State ex rel. Zimmerman v. Avon Lake, 2026-Ohio-1090 (March 31, 2026)

On March 31, 2026, the Supreme Court of Ohio reaffirmed that committees and subcommittees of a public body are also public bodies under Ohio’s Open Meetings Act, and the City of Avon Lake was required to turn over the meeting minutes of an advisory committee that collected information related to the city’s redevelopment projects. The Court’s full opinion is available at the link provided above.

The city created the Avon Lake Community Improvement Corporation (“Avon Lake CIC”) to oversee economic-development activities within its jurisdiction. Avon Lake CIC then created the Brownfield funding Committee (“Brownfield committee”) to collect and evaluate information related to the CIC’s redevelopment projects.

A public records request was submitted to the city on October 29, 2024 requesting the Brownfield committee’s meeting minutes. The city’s law director denied the original records request, claiming that there were no meeting minutes for the Brownfield committee. The city went on to argue that the Brownfield committee was not a “public body” under Ohio’s Open Meetings Act because it was merely an “advisory group without delegated authority to act” on behalf of the Avon Lake CIC and it lacked decision-making authority.

The Court concluded that the lack of delegated authority by a public body is only one factor considered when evaluating whether a particular entity was a committee of a public body. The Brownfield committee was directly created by Avon Lake CIC, which itself is a public body under O.R.C. 121.22. The Court also noted that O.R.C. 121.22(B)(1)(b) does not require that a committee be a formal decision-making body, and several appellate courts had previously held that advisory committees may be a public body under Ohio’s Open Meetings Act. Citing to State ex rel. Mohr v. Colerain Twp., 2022-Ohio-1109 (1^st Dist.); Kanter v. Cleveland Hts., 2021-Ohio-4318 (8^th Dist.); Thomas v. White, 85 Ohio App. 3d 410 (9^th Dist. 1992).

After concluding that the Brownfield committee was a public body subject to Ohio’s Open Meetings Act, the Court ordered the city to prepare and produce the minutes for previously held committee meetings attended by a majority of its members at which public business was discussed.

What does this mean for your district? Any committees or subcommittees of the Board, even if they lack decision-making authority, are still considered “public bodies” under Ohio’s Open Meetings Act. As such, districts must ensure that these smaller committees continue to comply with the requirements of the Open Meetings Act.

Remember that a “public body” is any board or similar decision-making body of any school district, AND any committee or subcommittee of said board. Committee meetings must be open to the public at all times, and the minutes of a regular or special meeting of the committee must be promptly prepared and available for public inspection. These requirements apply to any prearranged discussion of public business by a majority of the committee or subcommittee’s members.

Opinion No. 2026-02.

The Ohio Attorney General issued its second formal opinion of the year on April 1, 2026, holding that an individual generally cannot serve simultaneously as a member of a school district board of education and a juvenile court probation officer. A link to the full opinion has been provided above.

This opinion came at the request of a County Prosecutor in response to a probation officer expressing a desire to serve on the board of education of a local school district that was within the county that they served. Accordingly, the Attorney General determined that there were sufficient conflicts of interest between the two positions that render them incompatible. A seven-part test is used when determining whether two public offices are compatible with one another, and all seven factors must point to compatibility in order for an individual to serve in both roles simultaneously.

One of these factors is whether there is “an impermissible conflict of interest between the two positions.” A conflict of interest exists “when an individual’s responsibilities in one position are such as to influence the performance of their duties in the other position” which subject them to “influences which may prevent their decisions from being completely objective.” 1989 Ohio Atty. Gen. Ops. No. 89-052.

Juvenile probation officers often have regular communication with school officials. These officers can conduct home and school visits to check on probationers, administer drug tests, and advise and testify in juvenile court when necessary. Chief probation officers are also responsible for procuring grant money from the Ohio Department of Youth Services, which can then be distributed to schools in the county to provide school resources officers and fund counseling service. O.R.C. 5139.34.

A person holding both positions would be subject to overlapping influences, making it difficult for them to exercise independent judgment. The Attorney General highlighted several potential conflicts, including:

• Access to confidential records: as a probation officer, the individual would have access to a wide variety of records from law-enforcement and children’s services. A school board may seek to obtain those records in order to take disciplinary action against a student. School officials have a duty to protect student information under FERPA, but they must comply with records requests from juvenile probation departments. A person serving in both positions would have access to confidential information from each position that normally would not be available to the other.
• Competition among schools for grant funds: Chief probation officers are responsible for writing and submitting grant applications to acquire funding for school districts. The Attorney General argues that a person serving both positions may be tempted to influence grant awards to the greater benefit of their own school district.
• Questions surrounding the individual’s investigative duties and authorities: Juvenile probation officers possess the powers of regular police officers, including the authority to make arrests. O.R.C. 2301.27(A). The capacity in which the probation officer is acting (i.e. as a board member or as an officer) could confuse parents, teachers, or other school board members. And if the officer’s conduct is challenged in court, issues of liability and qualified immunity could result in the district and the probation department on opposite sides of potential litigation.

