Ohio Supreme Court Remands Eighth District Decision Denying Arbitration of Union’s Termination Grievance

Ohio Supreme Court Remands Eighth District Decision Denying Arbitration of Union’s Termination Grievance

by | Jun 18, 2025 | Board Policy & Representation, Labor and Employment

Ohio Council 8, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. Lakewood, Slip Opinion No. 2025-Ohio-2052. Decided June 12, 2025

A City of Lakewood employee was fired for misconduct while under a last chance agreement. The last chance agreement was entered into after the employee was terminated for “insubordinate, inappropriate, and intimidating acts in the workplace.” The Union filed a grievance challenging the termination in response.

The grievance was resolved by entering into the last chance agreement and returning the employee to work. As is typical, the agreement provided that any further misconduct would result in the employee’s termination, and the termination would not be subject to the grievance process.

The agreement did not last long. Exactly one year later, the City moved to terminate the employee again. The Union filed a grievance. Puzzled, the City responded that the grievance process was not available due to the last chance agreement. The Union claimed that the City had violated the CBA, and that was the basis of the grievance (the decision does not specify what the nature of the alleged violation was).

Based on the City’s refusal to process the grievance for arbitration, the Union filed suit seeking an order compelling the City to participate in the arbitration of the grievance. The Court obliged, and the City appealed. The City argued that the suit alleges violations of Chapter 4117, over which the State Employment Relations Board has exclusive jurisdiction, not the Court. The City alleged on appeal that the lower court made two errors:

  1. The lower court had erred by exercising jurisdiction over the case; and
  2. the lower court had erred by granting the Union’s application and motion to compel arbitration.

The Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga) decided in favor of the City, addressing only the City’s first allegation of error by the lower court. The court held that because the Union was bringing claims that “arise from or depend on collective bargaining rights created by R.C. Chapter 4117,” the lower court did not have jurisdiction to hear the Union’s case.  The court stated that while the Union was not explicitly seeking relief under Chapter 4117 of the Revised Code, it was substantively alleging that the City had interfered with the employee’s collective bargaining rights by refusing to arbitrate the grievance under the CBA.

The Union appealed and the Ohio Supreme Court decided to accept the case.  The Supreme Court looked to the nature of what the Union was trying to do, which was to compel the City to obey the collective bargaining agreement when it alleged that the City violated it by refusing to participate in arbitration. The Union was not alleging that the City had engaged in or was committing an unfair labor practice under Chapter 4117.

The Supreme Court then determined that, even though there is some overlap between the subject matters covered by 4117 regarding unfair labor practices, exclusive representation, and actions to enforce rights under a collective bargaining agreement, the law provides remedies for both situations. The Court expressly stated that its decision does not mean that a party may bring any claim for a violation of a collective bargaining agreement in a court of common pleas. If a CBA has an arbitration provision, the arbitration provision governs. If one party refuses to arbitrate, the Court concluded that R.C. 4117.09(B)(1) allows a party to bring a suit in the Common Pleas Court to attempt to compel the arbitration guaranteed by the CBA.

Although the lines of distinction can be a bit hazy, readers can take three things from this case:

  1. SERB has exclusive jurisdiction over unfair labor practice charges filed with SERB, as well as complaints filed with a court that allege conduct that would constitute an unfair labor practice. In other words, if you try to run to court with a ULP, the court should send you packing.
  2. If a CBA has an arbitration provision, the parties are bound to resolve disputes governing the terms and conditions of the CBA, solely by the arbitration procedure (subject to limited appeals to court). If, for example, a district is alleged to have improperly disciplined an employee or improperly denied a vacation or a personal leave day, the parties must resolve the dispute through the grievance process. The employee cannot simply run to court and sue the district over the denial of a personal day.
  3. Where a party refuses to perform under the CBA, such as by refusing to arbitrate when the CBA requires it, that party can be sued in court to be compelled to follow the CBA.

 

 

 

Special Eduction Update: No Shots, No Services: Noncompliance Defeats Parent’s Due Process Complaint

Special Eduction Update: No Shots, No Services: Noncompliance Defeats Parent’s Due Process Complaint

by | Jun 18, 2025 | Special Education

New Fairfield Bd. of Educ., 125 LRP 10684 (SEA CT 03/28/25).

A Connecticut school district did not have to defend its refusal to provide IDEA services in a non-school setting after a preschool student with disabilities was disenrolled based on state vaccination requirements.

The student enrolled at the district during the 2024-2025 school year. Over winter break the student was involuntarily withdrawn from the district based on their noncompliance with Connecticut’s vaccination requirements. The student’s IEP provided for speech therapy, occupational therapy, and physical therapy, but they did not receive IEP services after their withdrawal from school. The parent had requested the IEP be amended to allow for services to be provided outside of the school building during a February team meeting, but the district denied the request. A due process complaint was filed against the district following the denial, alleging that the student was being denied FAPE. 

