Innuendos Aren’t Innocent: Sixth Circuit Upholds Dress Ban on Vulgar Messages

Innuendos Aren’t Innocent: Sixth Circuit Upholds Dress Ban on Vulgar Messages

D.A. v. Tri County Area Schools, 1:23-cv-00423 (6th Cir. October 14, 2025).

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recently ruled against two middle school students who challenged their district’s dress code, upholding the school’s authority to regulate clothing that contains vulgar innuendo—even when the message also has a political dimension.

The students, D.A. and X.A., received “Let’s Go Brandon” sweatshirts as Christmas gifts from their mother. When D.A. wore his sweatshirt to school, the assistant principal directed him to remove it because the phrase’s meaning was considered profane. Despite the warning, both students wore the sweatshirts again and were once more instructed to remove them due to the slogan’s “profane double meaning.”

The district’s dress code prohibited “attire with messages or illustrations that are lewd, indecent, vulgar, or profane.” School officials testified that the policy did not restrict political expression so long as the message complied with the dress code. In fact, both students acknowledged that classmates had worn “Make America Great Again” apparel, and the principal testified that students regularly wore clothing supporting candidates from both political parties without incident.

The plaintiffs argued that “Let’s Go Brandon” is not inherently profane but is instead a euphemism—a non-profane substitute for an offensive phrase. The Sixth Circuit rejected that argument, emphasizing that a euphemism carries the same communicative content as the phrase it replaces, even if the offensive word is obscured. Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Bethel School District v. Fraser, the court reiterated that schools may regulate speech conveying an obscene or vulgar message even when the specific words are not themselves obscene or vulgar. 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986). The court also relied on Boroff v. Van Wert City Board of Education, which affirms that districts have broad discretion to identify student expression as vulgar so long as their determination is reasonable. 220 F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 2000).

Here, the court found that the origin and commonly understood meaning of “Let’s Go Brandon”—a euphemism for “F*** Joe Biden”—was plainly vulgar. Accordingly, the administrators’ decision to classify the phrase as vulgar and to prohibit the sweatshirts was deemed reasonable.

The political nature of the message did not alter the analysis. The court explained that “in the schoolhouse, vulgarity trumps politics,” and that the First Amendment does not allow students to circumvent school rules by embedding vulgarity within political expression. While adults may use such language in public discourse, schools are not required to permit the same level of expression among children. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682. As a result, the district could categorically prohibit the slogan as a vulgar expression despite its political context.

What Does This Mean for Your District? This decision reaffirms that Ohio school districts have broad discretion to restrict student expression that they reasonably deem to be vulgar or profane, even when the message also carries political content. While students retain First Amendment rights at school, those rights are not unlimited, and districts are not required to tolerate “lewd, indecent, or offensive speech and conduct” simply because students wish to express it.

 

 

 

Frequent Flyer Miles Fair Game for Public Officials in Ohio

Frequent Flyer Miles Fair Game for Public Officials in Ohio

On August 4, 2025 the Ohio Ethics Commission (OEC) issued an opinion stating that public officials or employees could use frequent flyer miles and other rewards earned during official business for their own personal use. The entire opinion may be found here: Adv. Op. No. 2025-02.  

In prior opinions, the personal use of frequent flyer miles while permitting public officials to use credit card points and hotel rewards was restricted. The revised interpretation will bring Ohio in line with similar federal guidance. All rewards programs will now be treated the same by the OEC. The Commission expressed its hope that the new interpretation will clear up confusion for public agencies and reduce administrative burdens associated with enforcing the rule.

Under the revised standard, Ohio public officials or employees may use frequent flyer miles, credit card rewards, hotel points, or other rewards earned while on official business in their personal life, provided that:

  1. The rewards are earned in the same way as members of the public would have earned them; and
  2. The rewards do not impose additional costs on the public agency.

However, a public official or employee is still prohibited from choosing an airline, vendor, a conference, event, or service based on whether it provides frequent flyer miles or other rewards points.

Under Ohio’s conflict of interest laws, public officials are prohibited from soliciting, accepting, or using their authority or influence to secure any financial benefit for themselves. R.C. 102.03(D) and (E). While frequent flyer miles constitute a “thing of value” for Ohio ethics law purposes, the OEC does not believe the value is significant enough to impair the public official’s independent judgment. Because the frequent flyer miles are broadly available to all passengers, are uniformly accrued, and are not being offered to officials for performing their official duties, the OEC maintains that the programs do not create a “substantial and improper influence” upon the public official’s judgment.

