by Pamela Leist | Sep 26, 2019 | Board Policy & Representation, General, Labor and Employment, Legislation, School Management
The Sixth District Court of Appeals delivered a win to school districts recently when it reversed a lower court’s decision ordering the Perkins Local School District to reinstate a former teacher who had been terminated with an award of $367,202.52 in lost wages and benefits. The case was brought by former teacher and coach Tracey Hiss. Hiss was terminated for cause after the district learned she supplied several members of her girls track team with Lidoderm patches – prescription patches containing lidocaine that help with pain relief.
When the superintendent learned of the allegations, he met with Hiss and subsequently placed her on paid leave pending further investigation. He also reported the allegations to the police, who subsequently charged her with a minor misdemeanor for her actions. The district held a pre-disciplinary hearing and the superintendent sent notice of his intent to recommend termination. Hiss, through legal counsel, objected to some of the reasons listed in the notice because they had not been addressed at the pre-disciplinary hearing. The superintendent subsequently held another pre-disciplinary hearing and again recommended termination which the board approved. Hiss requested a hearing to challenge the board’s intent to terminate before a state appointed referee. At the termination hearing, Hiss introduced evidence of an incident where a prior coach, Crabtree, had given a student Tylenol to help reduce pain. She argued that the board should not have terminated her contract due to the fact that this teacher merely received a reprimand and a brief suspension from coaching, where she was being terminated.
After conclusion of the five-day hearing, the referee issued his report and recommendation that the board terminate Hiss’s teaching contract. In making this recommendation, the referee found that the board had sufficient policies prohibiting teachers from both possessing and distributing controlled substances and medicines to students without a parent’s permission.
Shortly thereafter, the Board adopted the referee’s recommendation and passed a resolution to terminate Hiss’s teaching contract. Hiss then appealed this decision to the common pleas court. The court applied the Daughtry test of good and just cause, concluding that the board lacked cause to terminate Hiss’s contract. The court focused in particular on the fact that Crabtree, who had engaged in similar behavior, received a much less severe discipline. The district appealed, claiming in part that the court of common pleas abused its discretion in applying this new test and effectively usurping the role of the ODE referee.
On appeal, the Sixth District Court of Appeals agreed that the court of common pleas abused its discretion when it substituted its own judgement in place of the board of education. The court of appeals concluded that the court’s reliance on the Daugherty test to define “good and just cause” was misplaced. The court reasoned that, while an arbitrator may use the Daugherty test to determine the standard of good and just cause in a labor-arbitration matter, the Ohio Supreme Court has failed to adopt the Daugherty test in just cause teacher termination cases. Thus, the common pleas court exceeded its authority by relying on the Daugherty test as opposed to the cases interpreting R.C. 3319.16 as to whether good or just cause exists.
Examining the merits of the case, the court also determined that Hiss’s misconduct was , a “fairly serious matter” that falls within the realm of good and just cause for termination under R.C. 3319.16. Hiss repeatedly gave prescription pain medicine to students in direct violation of district policy that could have ultimately caused serious harm to the students. The court opined that this added to the fact that the board of education complied with procedural requirements of R.C. 3319.16 by providing Hiss with two informal hearings as well as a hearing before the referee justified the board’s decision to terminate. Therefore, the board’s earlier decision to terminate Hiss’s teaching contract was reinstated.
by Giselle Spencer | Aug 16, 2019 | Board Policy & Representation, General, Labor and Employment, Legislation, School Finance, School Management
The Ohio Attorney General’s Office recently released an opinion in response to a request for legal advice on the issue of arming school staff. The letter requested, among other things, an analysis on how the training requirements under R.C. 109.78(D) apply to school employees authorized by the board of education to carry or possess a deadly weapon on school property under R.C. 2923.122(A).
R.C. 109.78(D) in full provides:
“(D) No public or private educational institution or superintendent of the State Highway Patrol shall employ a special police officer, security guard, or other position in which such person goes armed while on duty, who has not received a certificate of having satisfactorily completed an approved basic police officer training program, unless the person has completed twenty years of active duty as a police officer.”
As noted, R.C. 2923.122(A) prohibits any person from knowingly conveying, or attempting to convey, a deadly weapon into a school safety zone. However, there is a specific exception set out in R.C. 2923.122(D)(1)(a) which excludes any other person from this prohibition:
“who has written authorization from the board of education or governing body of a school to convey deadly weapons… in a school safety zone or to possess a deadly weapon… in a school safety zone and who convey or possesses the deadly weapon… in accordance with that authorization.”