Ruling for the district, the Hearing Officer determined that the parent’s complaint did not meet the legal requirements for a due process complaint under the IDEA. Parents are entitled to bring a due process complaint when there are disputes relating to a student’s identification, evaluation, education placement, or special education services. 34 CFR 300.507. Acknowledging that the complaint was filed after the district denied the parent’s request to amend the IEP, the Hearing Officer rejected the parent’s argument that this complaint was about the child’s educational placement. The student’s eligibility for services was not in dispute, and both parties agreed that the special education services provided in the student’s IEP were proper. Additionally, the district was able to show that the student received school-based services without incident while the student was enrolled, and the parent did not request a non-school placement until after the student had been withdrawn for noncompliance.

At its core, the Hearing Officer argued, the parent’s complaint was really a challenge of the state’s vaccination requirements. His request for a change of placement was not based on educational concerns – it was based on his own disagreement with state law. Connecticut’s public health law does not allow preschool students to attend or enroll in school if they are not in compliance with the vaccination requirements, and it is undisputed that the student is currently ineligible to attend. These requirements apply equally to all students, regardless of whether they are eligible for special education services, so this was not an IDEA issue. Rather, the only barrier preventing the student from receiving the services in their current IEP was the parent’s continued noncompliance with the State’s vaccination requirements.

What does this mean for your district?

Parents are free to file an IDEA due process complaint whenever they believe their child’s educational placement is not meeting their disability-related needs. But when those complaints are based on challenges or factors that are not related to special education, districts will generally be able to secure a quick dismissal.

 

 

Elimination of Property Tax Proposal Moves Forward

Elimination of Property Tax Proposal Moves Forward

by | Jun 18, 2025 | Board Policy & Representation, Labor and Employment, School Finance

On May 14, 2025, the Ohio Ballot Board voted to certify a proposed constitutional amendment from Citizens for Property Tax Reform to ban property taxes in the state of Ohio. Many individuals joined the group after receiving letters related to the state-mandated reappraisal in 2024. The state-mandated reappraisal happens every six years in Ohio. No state has yet abolished property tax, although a few have limited it significantly.

In order to make it onto the November 2025 ballot, at least 413,487 voters must give their signatures prior to July 2, 2025. These signatures must come from voters in at least 44 of Ohio’s 88 counties. Supporters of the proposed amendment say they are worried about seniors on fixed income who cannot afford the increase in property taxes. Critics say that abolishing the property tax will make it difficult to fund essential services.

 What would this mean for your school district?

The proposed amendment does not include any indication of how major public programs like public education would be funded without property taxes. Nor is there any legislative solution proposed at this time. Ohio Governor Mike DeWine told reporters that, in what he has seen so far, the effect would be devastating to our schools. Banning property taxes outright could put children, families, and communities at risk because the government would not be able to provide services. This includes not only public education, but libraries, police, firefighters, or other services that are funded with property taxes.

 

 

Unanimous Supreme Court Decision in A.J.T. v. Osseo Area Schools Lowers Standard for 504 Discrimination Damages Cases

Unanimous Supreme Court Decision in A.J.T. v. Osseo Area Schools Lowers Standard for 504 Discrimination Damages Cases

by | Jun 18, 2025 | Special Education

On June 12, 2025, the Supreme Court issued a decision in the case of A.J.T. v. Osseo Area Schools regarding the standard of proof for Section 504 discrimination lawsuits for damages filed against school districts.

In this case, the student is a teenage girl who suffers from serious disabilities caused by a rare form of epilepsy. She has many seizures, mostly in the morning hours. As an accommodation, her previous public school in Kentucky arranged her schedule to be in the afternoon only, including a teacher who gave her instruction at home in the early evening. However, her new school in Minnesota refused to accommodate her late-day schedule, meaning she was receiving only two-thirds of the instructional time in school compared to other students.

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the parents’ claims for damages as they failed to prove that the school district acted in “bad faith” or with “gross misjudgment,” which is the standard multiple circuit courts apply to these cases – including Ohio’s Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. However, the United States Supreme Court overruled this decision and determined that the lower courts were using a heightened standard that was not intended by Congress.

The Court did not provide a specific new standard, and different judges proposed (via concurring opinions) different potential standards. However, the decision did allude at multiple points to the standard that is typically followed for 504 and ADA disability discrimination in other contexts. In those cases, the standard for monetary damages is “deliberate indifference.”  Justices Thomas and Cavanaugh issued a concurring opinion that discussed applying a heightened, intent-based standard. Justices Sotomayor and Jackson issued an opposite concurring opinion that discussed applying a no-intent standard for both forms of relief.

The Court further refused to determine if its decision applies across the board, meaning to lawsuits seeking specific relief other than monetary damages, i.e. making the school provide certain accommodations. We will have to wait for future litigation to clarify these remaining open questions.

What does this mean for your school district?

It is possible that this case will bring more awareness to parents that lawsuits for monetary damages can be filed for failure to accommodate under 504 and that parents now have a lower standard to meet in these cases. While we do not know the exact standard any court will apply, if your district is facing one of these lawsuits or is concerned that such a lawsuit may arise, parents will have an easier case to prove than under the previous standard.

If you have any specific questions concerning the Court’s decision and its impact on your school district, please contact an Ennis Britton attorney.