. Committee meetings must be open to the public at all times, and the minutes of a regular or special meeting of the committee must be promptly prepared and available for public inspection. These requirements apply to any prearranged discussion of public business by a majority of the committee or subcommittee’s members.

Opinion No. 2026-02.

The Ohio Attorney General issued its second formal opinion of the year on April 1, 2026, holding that an individual generally cannot serve simultaneously as a member of a school district board of education and a juvenile court probation officer. A link to the full opinion has been provided above.

This opinion came at the request of a County Prosecutor in response to a probation officer expressing a desire to serve on the board of education of a local school district that was within the county that they served. Accordingly, the Attorney General determined that there were sufficient conflicts of interest between the two positions that render them incompatible. A seven-part test is used when determining whether two public offices are compatible with one another, and all seven factors must point to compatibility in order for an individual to serve in both roles simultaneously.

One of these factors is whether there is “an impermissible conflict of interest between the two positions.” A conflict of interest exists “when an individual’s responsibilities in one position are such as to influence the performance of their duties in the other position” which subject them to “influences which may prevent their decisions from being completely objective.” 1989 Ohio Atty. Gen. Ops. No. 89-052.

Juvenile probation officers often have regular communication with school officials. These officers can conduct home and school visits to check on probationers, administer drug tests, and advise and testify in juvenile court when necessary. Chief probation officers are also responsible for procuring grant money from the Ohio Department of Youth Services, which can then be distributed to schools in the county to provide school resources officers and fund counseling service. O.R.C. 5139.34.

A person holding both positions would be subject to overlapping influences, making it difficult for them to exercise independent judgment. The Attorney General highlighted several potential conflicts, including:

• Access to confidential records: as a probation officer, the individual would have access to a wide variety of records from law-enforcement and children’s services. A school board may seek to obtain those records in order to take disciplinary action against a student. School officials have a duty to protect student information under FERPA, but they must comply with records requests from juvenile probation departments. A person serving in both positions would have access to confidential information from each position that normally would not be available to the other.
• Competition among schools for grant funds: Chief probation officers are responsible for writing and submitting grant applications to acquire funding for school districts. The Attorney General argues that a person serving both positions may be tempted to influence grant awards to the greater benefit of their own school district.
• Questions surrounding the individual’s investigative duties and authorities: Juvenile probation officers possess the powers of regular police officers, including the authority to make arrests. O.R.C. 2301.27(A). The capacity in which the probation officer is acting (i.e. as a board member or as an officer) could confuse parents, teachers, or other school board members. And if the officer’s conduct is challenged in court, issues of liability and qualified immunity could result in the district and the probation department on opposite sides of potential litigation.

If conflicts of interest can be appropriately mitigated, an individual may be permitted to serve in both positions simultaneously. Here the potential conflicts relate to the primary responsibilities of both positions. While it is possible for the school board member to recuse themselves from potential conflicts, the Attorney General cautioned that “constant abstentions” would “prevent a board member form competently fulfilling their duties in that position.” Absent a juvenile court judge’s discretion to reassign, alter, or shift the responsibilities of the probation officer at issue, the two positions are incompatible, and an individual should not be serving in both roles at the same time.

What does this mean for your district? A juvenile court probation officer should not be permitted to simultaneously serve as a public-school board member in the county in which they work, because the two positions are generally incompatible with one another.

Although it is unlikely that the exact scenario addressed in this opinion will occur in your district, the opinion is nonetheless important for all public-school districts in Ohio. School board members are public officials, and there are some restrictions against public officials holding multiple positions. If you have an individual that is interested in running for school board, but they hold another public office or position, consider following factors:

1. Is either position considered classified employment?
2. Whether the empowering statutes of either position limit employment in another public position?
3. Whether one position would be subordinate to the other in any way?
4. Whether it is physically possible for one person to discharge the duties of both positions?
5. Are there any impermissible conflicts of interest between the two positions?
6. Are there any local charter provisions, resolutions, or ordinance that are controlling?
7. Whether a federal, state, or local departmental regulation is applicable?

The attorney general has argued that all seven of these factors must be resolved in favor of compatibility in order for an individual to hold two offices simultaneously. The fact that someone already holds another public position doesn’t automatically disqualify them, but it should trigger some alarm bells. Work with the individual to determine what serving in both roles would look like in practice and whether any potential issues could arise that would justify keeping the two positions separate.