Similarly, public officials may not have an interest in the profits or benefits of a public contract, and the public agency’s purchase of a flight would be a public contract. R.C. 2921.42(A)(4). Public officials would have an interest in the contract with the airline based on the frequent flyer miles they are receiving, but the OEC points out that the benefit is relatively small and that it would be more administratively efficient to allow officials to use these programs compared to the cost of preventive measures. To minimize the risk to the public, the OEC’s new position still prohibits public officials from selecting a specific airline based on the frequent flyer miles they would receive from the flight.

What does this mean for your district? School board members and district employees may now keep and personally use frequent flyer miles earned during official travel, and Ohio law no longer differentiates between airline miles and other rewards programs such as credit card or hotel points. However, public officials and employees are still limited in the selection process, as the Commission specifically notes that vendors may not be selected based on the rewards provided, and there must be no additional costs imposed on the district.

 

 

 

Career Tech Corner: Immigration Enforcement Comes for Adult Education Programs

Career Tech Corner: Immigration Enforcement Comes for Adult Education Programs

On July 10, 2025 the U.S. Department of Education (ED) announced it would end the “subsidization of illegal aliens in career, technical, and adult education programs.” The new Notice of Interpretation applies to all CTE programs under the Carl D. Perkins Career and Technical Education Act (Perkins V) which provides over a billion dollars annually to programs across the country.

By rescinding a 1997 Dear Colleague Letter, the ED argued that career, technical, and adult education programs were subject to the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) which limits eligibility for federal public benefits to U.S. citizens, permanent residents, and qualified aliens. The PRWORA defines “federal public benefits” to include “postsecondary education…or any similar benefits for which payments or assistance are provided.”

The Notice of Interpretation states that non-qualified alien adults are not permitted to receive education benefits and non-qualified alien children are not eligible to receive postsecondary education benefits, which includes dual enrollment and other early college programs that provide students the opportunity to earn college credits such as College Credit Plus (CCP).

The ED maintains that this decision is in line with the Supreme Court’s decision in Plyler v. Doe, which established that states cannot deny undocumented children access to a public K-12 education. Congress has since codified the Plyler ruling in the PRWORA, expressly exempting basic public education benefits from the act. But the Department “does not interpret Plyler as conferring any rights to adults. Nor does the holding in Plyler reach the question as to whether a minor has the right to postsecondary education,” and the ED has taken the position that anything beyond basic public education benefits received by children may be denied to undocumented students.

What this means for schools. Allowing non-citizen students to enroll could jeopardize receipt of federal funds. The ED has stated that letters will be sent to all Perkins V grantees discussing eligibility verification. However, enforcement has been paused through September 10, 2025 as part of an ongoing lawsuit. At that point, CTCs will be obligated verify the citizenship status of students in their programs. Plyler does not entirely insulate traditional secondary schools from these requirements. In many cases, enforcement can be left to institutions of higher education, but districts may want to warn students interested in enrolling in CCP programs of the new verification requirements in case their immigration status might impact their ability to enroll in the programs under the new interpretation.

 

 

 

Career Tech Corner: Private Business Partnerships and Their Potential Impact on Students

Career Tech Corner: Private Business Partnerships and Their Potential Impact on Students

Career-technical education is a vital part of Ohio’s system of public education for students in grades seven through twelve. As public education entities that receive federal funds, CTCs are prohibited from discriminating against their students on the basis of a protected class. The Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, and national origin; Title IX prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex; while Section 504 and the ADA prohibit discrimination based on disability.

This duty under Federal law also prohibits CTCs from working with private entities that discriminate. But are all standards for private employers the same as they are for public education? And if not, what kind of impact may that have on Ohio students working in internships and co-ops with private business partners through their CTC programs?

These issues might commonly come up in the admissions/hiring process. Federal law requires that public schools provide equal access to any career and technical programs that they offer. However, vocational programs may impose criteria that are “essential for participation” in a particular program even if it has the effect of disproportionally excluding persons of a protected class. Standards for a private employer is different. Private employers do not have to hire an employee if their disability prevents them from performing the “essential functions” of the job even with reasonable accommodations, or if hiring them would pose a significant risk to the health and safety of others in the workplace. This is particularly important for students with disabilities. Schools must provide equal access to career tech programs, but private employers may permissibly turn down a student for an internship or co-op position based on the nature of the particular program and the extent of that student’s disability.

