by Megan Bair | Feb 3, 2016 | Board Policy & Representation, Student Education and Discipline
The Thomas Moore Law Center, on behalf of John and Melissa Wood and their minor daughter, filed suit against the Charles County Public School District Board of Education and the High School Principal and Vice-Principal alleging that the La Plata High School “promoted Islam” by implementing a pro-Muslim lesson plan in its World History class. The Woods claim that the school concealed that it promoted Islam by leaving the topic out of a course syllabus and that students were forced to use a separate textbook for the segment on Islam but were not permitted to take it home. To that end, the Woods allege that their daughter was forced to profess and to write out the Shahada, the Islamic creed, in worksheets and quizzes.
By way of background, the lawsuit alleges that after the Woods learned of the Islamic subject matter being taught, Mr. Woods immediately contacted the school to voice his objections and to obtain an alternative assignment for his daughter. He maintains that the school ultimately refused to allow his daughter to “opt-out” of the assignments and subsequently enforced its “No Trespass” policy on him so that he was no longer permitted to enter onto school premises.
In a January statement, President and Chief Counsel of the Thomas More Law Center Richard Thompson said the school “forced Wood’s daughter to disparage her Christian faith by reciting the Shahada, and acknowledging Mohammed as her spiritual leader.”
“The Woods believe that it is a sin to profess commitment in word or writing to any god other than the Christian God,” the Thomas Moore Society says on its website. “Thus, they object to their daughter being forced to deny the Christian God and to her high school promoting Islam over other religions.”
The Woods seek a court declaration that the Defendants violated their constitutional and statutory rights, a temporary and permanent injunction barring Defendants from endorsing Islam or favoring Islam over Christianity and other religions, and from enforcing the no trespassing order issued against Mr. Wood.
by Pamela Leist | Jan 21, 2016 | Board Policy & Representation, General
On January 26th, 2016, the Ohio Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in a case to determine whether a public school district may implement a more restrictive policy on release of student directory information by requiring that parents “opt in” before the information can be released.
The case was brought by School Choice Ohio, Inc. (“SCO”) against the Springfield City School DistrictBoard of Education(“Springfield”). SCO is a registered non-profit corporation formed in the state of Delaware. The corporation informs students and parents across the state about scholarships the state provides, especially to students of low performing or at risk schools. SCO relies on school directory information that public schools provide through a records request to generate its mailing lists.
In January of 2013, SCO submitted a request for student directory information to Springfield. The District denied the request, citing a new policy it had recently passed which purportedly stopped the District’s collection of directory information, and further required parents to sign a consent to “opt in” to release of the data for lawful records requests. SCO countered that under state public records law, codified in ORC §149.43, the District does not have the authority to refuse an otherwise lawful request for directory information that the District maintains. Through its case, SCO seeks an order from the Ohio Supreme Court that would prevent Springfield from denying SCO’s requests for directory information on that ground.
State and federal law, specifically Ohio Revised Code §3319.321 and the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (20 USC §1232g/20 CFR Part 99), permit public schools to release limited student information defined as directory information in certain circumstances. In general, federal law defines directory information to include a student’s name, address, telephone number, date and place of birth, honors and awards, and dates of attendance. Ohio’s definition of directory information is more expansive. However, schools are required to provide an annual notice to parents that allow them the opportunity to opt out of directory information releases. Schools also are prohibited from releasing directory information to anyone who may use the information for a profit making plan or venture.
The Supreme Court’s decision in this case could have far-reaching policy implications for districts, and may open the door for additional challenges to the release of directory information in the future. A decision from the Court is not expected before early summer 2016. We will keep you posted on the status of the case. In the meantime, seek legal counsel if you have questions about application of your directory information policies and procedures.
by Pamela Leist | Jan 14, 2016 | Board Policy & Representation, Construction & Real Estate, School Finance, School Management
On December 30th, 2015, the Ohio Supreme Court unanimously declared that real property owned by a public school district board of education is tax exempt regardless of whether it is currently used for school purposes. Ennis Britton Shareholder Gary Stedronsky represented the Talawanda City School District Board of Education at all levels of appeal, including before the Supreme Court.
The case involved a provision in Ohio law that generally exempts real property owned by a public school district from property taxes, which is codified in Ohio Revised Code section 3313.44. In this case, the Talawanda City School District Board of Education (the “Board”) purchased 154 acres of land to build a new high school. A portion of this land was not needed for the high school and was leased by the Board to a farmer.
In January of 2010, the Board filed an application to exempt all 154 acres from real property taxes. The Tax Commissioner approved the exemption application for all but the portion of the land that was leased to the farmer. The Tax Commissioner concluded that the pecuniary benefit realized by the farmer disqualified the land from tax exemption because the property was not being used for school purposes.