The letter sought advice on whether or not a school employee who has been authorized to carry a deadly weapon by the board of education under R.C. 2923.122(D)(1)(a) is subject to the training requirements of R.C. 109.78(D). The Attorney General’s Office reiterated their argument laid out in their amicus brief in the appeal of Gabbard v. Madison Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. The court in that case concluded that school employees authorized by the board of education to carry firearms on school premises were not subject to the training requirements of R.C. 109.78(D) because they were not employed by the district in a security capacity. The Attorney General’s Office agreed and opined that in order to determine which provision outlined above is applicable to an employee hired by a school district, we must analyze whether the individual is employed in a role comparable to that of a security guard or police officer. In doing so, we must look to the person’s job title along with the duties and responsibilities assigned to them.
If an employee is hired by the district in a security capacity, then they are subject to the training requirements expressed in R.C. 109.78(D). (I.e. approved basic training police program, or twenty years active duty of a police officer). However, any other employee hired by a school district who does not serve in such a role, i.e. teacher, principal, custodian, and who is authorized by the board to carry or possess a firearm under R.C. 2923.122(D)(1)(a), is not subject to the training requirements of R.C. 109.78(D).
by Gary Stedronsky | May 23, 2019 | Board Policy & Representation, General, Labor and Employment
Given their choice to enter into elective office, school board members are typically service oriented individuals. They are very active in their communities and are often interested in the athletic programs of their district. Thus, it is not surprising that many school board members would want to help out by coaching or assisting a coach with an athletic team. On January 9, 2019 the Ohio Ethics Commission received a request from a district’s superintendent for an advisory opinion letter on behalf of a board member. The member wanted to pursue a coaching position with the district and asked if he could accept employment as a paid coach or serve as a volunteer coach.
The opinion indicates that a board member is prohibited, under Ohio ethics laws, from being employed as a paid coach by the district they serve. Ohio Revised Code section 3313.33(B) expressly states that members of the board may not “be employed in any manner for compensation.” RC 2921.42 (A)(4) also provides that a public official is prohibited from having an interest in the profits and benefits of a contract of the public agency he or she serves. A school board member who is a compensated employee of a district would have an interest in the district by entering into an employment contract as a coach. As a result, the commission’s opinion states that “RC 2921.42(A)(4) prohibits the school board member from serving simultaneously as a paid district coach.”
The opinion further provides that a board member may volunteer as a coach without any compensation. There is no statute that prohibits a member from serving as a volunteer coach. Additionally, there is no prohibited interest in a public contract when a board member volunteers his or her time without compensation. Although, members in this position may be required to abstain from participating in matters directly affecting the athletic department. This could include voting, discussing, deliberating or taking any other actions regarding athletic department personnel. They may also be required to abstain from voting on an employment/supplemental contract for an employee who works in that sport/activity or who oversees the program in which the board member volunteers (ie – athletic director) because of concerns about undue influence. However, the Ethics Commission found that a member was “not prohibited from participating in matters that affect all athletic department personnel within the district uniformly” (i.e. voting on a CBA that includes an increase in compensation to supplemental positions) or from participating in general budgetary matters that might include funding for athletics and compensation or benefits for employees.
It appears that the Ethics Commission likely issued the opinion to address the situation where board members volunteer to take the place of a paid supplemental coach rather than to serve as a volunteer in some other capacity, such as announcing the game, taking tickets, etc. However, the Ethics Commission was not very clear in delineating between someone who volunteers as a coach versus someone who volunteers in another capacity. For that reason, board members who volunteer in a capacity other than taking the place of a supplemental position are also advised to follow the advice in this Ethics Commission opinion.
by Pamela Leist | Mar 19, 2019 | Board Policy & Representation, General, Labor and Employment
The Licensure Code of Professional Conduct for Ohio Educators (“Code”), which was first adopted in 2008, outlines the framework for professional conduct for individuals who have a license or permit issued by the State Board of Education. On February 13, 2019, the Ohio Department of Education (“ODE”) released a revised draft of the Code. The proposed changes highlight areas that ODE and the State Board have placed renewed focus on.
For instance, Principle One was revised to recognize that educators who have an ongoing physical or mental incapacity violate the Code. This includes an addiction to a substance that renders them unable to effectively perform their duties or maintain the care and custody of children. Under this Principle, ODE recognized acts of sexual harassment and dishonesty violate the Principle as well.
ODE clarified, under Principle Two, the expectation for educators to maintain appropriate relationships with students. The Principle was amended to outline that establishing an unprofessional relationship with a student for emotional, romantic or other reasons is prohibited and has severe implications.