If conflicts of interest can be appropriately mitigated, an individual may be permitted to serve in both positions simultaneously. Here the potential conflicts relate to the primary responsibilities of both positions. While it is possible for the school board member to recuse themselves from potential conflicts, the Attorney General cautioned that “constant abstentions” would “prevent a board member form competently fulfilling their duties in that position.” Absent a juvenile court judge’s discretion to reassign, alter, or shift the responsibilities of the probation officer at issue, the two positions are incompatible, and an individual should not be serving in both roles at the same time.

What does this mean for your district? A juvenile court probation officer should not be permitted to simultaneously serve as a public-school board member in the county in which they work, because the two positions are generally incompatible with one another.

Although it is unlikely that the exact scenario addressed in this opinion will occur in your district, the opinion is nonetheless important for all public-school districts in Ohio. School board members are public officials, and there are some restrictions against public officials holding multiple positions. If you have an individual that is interested in running for school board, but they hold another public office or position, consider following factors:

1. Is either position considered classified employment?
2. Whether the empowering statutes of either position limit employment in another public position?
3. Whether one position would be subordinate to the other in any way?
4. Whether it is physically possible for one person to discharge the duties of both positions?
5. Are there any impermissible conflicts of interest between the two positions?
6. Are there any local charter provisions, resolutions, or ordinance that are controlling?
7. Whether a federal, state, or local departmental regulation is applicable?

The attorney general has argued that all seven of these factors must be resolved in favor of compatibility in order for an individual to hold two offices simultaneously. The fact that someone already holds another public position doesn’t automatically disqualify them, but it should trigger some alarm bells. Work with the individual to determine what serving in both roles would look like in practice and whether any potential issues could arise that would justify keeping the two positions separate.

Schaffer v. Ohio State Univ., 2025-Ohio-5647

The Tenth District Court of Appeals of Ohio ruled against the Ohio State University (OSU), demanding that emails from OSU President Walter Carter be released following a public records request. This decision affirmed a ruling from the Court of Claims after it was determined that the specific request for the President’s emails was not overbroad. A link to the full decision has been provided above.

The original public records request was issued in November 2024, demanding all emails to and from the OSU President’s email address and all text messages to and from his phone over an eleven-day period. OSU denied the request, arguing it was “improperly overbroad, voluminous, and did not ask for records with sufficient specificity.” The special master appointed to review the complaint recommended denying the request for the President’s text messages. He argued the request could have applied to multiple cell phone numbers and would include many private, personal communications that would not qualify as public records. But he concluded the request for the President’s emails was adequate. By referencing (1) a specific official, (2) a specific email account, and (3) a discrete period of eleven days, the request was “reasonably limited” in scope and “identified the records with reasonable clarity.”

The Ohio Supreme Court has previously held that the Public Records Act “does not contemplate that any individual has the right to a complete duplication of voluminous files kept by government agencies.” State ex rel. The Warren Newspapers v. Hutson, 1994-Ohio-5. And the court in this case found that requests for whole categories of records “without any limitation as to content or time period” can be denied. Citing to State ex rel. Zidonis v. Columbus State Community College, 2012-Ohio-4228. Under Ohio law, a public office may deny an ambiguous or overly broad request, or one that does not allow the public office to reasonably identify what public records are being requested. O.R.C. 149.43(B)(2). However, even if an overbroad request is correctly denied the public office must still provide an opportunity for the requester to revise the request “by informing the requester of the manner in which records are maintained by the public office and accessed in the ordinary course of the public office’s duties.” O.R.C. 149.43(B)(2). If a public office fails to provide this information to the requester, they lose the right to object to the request for being overbroad. State ex rel. Summers v. Fox, 2020-Ohio-5585.

In this case OSU insisted the request was improper for failing to identify the other communicating parties and not narrowing the request by subject matter. However, OSU did not indicate that the President’s emails were maintained by subject matter or identity of sender/recipient, and they conceded that they were able to identify all the records responsive to the request. OSU incorrectly believed that such information was “generally required” for every records request, and the university’s failure to provide context or specific facts behind their decision made their denial improper. The Court also denied OSU’s claim that the request sought the “duplication of an entire category” of records because the request for email correspondence from a single individual did not represent a “complete duplication” of OSU’s files.

OSU also asked the court to consider the reasonableness of the request considering the circumstances. Schaffer, the requester, had made over 1,000 public records requests to OSU in 2024 and was on track to do so again in 2025. A previous case in the Court of Claims ended with a recommendation for dismissal to keep Schaffer “from becoming a party to abuse of the public records laws.” Schaffer v. Sheets, 2025-Ohio-1007. While the court appeared sympathetic to OSU’s argument, the university failed to raise this issue at the Court of Claims, so it could not be considered on appeal.

What does this mean for your district? Public records requests are context-specific. The absence of the author, date, or search terms alone is not enough to declare the request overbroad as a matter of law. What matters is the public official’s ability to identify and locate the requested records. Even a broad request (all emails) can be reasonable if some other modifier is included (specific individual, short time frame, etc.). In some cases, it may be appropriate to ask for clarification in response to a large records request, but districts must be prepared to provide an adequate explanation for that decision. Denying a request because they failed to specify a subject, for example, would not be appropriate if your office does not organize its records by subject. Nor would it be appropriate to deny a seemingly broad request when the district is already aware of the specific records being requested.