Schaffer v. Ohio State Univ., 2025-Ohio-5647

The Tenth District Court of Appeals of Ohio ruled against the Ohio State University (OSU), demanding that emails from OSU President Walter Carter be released following a public records request. This decision affirmed a ruling from the Court of Claims after it was determined that the specific request for the President’s emails was not overbroad. A link to the full decision has been provided above.

The original public records request was issued in November 2024, demanding all emails to and from the OSU President’s email address and all text messages to and from his phone over an eleven-day period. OSU denied the request, arguing it was “improperly overbroad, voluminous, and did not ask for records with sufficient specificity.” The special master appointed to review the complaint recommended denying the request for the President’s text messages. He argued the request could have applied to multiple cell phone numbers and would include many private, personal communications that would not qualify as public records. But he concluded the request for the President’s emails was adequate. By referencing (1) a specific official, (2) a specific email account, and (3) a discrete period of eleven days, the request was “reasonably limited” in scope and “identified the records with reasonable clarity.”

The Ohio Supreme Court has previously held that the Public Records Act “does not contemplate that any individual has the right to a complete duplication of voluminous files kept by government agencies.” State ex rel. The Warren Newspapers v. Hutson, 1994-Ohio-5. And the court in this case found that requests for whole categories of records “without any limitation as to content or time period” can be denied. Citing to State ex rel. Zidonis v. Columbus State Community College, 2012-Ohio-4228. Under Ohio law, a public office may deny an ambiguous or overly broad request, or one that does not allow the public office to reasonably identify what public records are being requested. O.R.C. 149.43(B)(2). However, even if an overbroad request is correctly denied the public office must still provide an opportunity for the requester to revise the request “by informing the requester of the manner in which records are maintained by the public office and accessed in the ordinary course of the public office’s duties.” O.R.C. 149.43(B)(2). If a public office fails to provide this information to the requester, they lose the right to object to the request for being overbroad. State ex rel. Summers v. Fox, 2020-Ohio-5585.

In this case OSU insisted the request was improper for failing to identify the other communicating parties and not narrowing the request by subject matter. However, OSU did not indicate that the President’s emails were maintained by subject matter or identity of sender/recipient, and they conceded that they were able to identify all the records responsive to the request. OSU incorrectly believed that such information was “generally required” for every records request, and the university’s failure to provide context or specific facts behind their decision made their denial improper. The Court also denied OSU’s claim that the request sought the “duplication of an entire category” of records because the request for email correspondence from a single individual did not represent a “complete duplication” of OSU’s files.

OSU also asked the court to consider the reasonableness of the request considering the circumstances. Schaffer, the requester, had made over 1,000 public records requests to OSU in 2024 and was on track to do so again in 2025. A previous case in the Court of Claims ended with a recommendation for dismissal to keep Schaffer “from becoming a party to abuse of the public records laws.” Schaffer v. Sheets, 2025-Ohio-1007. While the court appeared sympathetic to OSU’s argument, the university failed to raise this issue at the Court of Claims, so it could not be considered on appeal.

What does this mean for your district? Public records requests are context-specific. The absence of the author, date, or search terms alone is not enough to declare the request overbroad as a matter of law. What matters is the public official’s ability to identify and locate the requested records. Even a broad request (all emails) can be reasonable if some other modifier is included (specific individual, short time frame, etc.). In some cases, it may be appropriate to ask for clarification in response to a large records request, but districts must be prepared to provide an adequate explanation for that decision. Denying a request because they failed to specify a subject, for example, would not be appropriate if your office does not organize its records by subject. Nor would it be appropriate to deny a seemingly broad request when the district is already aware of the specific records being requested.  

D.A. v. Tri County Area Schools, 1:23-cv-00423 (6th Cir. October 14, 2025).

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recently ruled against two middle school students who challenged their district’s dress code, upholding the school’s authority to regulate clothing that contains vulgar innuendo—even when the message also has a political dimension.

The students, D.A. and X.A., received “Let’s Go Brandon” sweatshirts as Christmas gifts from their mother. When D.A. wore his sweatshirt to school, the assistant principal directed him to remove it because the phrase’s meaning was considered profane. Despite the warning, both students wore the sweatshirts again and were once more instructed to remove them due to the slogan’s “profane double meaning.”