Other areas where CTC programs and private business partners may clash are connected to employer rights. Employers generally have the right to set reasonable work expectations, establish workplace policies, and discipline employees for misconduct. Private employers are not required to yield to the CTC if the two have conflicting policies on a particular issue. For example, an employee may allow ICE agents to enter their property to arrest someone with an administrative warrant, even though school policy may not. Or a private employer may discipline a student with disabilities for violating company policy and have a much lower risk of liability for discrimination. These potential differences need to be considered when determining which outside business partners a CTC should work with, as well as what options might be a good fit for a student, and both the student and their parents should be informed of the potential impact on a student’s rights as part of their participation in the program. 

What does this mean for your district? We must recognize that business partners are often playing by their own rules, even if school districts and their students are typically given special protections under state and federal law. Private employers, despite being part of a career tech program, often have significant control over how they handle their business. Control that may be used against our students in a way that a CTC typically would not, or legally could not, do. This is not to say that districts should avoid working with private business partners, but we should strive to ensure that all participants are informed citizens, and the fact of the matter is that students and staff need to know that these premises are not under the CTC’s control.

 

Navigating SB 29: What’s New for Educators Following a Series of Lame Duck Amendments

Navigating SB 29: What’s New for Educators Following a Series of Lame Duck Amendments

Senate Bill 29 has caused its fair share of headaches since it went into effect in October. Passing out some much-needed proverbial ibuprofen, the state legislature passed an amendment that took effect immediately on December 9, 2024. The amendments included numerous changes to some of SB 29’s more troubling provisions, most notably the student notice requirements, requirements for technology provider contracts, and directions for when the state board may act against an individual’s license.

Notice requirements

SB 29 restricted districts from monitoring or accessing student activities on school-issued devices and accounts. While districts were largely prohibited from accessing location tracking features, audio/visual receiving, transmitting, or recording features, and data about student interactions, they could still access the device under limited exceptions. The bill set forth two separate notice requirements for school districts: (1) A requirement for schools to provide general monitoring notice annually to parents; and (2) an individual 72-hour notice after one of the bill’s exceptions were triggered.

While much of the law remains the same, HB 432 modified the exceptions to ease notice requirements for school districts. Districts may still monitor a device if the activity “is limited to a noncommercial educational purpose for instruction, technical support, or exam-proctoring.” Additionally, the exception for judicial warrants was expanded to include subpoenas. Finally, the new law significantly limits the requirement for the 72-hour notice. HB 432 clarifies that the district must only send notice within 72 hours if:

  1. The district initiates responsive action in response to
  1. Judicial warrant or subpoena;
  2. Device is missing or stolen; or.
  3. (Or prevention of) a threat to life or safety.

Only when responsive action is taken by the district, must the school notify the student’s parent and provide a written description of the triggering circumstance within 72 hours. Even then, the notice is NOT required at any time when the notice itself would pose a threat to life or safety.

HB 432 also introduced a new provision regarding notice requirements. Under the newly amended language, all contracts between a school district and a county board of developmental disabilities, educational service center, joint vocational school district, another school district, or an informational technology center for services, “shall indicate which entity is responsible for providing notice under this section.”

Tech provider contracts

SB 29 as it was originally enacted incorporated a definition of “educational records” which failed to align with the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) or its corresponding state law (R.C. 3319.321). HB 432 modified the definition of “education records” to align with these laws. The bill also narrowed the definition of “student” to only apply to students currently enrolled in grades K-12 so that SB 29 no longer applied to former students or applicants.

In another attempt to relax the burden SB 29 placed on districts, the definition of “technology providers” has been changed to exclude county boards of developmental disabilities, educational service centers, informational technology centers, assessment providers, curriculum providers, and other city, exempted village, local school districts, and joint vocational schools that enter into service contracts with the district to provide school-issued devices. While the requirements for tech providers have not changed, the group that qualifies is now much smaller. This is particularly beneficial as many districts rely heavily on information technology centers for technology services.

State Board licensure clarification

HB 432 narrowed the State Board’s authority to act against an individual’s license or licensure application for releasing or discussing certain information. The State Board had previously been authorized to reject an application, suspend, revoke, or limit the license of an individual who uses or releases information deemed to be confidential under state or federal law concerning a student or their family members for any purpose other than student instruction. HB 432, however, specifies that the State Board’s authority is only triggered when an individual “purposely uses or intentionally releases” confidential information.

What does this mean for your district? While SB 29 is here to stay, many of the more demanding requirements under the act have been relaxed. The requirements for technology providers may not have changed, but who qualifies for that group has been significantly restricted. ITCs, for example, are now excluded from many of the tech provider requirements. Further clarification to the law limits its reach to current students only, and brings the definition of “education records” in line with the definition established under FERPA. Perhaps most significantly, the 72-hour notice requirements now need only be given to a student’s parents when the district initiates responsive action in those limited circumstances described above.