The Board appealed the Tax Commissioner’s decision to the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”), which affirmed the Tax Commissioner’s decision. The Board further appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court was tasked with deciding whether the BTA decision was supported by the language in Ohio Revised Code section 3313.44. The applicable version of section 3313.44 simply states: “Real or personal property owned by or leased to any board of education for a lease term of at least fifty years shall be exempt from taxation.” The Board argued that this statute requires that a board of education merely own real property in order for it to qualify for tax exemption. In other words, there is no requirement in the statute that the property must be used for school purposes in order for the tax exemption to apply.
The Ohio Supreme Court agreed with the Board’s argument and concluded that the property that was leased to the farmer was exempt from taxation regardless of the specific use of the property. The Supreme Court acknowledged that past interpretations by the Tax Commissioner may have correctly interpreted an implied use restriction in the prior version of the statute. However, the Court recognized that the General Assembly chose not to include such a restriction when the statute was amended in 2010 even though it had authority to do so. Therefore, the Court held that the statute does not include an implied use restriction and the Board’s property is entitled to tax exemption even though it was leased to a farmer.
The Court also dismissed the Tax Commissioner’s argument that the Board’s request for tax exemption must be denied on grounds that the Board overstepped its legislative authority by leasing the land to a farmer for a commercial purpose. The Court held that a Board of Education’s property is entitled to tax exemption as long as it meets the conditions of the exemption statute in Ohio Revised Code section 3313.44, which merely requires ownership.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court decision clarifies that a board of education is entitled to a property tax exemption for all real property owned by the board of education regardless of how the property is currently being used. This decision is very favorable to school districts and will be used in the future to support applications for tax exemptions.
Talawanda City School District Board of Edu. v. Testa, Tax Commissioner (Ohio 2015), Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-5450.
by Pamela Leist | Nov 3, 2015 | Board Policy & Representation, General, School Management
The Ohio Attorney General’s office recently issued an opinion that concluded a deputy sheriff who is employed in classified service may simultaneously serve as a member of a city or local school district board of education with a few limitations. The opinion was released on October 27th, 2015. The question of law turned on an interpretation of Ohio Revised Code §124.57(A), which states that an officer or employee in the classified service of the state or a public municipality is prohibited from 1) receiving any contribution for a political party or candidate for public office; 2) being an officer in any political party; or 3) taking part in politics other than to vote.
In analyzing the issue, the drafter of the opinion relied on a seven-question test to determine whether the two public positions were compatible. The test includes the following:
1. Is either of the positions considered classified employment within the terms of R.C. §124.57?
2. Do the empowering statutes of either position limit employment in another public position or the holding of another public office?
3. Is one position subordinate to, or in any way a check upon the other?
4. Is it physically possible for one person to discharge the duties of both positions?
5. Is there an impermissible conflict of interest between the two positions?
6. Are there local charter provisions, resolutions, or ordinances which are controlling?
7. Is there a federal, state, or local departmental regulation applicable?
The first question about whether a deputy sheriff serves as classified staff was answered in the affirmative, unless the deputy is assigned special duties which alter his or her status as a classified employee. In analyzing the second question, since a board of education member is elected in a nonpartisan election, and no other laws expressly prohibit a sheriff from serving as a board member or vice versa, the Attorney General opined that a deputy sheriff may lawfully run for the position subject to a few limitations discussed more fully below. And, in review of the third question, the opinion concluded that the deputy’s position in particular was not really subordinate to the board of education even when that deputy served as the district’s DARE officer, since the county sheriff and not the board generally determined specific duties and assignments. The opinion quickly dispensed with any concerns about whether an individual could physically perform the duties of both jobs under the fourth question, again affirming there was no issue as long as the deputy was able to serve on the board through use of leave or some other means when he/she was simultaneously assigned to active duty as a deputy.
However, when analyzing the fifth question in the test, the opinion concluded there was the potential for a number of conflicts of interest to arise when the individual carried out his or her duties as deputy and board member. First, there is a potential conflict of interest in preparation of and submission of budgets to the county commissioner, since the county sheriff and the board of education may compete for limited funds. This conflict could be avoided as long as the member did not appear before the county commissioner for budget matters on behalf of either organization. Second, the attorney general also recognized a potential conflict in the event both the sheriff and the board of education sought levies. However, the opinion recognized that the chance for conflict was low, and further could be avoided as long as the individual did not participate in any board member discussions, deliberations, and votes concerning the levy. Third, the opinion notes there is a potential conflict when the deputy is required to investigate an employee or member of the board of education, which can be avoided by reassigning the investigation to another deputy or another law enforcement agent. Fourth, there could be a conflict when contracts are negotiated between the board and the sheriff’s office. Again as long as the deputy refrains from any board deliberations about the contract, and as long as the deputy is not assigned to serve the board through the contract, the conflict is avoidable. Finally, the deputy may avoid any conflict with regard to allocation of trust fund grants such as through the D.A.R.E. program as long as the deputy is not a part of the internal control policy that determines how money is allocated.
The answers to the sixth and final questions in the test mentioned above were in the negative, since there were no applicable state or local regulations that applied in this case. Therefore, as long as the deputy avoided the potential conflicts mentioned above, the attorney general concluded that the positions of deputy sheriff and board of education member were compatible. In closing, however, the author of the opinion recognized that it may be impossible to consider all possible conflicts that could arise. Should the board member find that he or she must frequently refrain from deliberations, it is possible the member will eventually have a duty to resign from one position.