The district’s dress code prohibited “attire with messages or illustrations that are lewd, indecent, vulgar, or profane.” School officials testified that the policy did not restrict political expression so long as the message complied with the dress code. In fact, both students acknowledged that classmates had worn “Make America Great Again” apparel, and the principal testified that students regularly wore clothing supporting candidates from both political parties without incident.

The plaintiffs argued that “Let’s Go Brandon” is not inherently profane but is instead a euphemism—a non-profane substitute for an offensive phrase. The Sixth Circuit rejected that argument, emphasizing that a euphemism carries the same communicative content as the phrase it replaces, even if the offensive word is obscured. Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Bethel School District v. Fraser, the court reiterated that schools may regulate speech conveying an obscene or vulgar message even when the specific words are not themselves obscene or vulgar. 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986). The court also relied on Boroff v. Van Wert City Board of Education, which affirms that districts have broad discretion to identify student expression as vulgar so long as their determination is reasonable. 220 F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 2000).

Here, the court found that the origin and commonly understood meaning of “Let’s Go Brandon”—a euphemism for “F*** Joe Biden”—was plainly vulgar. Accordingly, the administrators’ decision to classify the phrase as vulgar and to prohibit the sweatshirts was deemed reasonable.

The political nature of the message did not alter the analysis. The court explained that “in the schoolhouse, vulgarity trumps politics,” and that the First Amendment does not allow students to circumvent school rules by embedding vulgarity within political expression. While adults may use such language in public discourse, schools are not required to permit the same level of expression among children. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682. As a result, the district could categorically prohibit the slogan as a vulgar expression despite its political context.

What Does This Mean for Your District? This decision reaffirms that Ohio school districts have broad discretion to restrict student expression that they reasonably deem to be vulgar or profane, even when the message also carries political content. While students retain First Amendment rights at school, those rights are not unlimited, and districts are not required to tolerate “lewd, indecent, or offensive speech and conduct” simply because students wish to express it.

On August 4, 2025 the Ohio Ethics Commission (OEC) issued an opinion stating that public officials or employees could use frequent flyer miles and other rewards earned during official business for their own personal use. The entire opinion may be found here: Adv. Op. No. 2025-02.  

In prior opinions, the personal use of frequent flyer miles while permitting public officials to use credit card points and hotel rewards was restricted. The revised interpretation will bring Ohio in line with similar federal guidance. All rewards programs will now be treated the same by the OEC. The Commission expressed its hope that the new interpretation will clear up confusion for public agencies and reduce administrative burdens associated with enforcing the rule.

Under the revised standard, Ohio public officials or employees may use frequent flyer miles, credit card rewards, hotel points, or other rewards earned while on official business in their personal life, provided that:

1. The rewards are earned in the same way as members of the public would have earned them; and
2. The rewards do not impose additional costs on the public agency.

However, a public official or employee is still prohibited from choosing an airline, vendor, a conference, event, or service based on whether it provides frequent flyer miles or other rewards points.

Under Ohio’s conflict of interest laws, public officials are prohibited from soliciting, accepting, or using their authority or influence to secure any financial benefit for themselves. R.C. 102.03(D) and (E). While frequent flyer miles constitute a “thing of value” for Ohio ethics law purposes, the OEC does not believe the value is significant enough to impair the public official’s independent judgment. Because the frequent flyer miles are broadly available to all passengers, are uniformly accrued, and are not being offered to officials for performing their official duties, the OEC maintains that the programs do not create a “substantial and improper influence” upon the public official’s judgment.

Similarly, public officials may not have an interest in the profits or benefits of a public contract, and the public agency’s purchase of a flight would be a public contract. R.C. 2921.42(A)(4). Public officials would have an interest in the contract with the airline based on the frequent flyer miles they are receiving, but the OEC points out that the benefit is relatively small and that it would be more administratively efficient to allow officials to use these programs compared to the cost of preventive measures. To minimize the risk to the public, the OEC’s new position still prohibits public officials from selecting a specific airline based on the frequent flyer miles they would receive from the flight.

What does this mean for your district? School board members and district employees may now keep and personally use frequent flyer miles earned during official travel, and Ohio law no longer differentiates between airline miles and other rewards programs such as credit card or hotel points. However, public officials and employees are still limited in the selection process, as the Commission specifically notes that vendors may not be selected based on the rewards provided, and there must be no additional costs imposed on the district.

State ex rel. Platt v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Elections, Slip Opinion No. 2025-Ohio-2079.

