by Pamela Leist | Sep 26, 2016 | General, Special Education, Student Education and Discipline
A school district’s authority to discipline a student for off-campus speech is an increasingly relevant concern today for public schools. Inappropriate or offensive speech can cause lasting injury to victims and can trigger significant community backlash and unrest. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently addressed this issue in a case that arose out of Oregon.
The case was filed after a school district suspended a seventh-grade student named C.R. for harassing two other students from school. C.R. and some of his friends had been involved in an escalating series of encounters with two sixth-grade students, a girl and a boy, both disabled, first calling them vulgar names and later increasing to sexual taunting. On the day of the incident at issue, the students were traveling home from school through a public park adjacent to school property, just a few hundred feet from the campus. About five minutes after school let out, C.R. and his friends circled around the two younger students, commenting and questioning them about sexual acts and pornography. A school employee rode by the students on her bicycle, noticed the group, and stopped to help the younger girl and boy. The girl reported that the encounter made her feel unsafe, and the employee walked the two students home.
After investigating the incident, school administrators concluded that C.R. was the “ringleader” of the group and that the conduct fell within the district’s definition of sexual harassment. All of the boys were disciplined. C.R. was suspended for two days, not only because of the harassment but also because he had lied to administrators during the investigation and had disregarded their request to not discuss the interview with his friends.
C.R.’s parents filed a lawsuit a year after the incident, alleging that his First Amendment and due process rights had been violated and that the school lacked authority to discipline him. The school district moved for summary judgment, which was granted by the district court. The parents appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit, which considered the following.
Was C.R.’s conduct sexual harassment? The school had a policy that defined sexual harassment, and the investigation had yielded evidence that C.R.’s behavior fit within that definition. The Ninth Circuit Court noted, “Federal courts owe significant deference to a school’s interpretation of its own rules and policies. … We uphold a school’s disciplinary determinations so long as the school’s interpretation of its rules and policies is reasonable, and there is evidence to support the charge.” Therefore, the court upheld the district’s conclusion that C.R.’s behavior was considered sexual harassment.
Could the school regulate his speech and discipline him? The court first considered whether the school could permissibly regulate the student’s off-campus speech at all, and then considered whether the school’s regulation of the student’s speech complied with the requirements of the First Amendment.
Regulation of students’ on-campus speech is well established as constitutional; however, regulation of off-campus speech is another matter. Following a previous Supreme Court decision (Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)), regulation of student speech is permissible if the speech “might reasonably lead school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities” or if the speech might collide “with the rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone.” Speech that is merely offensive is not sufficient; however, sexually harassing speech is more than that. Sexually harassing speech, the court held, implicates other students’ rights to be secure, threatening their sense of physical, emotional, and psychological security.
The age of the student who is being harassed is also relevant. The Supreme Court has noted that children younger than age 14 are less mature, and therefore overtly sexual speech could be more seriously damaging to them. For this reason, elementary schools may exercise greater control over student speech than secondary schools.
The court held that the school district did indeed have the authority to discipline C.R. for his harassing speech, even if it was off campus, for a number of reasons:
- All of the individuals involved were students
- The incident took place –
- On the students’ walk home
- A few hundred feet from school
- Immediately after school let out
- On a path that begins at the school
- The students were together on the path because of school
Succinctly stated, the court held that “a school may act to ensure students are able to leave the school safely without implicating the rights of students to speak freely in the broader community.”
Were C.R.’s due process rights violated? Again citing previous court decisions, the opinion noted that the Constitution allows informal procedures when a student suspension is 10 days or fewer. The school must provide the student notice of the charges but need not outline specific charges and their potential consequences or notify parents of the charges prior to the suspension. If the student denies the charges, the student then must have an opportunity to explain his side of the story. A school is not constitutionally required to inform the student of the specific rules or policies in question. For these reasons, the court held that the school did not violate C.R.’s procedural due process rights.
