Schaffer v. Ohio State Univ., 2025-Ohio-5647

The Tenth District Court of Appeals of Ohio ruled against the Ohio State University (OSU), demanding that emails from OSU President Walter Carter be released following a public records request. This decision affirmed a ruling from the Court of Claims after it was determined that the specific request for the President’s emails was not overbroad. A link to the full decision has been provided above.

The original public records request was issued in November 2024, demanding all emails to and from the OSU President’s email address and all text messages to and from his phone over an eleven-day period. OSU denied the request, arguing it was “improperly overbroad, voluminous, and did not ask for records with sufficient specificity.” The special master appointed to review the complaint recommended denying the request for the President’s text messages. He argued the request could have applied to multiple cell phone numbers and would include many private, personal communications that would not qualify as public records. But he concluded the request for the President’s emails was adequate. By referencing (1) a specific official, (2) a specific email account, and (3) a discrete period of eleven days, the request was “reasonably limited” in scope and “identified the records with reasonable clarity.”

The Ohio Supreme Court has previously held that the Public Records Act “does not contemplate that any individual has the right to a complete duplication of voluminous files kept by government agencies.” State ex rel. The Warren Newspapers v. Hutson, 1994-Ohio-5. And the court in this case found that requests for whole categories of records “without any limitation as to content or time period” can be denied. Citing to State ex rel. Zidonis v. Columbus State Community College, 2012-Ohio-4228. Under Ohio law, a public office may deny an ambiguous or overly broad request, or one that does not allow the public office to reasonably identify what public records are being requested. O.R.C. 149.43(B)(2). However, even if an overbroad request is correctly denied the public office must still provide an opportunity for the requester to revise the request “by informing the requester of the manner in which records are maintained by the public office and accessed in the ordinary course of the public office’s duties.” O.R.C. 149.43(B)(2). If a public office fails to provide this information to the requester, they lose the right to object to the request for being overbroad. State ex rel. Summers v. Fox, 2020-Ohio-5585.

In this case OSU insisted the request was improper for failing to identify the other communicating parties and not narrowing the request by subject matter. However, OSU did not indicate that the President’s emails were maintained by subject matter or identity of sender/recipient, and they conceded that they were able to identify all the records responsive to the request. OSU incorrectly believed that such information was “generally required” for every records request, and the university’s failure to provide context or specific facts behind their decision made their denial improper. The Court also denied OSU’s claim that the request sought the “duplication of an entire category” of records because the request for email correspondence from a single individual did not represent a “complete duplication” of OSU’s files.

OSU also asked the court to consider the reasonableness of the request considering the circumstances. Schaffer, the requester, had made over 1,000 public records requests to OSU in 2024 and was on track to do so again in 2025. A previous case in the Court of Claims ended with a recommendation for dismissal to keep Schaffer “from becoming a party to abuse of the public records laws.” Schaffer v. Sheets, 2025-Ohio-1007. While the court appeared sympathetic to OSU’s argument, the university failed to raise this issue at the Court of Claims, so it could not be considered on appeal.

What does this mean for your district? Public records requests are context-specific. The absence of the author, date, or search terms alone is not enough to declare the request overbroad as a matter of law. What matters is the public official’s ability to identify and locate the requested records. Even a broad request (all emails) can be reasonable if some other modifier is included (specific individual, short time frame, etc.). In some cases, it may be appropriate to ask for clarification in response to a large records request, but districts must be prepared to provide an adequate explanation for that decision. Denying a request because they failed to specify a subject, for example, would not be appropriate if your office does not organize its records by subject. Nor would it be appropriate to deny a seemingly broad request when the district is already aware of the specific records being requested.  

D.A. v. Tri County Area Schools, 1:23-cv-00423 (6th Cir. October 14, 2025).

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recently ruled against two middle school students who challenged their district’s dress code, upholding the school’s authority to regulate clothing that contains vulgar innuendo—even when the message also has a political dimension.

The students, D.A. and X.A., received “Let’s Go Brandon” sweatshirts as Christmas gifts from their mother. When D.A. wore his sweatshirt to school, the assistant principal directed him to remove it because the phrase’s meaning was considered profane. Despite the warning, both students wore the sweatshirts again and were once more instructed to remove them due to the slogan’s “profane double meaning.”