The Ohio Supreme Court ruled in June that some emails were improperly withheld by the Montgomery County Board of Elections (“Board of Elections”) in response to a public records request. However, based on the specific facts at issue, the Court also ruled that an email sent by a Board of Elections member from his personal email account was not a public record. This appears to be a marked change from previous Ohio Supreme Court decisions on public records and will be a case to take with caution.

In December 2023, Mary McDonald filed a petition to be on the March 2024 primary election ballot as a Republican challenger for a seat on the Montgomery County Board of Commissioners. The Democratic candidate for the seat was the unopposed incumbent Debbie Lieberman. Mohamed Al-Hamdani, the chairman of the Montgomery County Democratic Party, along with Brenda Blausser from the City of Trotwood, challenged McDonald’s placement, alleging McDonald was not qualified to be on the ballot because she was an elected member of the Montgomery County Democratic Party Central Committee and had not resigned from that office.

Al-Hamdani was not only the party chair but also a partner of the law firm Flanagan, Lieberman & Rambo. Another partner in the firm, Dennis Lieberman, the husband of Debbie Lieberman, was McDonald’s would-be opponent in the general election.
The Board of Elections conducted a protest hearing where the lawyer representing the protestors referred to a “legal memorandum from the county prosecutor’s office,” and said he received the memo from Dennis Lieberman. At the hearing, it was stated that the memo was a legal opinion requested by the Board and was not to be disclosed because it was covered by “attorney-client privilege.”
After hearing the protest, the Board deadlocked 2-2 on whether to place McDonald on the ballot. Secretary of State Frank LaRose cast the tie-breaking vote to allow McDonald to be on the primary ballot, and she was selected as the Republican candidate. She went on to defeat Lieberman in the November 2024 general election.

The Board of Elections director called for a full investigation into the leak of the attorney-client privileged memorandum. The investigation found the memo was emailed to the four Board members. One of the Board members then forwarded the email to his personal email account, and it was then forwarded via the personal email account to Al-Hamdani, who sent it to Dennis Lieberman, who forwarded the memo to the attorney representing the protestors at the hearing.
At issue before the Court was a records request that came to the Board of Education for emails “to or from any member of the Montgomery County Board of Elections … wherein… the foregoing-referenced “legal memorandum from the county prosecutor’s office” … was sent or received.” The legal memorandum was not requested.

The focus of the requester and the Court was on three emails sent on January 10, 2024, that the Board’s investigative report refers to:

1. the email sent from the prosecutor’s office to the Board members, which transmitted the memo concerning the protest to McDonald’s candidacy;
2. the email one Board member sent from his Board email account forwarding the memo to his personal email account; and
3. the email the Board member sent from his personal email account forwarding the memo to Al-Hamdani.

In its decision, the Ohio Supreme Court found that the emails #1 and #2 above were public records, while the attachment (e.g. the legal memo) was not a public record. The Court acknowledged its previous decisions, finding that a communication does not have to contain purely legal advice to be protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege. If the communication “would facilitate the rendition of legal services or advice,” then the communication does not have to be released, the opinion stated. After reviewing the email, however, the Court found the only legal advice the prosecutor provided was in the attached memo, not the email itself. “The email did not reveal any client confidences or contain any substantive text relating to the legal advice from the prosecutor’s office to the board.”

However, the Court appears to have shifted from its prior decisions when it ruled that email #3 was not a public record. The Court acknowledged that “[e]mail messages are records for purposes of the Public Records Act if they were ‘created or received by or coming under the jurisdiction of [a] state agenc[y]’ and ‘serve to document the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of the office.’” The Court did not find any evidence that the email from the Board member’s personal email account was created by the Board or fell under its jurisdiction. It was not a public record, in the Court’s opinion, because it was not “’kept by any public office,’ R.C. 149.43(A)(1).”

The Court found the board violated the Public Records Act and awarded the requester the maximum $1,000 in damages, court costs, and the opportunity to seek attorney fees from the board.

What This Means for Your District:
This case could note a marked shift from the Ohio Supreme Court’s prior decisions impacting public records that are contained within personal email accounts and/or personal cell phones.

This is a case to apply with caution. There is no clear indication that this is a full change from the Court on public records, or if this was a fact-specific decision. Litigation challenges are expected to flesh out the full extension of this decision on records within personal emails and personal cell phones. Please feel free to contact your Ennis Britton attorney to discuss the implications your school district may have with its records, or any applicable records requests, considering this case.