C.R. also claimed that his substantive due process rights were violated when the school recorded the reason for suspension as “harassment – sexual,” which allegedly deprived him of a good reputation. The court opined that C.R. did not have a genuine interest in maintaining a good reputation, as he had since stolen supplies from the school, and held that the school may record the reason for suspension, “however unsavory,” so long as it applied appropriate procedural safeguards. Therefore, the school also did not violate his substantive due process rights.
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit upheld the summary judgment that the district court had previously granted.
C.R. v. Eugene School District 4J, No. 13-35856 (9th Cir. 2016)
by Pamela Leist | Jan 21, 2016 | Board Policy & Representation, General
On January 26th, 2016, the Ohio Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in a case to determine whether a public school district may implement a more restrictive policy on release of student directory information by requiring that parents “opt in” before the information can be released.
The case was brought by School Choice Ohio, Inc. (“SCO”) against the Springfield City School DistrictBoard of Education(“Springfield”). SCO is a registered non-profit corporation formed in the state of Delaware. The corporation informs students and parents across the state about scholarships the state provides, especially to students of low performing or at risk schools. SCO relies on school directory information that public schools provide through a records request to generate its mailing lists.
In January of 2013, SCO submitted a request for student directory information to Springfield. The District denied the request, citing a new policy it had recently passed which purportedly stopped the District’s collection of directory information, and further required parents to sign a consent to “opt in” to release of the data for lawful records requests. SCO countered that under state public records law, codified in ORC §149.43, the District does not have the authority to refuse an otherwise lawful request for directory information that the District maintains. Through its case, SCO seeks an order from the Ohio Supreme Court that would prevent Springfield from denying SCO’s requests for directory information on that ground.
State and federal law, specifically Ohio Revised Code §3319.321 and the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (20 USC §1232g/20 CFR Part 99), permit public schools to release limited student information defined as directory information in certain circumstances. In general, federal law defines directory information to include a student’s name, address, telephone number, date and place of birth, honors and awards, and dates of attendance. Ohio’s definition of directory information is more expansive. However, schools are required to provide an annual notice to parents that allow them the opportunity to opt out of directory information releases. Schools also are prohibited from releasing directory information to anyone who may use the information for a profit making plan or venture.
The Supreme Court’s decision in this case could have far-reaching policy implications for districts, and may open the door for additional challenges to the release of directory information in the future. A decision from the Court is not expected before early summer 2016. We will keep you posted on the status of the case. In the meantime, seek legal counsel if you have questions about application of your directory information policies and procedures.
by Pamela Leist | Jan 14, 2016 | Board Policy & Representation, Construction & Real Estate, School Finance, School Management
On December 30th, 2015, the Ohio Supreme Court unanimously declared that real property owned by a public school district board of education is tax exempt regardless of whether it is currently used for school purposes. Ennis Britton Shareholder Gary Stedronsky represented the Talawanda City School District Board of Education at all levels of appeal, including before the Supreme Court.
The case involved a provision in Ohio law that generally exempts real property owned by a public school district from property taxes, which is codified in Ohio Revised Code section 3313.44. In this case, the Talawanda City School District Board of Education (the “Board”) purchased 154 acres of land to build a new high school. A portion of this land was not needed for the high school and was leased by the Board to a farmer.
In January of 2010, the Board filed an application to exempt all 154 acres from real property taxes. The Tax Commissioner approved the exemption application for all but the portion of the land that was leased to the farmer. The Tax Commissioner concluded that the pecuniary benefit realized by the farmer disqualified the land from tax exemption because the property was not being used for school purposes.
The Board appealed the Tax Commissioner’s decision to the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”), which affirmed the Tax Commissioner’s decision. The Board further appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court was tasked with deciding whether the BTA decision was supported by the language in Ohio Revised Code section 3313.44. The applicable version of section 3313.44 simply states: “Real or personal property owned by or leased to any board of education for a lease term of at least fifty years shall be exempt from taxation.” The Board argued that this statute requires that a board of education merely own real property in order for it to qualify for tax exemption. In other words, there is no requirement in the statute that the property must be used for school purposes in order for the tax exemption to apply.