The district’s dress code prohibited “attire with messages or illustrations that are lewd, indecent, vulgar, or profane.” School officials testified that the policy did not restrict political expression so long as the message complied with the dress code. In fact, both students acknowledged that classmates had worn “Make America Great Again” apparel, and the principal testified that students regularly wore clothing supporting candidates from both political parties without incident.

The plaintiffs argued that “Let’s Go Brandon” is not inherently profane but is instead a euphemism—a non-profane substitute for an offensive phrase. The Sixth Circuit rejected that argument, emphasizing that a euphemism carries the same communicative content as the phrase it replaces, even if the offensive word is obscured. Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Bethel School District v. Fraser, the court reiterated that schools may regulate speech conveying an obscene or vulgar message even when the specific words are not themselves obscene or vulgar. 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986). The court also relied on Boroff v. Van Wert City Board of Education, which affirms that districts have broad discretion to identify student expression as vulgar so long as their determination is reasonable. 220 F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 2000).

Here, the court found that the origin and commonly understood meaning of “Let’s Go Brandon”—a euphemism for “F*** Joe Biden”—was plainly vulgar. Accordingly, the administrators’ decision to classify the phrase as vulgar and to prohibit the sweatshirts was deemed reasonable.

The political nature of the message did not alter the analysis. The court explained that “in the schoolhouse, vulgarity trumps politics,” and that the First Amendment does not allow students to circumvent school rules by embedding vulgarity within political expression. While adults may use such language in public discourse, schools are not required to permit the same level of expression among children. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682. As a result, the district could categorically prohibit the slogan as a vulgar expression despite its political context.

What Does This Mean for Your District? This decision reaffirms that Ohio school districts have broad discretion to restrict student expression that they reasonably deem to be vulgar or profane, even when the message also carries political content. While students retain First Amendment rights at school, those rights are not unlimited, and districts are not required to tolerate “lewd, indecent, or offensive speech and conduct” simply because students wish to express it.

On August 4, 2025 the Ohio Ethics Commission (OEC) issued an opinion stating that public officials or employees could use frequent flyer miles and other rewards earned during official business for their own personal use. The entire opinion may be found here: Adv. Op. No. 2025-02.  

In prior opinions, the personal use of frequent flyer miles while permitting public officials to use credit card points and hotel rewards was restricted. The revised interpretation will bring Ohio in line with similar federal guidance. All rewards programs will now be treated the same by the OEC. The Commission expressed its hope that the new interpretation will clear up confusion for public agencies and reduce administrative burdens associated with enforcing the rule.

Under the revised standard, Ohio public officials or employees may use frequent flyer miles, credit card rewards, hotel points, or other rewards earned while on official business in their personal life, provided that:

1. The rewards are earned in the same way as members of the public would have earned them; and
2. The rewards do not impose additional costs on the public agency.

However, a public official or employee is still prohibited from choosing an airline, vendor, a conference, event, or service based on whether it provides frequent flyer miles or other rewards points.

Under Ohio’s conflict of interest laws, public officials are prohibited from soliciting, accepting, or using their authority or influence to secure any financial benefit for themselves. R.C. 102.03(D) and (E). While frequent flyer miles constitute a “thing of value” for Ohio ethics law purposes, the OEC does not believe the value is significant enough to impair the public official’s independent judgment. Because the frequent flyer miles are broadly available to all passengers, are uniformly accrued, and are not being offered to officials for performing their official duties, the OEC maintains that the programs do not create a “substantial and improper influence” upon the public official’s judgment.

Similarly, public officials may not have an interest in the profits or benefits of a public contract, and the public agency’s purchase of a flight would be a public contract. R.C. 2921.42(A)(4). Public officials would have an interest in the contract with the airline based on the frequent flyer miles they are receiving, but the OEC points out that the benefit is relatively small and that it would be more administratively efficient to allow officials to use these programs compared to the cost of preventive measures. To minimize the risk to the public, the OEC’s new position still prohibits public officials from selecting a specific airline based on the frequent flyer miles they would receive from the flight.

What does this mean for your district? School board members and district employees may now keep and personally use frequent flyer miles earned during official travel, and Ohio law no longer differentiates between airline miles and other rewards programs such as credit card or hotel points. However, public officials and employees are still limited in the selection process, as the Commission specifically notes that vendors may not be selected based on the rewards provided, and there must be no additional costs imposed on the district.