Click here to review the opinion in full.
Ohio Attorney General Opinion No. 2015-032.
by Ryan LaFlamme | Oct 27, 2015 | Board Policy & Representation, Construction & Real Estate
Stetz v. Copley Fairlawn School Dist., 2015-Ohio-4358
The Ninth Appellate District Court of Appeals has reaffirmed political subdivision immunity for public school districts in a slip and fall case. The Copley Fairlawn School District was sued after a student slipped and fell. The student worked in the office during her study hall. During her office time, the student was directed by a vice principal to go and change the letters on a marquee. The student did so and reentered the building. Forty five minutes after re-entering the building, the student slipped as she began to descend a stair case. The student fell backwards and hit her head on concrete. The student did not recollect any water being present on the floor at the time of her fall.
The school moved for summary judgment on the basis that it was immune from suit under Ohio law. The trial court denied summary judgment, finding that there were genuine issues of fact in dispute for the jury to decide as to whether an exception to immunity applied.
There are five exceptions to political subdivision immunity provided by Revised Code Chapter 2744. If one of these exceptions applies, the school district is not protected by immunity. The exceptions for which political subdivisions (including school districts) are liable for injury, death, or loss to person or property are as follows:
1. The negligent operation of any motor vehicle by their employees when the employees are engaged within the scope of their employment and authority.
2. The negligent performance of acts by their employees with respect to proprietary functions of the political subdivisions.
3. Negligent failure to keep public roads in repair to remove obstructions from public roads.
4. Injury, death, or loss to person or property that is caused by the negligence of employees and that occurs within or on the grounds of, and is due to physical defects within or on the grounds of, buildings that are used in connection with the performance of a governmental function (e.g., a school building).
5. Civil liability is expressly imposed upon the political subdivision by a section of the Revised Code
The student here argued that the buildings and grounds exception (number 4 above) applied. However, the Court of Appeals found that the student had not set forth sufficient evidence that there was a defect in the building where she fell or that the school employees were negligent. Particularly here, the defect would have been that the staff permitted a wet substance to remain on the floor causing a safety hazard. The court found that there was not sufficient information to determine if the floor was even wet at the time she fell, let alone whether a hazard had negligently been permitted to remain. Accordingly the school district was entitled to immunity and the case was dismissed.
Districts should keep in mind that while they may be protected by the immunity grants of Chapter 2744, immunity is not automatic as there are exceptions to the rule.
by Giselle Spencer | Sep 25, 2015 | Board Policy & Representation, Construction & Real Estate, General, Labor and Employment, Legislation, School Finance, School Management, Special Education, Student Education and Discipline
As with most other provisions of the budget bill (Am. Sub. HB 64) some significant provisions impacting Ohio school districts go into effect on September 29, 2015, including the following:
- The maximum amount of a scholarship awarded under the Autism or Jon Peterson scholarship programs increases to $27,000 (up from $20,000).
- School districts must offer real property it intends to sell first to a “high performing community school,” then to other community and college preparatory boarding schools located in the district.
- ODE, in conjunction with an Ohio educational service center association and an Ohio gifted children’s association, must complete and submit a feasibility study for establishment of sixteen regional community schools for gifted children.
- The State Board must develop rules waiving any additional coursework requirements for renewal of an educator license for teachers who are consistently high performing.
- The duration of a pupil activity permit for individuals holding a valid educator license is changed from three (3) years to the same number of years as the educator license.
- The State Board of Education will develop a standards based framework for the evaluation of school counselors. Furthermore, all school districts must adopt a counselor evaluation policy by September 30, 2016, that conforms to the framework and will be implemented beginning in the 2016-2017 school year (will include annual evaluations with ratings of accomplished, skilled, developing, and ineffective just like OTES).
- The alternative teacher evaluation framework is revised to decrease SGM to 35%, maintain the performance rating at 50%, and authorize school districts to determine the appropriate measure or combination of measures for the remaining 15%.
- Exemplary community schools may now operate a preschool program for general education students.
- School districts may enroll under interdistrict open enrollment policies an adjacent or other district student who is a preschool child with a disability. ODE will deduct $4,000 from the resident district and pay that same amount to the enrolling district.
- School districts cannot appropriate monies to purchase an assessment developed by PARCC for use as the state elementary or secondary achievement assessments. Additionally testing for the 2015-2016 school year is reduced.
- Safe harbor provisions in effect during the 2014-2015 school year for state report cards are extended by two years.
- School districts may now enter into a contract with a health care provider for the provision of health care services for students.
- The new requirements for issuance of diplomas to home school students and students from non-chartered nonpublic schools are now in effect.
STEM schools can now enroll out-of-state students.
- Schools may install security doors or barricades as part of an emergency management plan.
- The filing date for financial disclosure statements with the Ohio Ethics Commission is May 15 (instead of April 15).