The Ohio Supreme Court agreed with the Board’s argument and concluded that the property that was leased to the farmer was exempt from taxation regardless of the specific use of the property. The Supreme Court acknowledged that past interpretations by the Tax Commissioner may have correctly interpreted an implied use restriction in the prior version of the statute. However, the Court recognized that the General Assembly chose not to include such a restriction when the statute was amended in 2010 even though it had authority to do so. Therefore, the Court held that the statute does not include an implied use restriction and the Board’s property is entitled to tax exemption even though it was leased to a farmer.
The Court also dismissed the Tax Commissioner’s argument that the Board’s request for tax exemption must be denied on grounds that the Board overstepped its legislative authority by leasing the land to a farmer for a commercial purpose. The Court held that a Board of Education’s property is entitled to tax exemption as long as it meets the conditions of the exemption statute in Ohio Revised Code section 3313.44, which merely requires ownership.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court decision clarifies that a board of education is entitled to a property tax exemption for all real property owned by the board of education regardless of how the property is currently being used. This decision is very favorable to school districts and will be used in the future to support applications for tax exemptions.
Talawanda City School District Board of Edu. v. Testa, Tax Commissioner (Ohio 2015), Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-5450.
by Pamela Leist | Nov 20, 2015 | General
The U.S. Department of Education Office of Civil Rights found that an Illinois district discriminated against a transgender student by failing to offer her the same facility access as other female students.
Each of the district’s five high schools have policies in place that allow transgender students to both use the restroom of their identified genderand to play on a sports team of their identified gender. However, an issue arose when it came to the locker rooms. Citing privacy, the district restricted transgender students’ use of the locker room of their gender identity.
The case began when the ACLU filed a complaint on a transgender student’s behalf in 2013. The student is a transgender female student who participates on a girls’ sports team, is referred to as “she” by school staff, is referred to by a female name, and is undergoinghormone therapy. She was denied unrestricted access to the girls’ locker room because of her transgender status.
The U.S. Department of Education Office for Civil Rights spent almost two years investigating the alleged violation under Title IX. It seemed that negotiations of the complaint would soon be ending when the school district decided to hang privacy curtains in the locker rooms. However, the district required only the transgender student to use the curtains. No other students were required to do so. Although thestudent indicated that she would probably use the curtain in the girls’ locker room, the ACLU argued that she should have to right to make that decision voluntarily and not be forced by school requirements.
OCR found that the school district’s action was a violation of the student’s rights under Title IX, which prohibits sex discriminationin education programs and activities that receive federal funding, because the district only compelled the transgender student to use the curtain. Federal officials deemed the solution insufficient.The district has 30 days to settle the matter or face an enforcement action which could involve administrative proceedings or a lawsuit by the U.S. Department of Justice. The district could also lose its Title IX funding.
by Pamela Leist | Nov 13, 2015 | General, Legislation
House Bill 64 directed the State Board of Education to develop standards for the evaluation of school guidance counselors. Just last week, the Ohio Standards for School Counselors were approved by the State Board. The standards-based framework for counselor evaluations must still be developed by the State Board of Education by May 31, 2016.By September 30, 2016, each school district board of education must adopt a school counselor evaluation policy in accordance with the framework and state law. The policy must reflect the implementation of the framework beginning with the 2016-2017 school year, and procedures for using the evaluation results beginning with the 2017-2018 school year.This will be an important subject for collective bargaining with teachers unions for the ensuing contract year.
Section 3319.61 of the Ohio Revised Code sets forth the requirements for the standards.The standards as approved by the State Board of Education and released last week outline the roles and responsibilities of school counselors, in general, and there are a total of six (6) standards upon which guidance counselors are to be evaluated. Those standardsare: comprehensive school counseling program plan; direct services for academic, career and social/emotional development; indirect services including partnerships and referrals; evaluation and data; leadership and advocacy; and professional responsibility, knowledge and growth.
Each standard as adopted contains the overarching goal and theme that provides a framework for effective practices, a narrative summary, and elements that define the various skills and characteristics that demonstrate effectiveness within the standard. Each element has an indicator which is an observable or measurable statement that provides evidence of the standard and the elements in action.
Click here for Ohio Standards for School Counselors