Principle Three spells out in more detail how an educator may violate the Code by falsifying, intentionally misrepresenting, willfully omitting, or negligently reporting professional qualifications and/or prior discipline issued by the State Board. It also indicates that an educator commits a violation by failing to cooperate with a formal inquiry or investigation of any state or federal agency.
Additional language was added in Principle Six, titled “Use, Possession, or Unlawful Distribution of Alcohol, Drugs, and Tobacco,” specifically to detail professional conduct of teachers in their personal behavior outside of school. It states that teachers may not engage in habitual use of alcohol as demonstrated by multiple alcohol-related convictions during a five-year timespan.
A new Principle was created to address technology in light of the ever-growing use of technology in our schools. Principle Nine requires educators to demonstrate responsible and appropriate conduct when using electronic devices and accessing the data that have been entrusted to them. The Code summarizes the expectation that educators must be diligent in preventing students and others from accessing improper or confidential material on their professional and personal devices. Educators may not present inappropriate, non-school media to students or use technology or social media for inappropriate communications with students. Educators under the Code will be held accountable for reporting online harassment or bullying of a student and will be expected to intervene when aware of illegal or inappropriate images and media involving a student or minor. Educators may not use technology to distribute inappropriate material that could be reasonably accessed by the school community. Lastly, educators may not use school technology for their personal business venture.
The State Board receives and investigates complaints of Code violations and has the authority to issue discipline. Possible discipline for violations ranges from a letter of admonishment up to the permanent revocation of a license or permit. The draft code may be accessed at: http://education.ohio.gov/getattachment/Topics/Teaching/Educator-Conduct/Licensure-Code-of-Professional-Conduct-for-Ohio-Ed/2019-DRAFT-Licensure-Code-of-Professional-Conduct-for-Ohio-Educators.pdf.aspx?lang=en-US
by Bronston McCord | Feb 26, 2019 | General, Labor and Employment, School Management
In a 5-4 decision made last June, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the extraction of agency fees from Illinois State’s nonconsenting employees of the public-sector violates their First Amendment rights. After the decision was made, all workers who attempted to withdraw their consent to extract agency fees, were refunded the money taken under the policy. The court stated that, “States and public-sector unions may no longer extract agency fees from nonconsenting employees. … employees must choose to support the union before anything is taken from them.”
The Supreme Court decision is sparking class action lawsuits across the country. In Ohio, Smith v. AFSCME has been monumental for post-Janus rulings. The suit was filed by several employees across Ohio who are employed by local government agencies. All of the employees attempted to withdraw their union membership and their dues deduction authorization following the Janus ruling. They were each denied their First Amendment right as union officials continued to extract dues. Officials followed the “15-day window period” that only allowed for resignation of the union 15 days prior to the expiration of the collective bargaining contract. This led to the employees filing suit against AFSCME, alleging that the policy was unconstitutional.
The employees were represented by the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, who also represented Mark Janus in Janus. At the end of January 2019, the case was finally settled. Under the terms of the settlement agreement, AFSCME agreed to pay back all union dues that were extracted after the employees attempted to withdraw their consent. The union will not deduct any agency fees or dues that were previously subject to the window policy. This is monumental because it is the first class action lawsuit since the Janus ruling in which union officials have reversed their policy on the window period. President of the National Right to Work Foundation, Mark Mix, said, “This first-in-the-nation victory in a class action case to enforce workers’ rights under Janus should be the first of many cases that result in union bosses dropping their illegal restrictions on workers seeking to exercise their rights secured in the Foundation’s Janus Supreme Court victory.” As of January 24th, Foundation was litigating 20 cases nationwide to enforce employee’s rights.
What this Means for Your District
In light of the ruling in Janus and the Smith settlement, districts should be mindful that any “window policy” on withdrawing union membership may present legal complications for the district if challenged. Districts should review their collective bargaining agreements and consult with their local unions regarding its position on that provision given Smith.
by John E. Britton | Jan 23, 2019 | General, Labor and Employment, School Management
On December 14, 2018, the Fifth District Court of Appeals (Morrow County) upheld Highland Local School District Board of Education’s decision to non-renew two first year bus drivers.
The Union filed a grievance in response to the Board’s notice of intent not to renew the limited contracts of two bus drivers. The grievance claimed there was no showing of “just cause” and proceeded to arbitration based upon the language of the collective bargaining agreement – only a “just cause” provision for discipline and discharge and silent on the issue of the non-renewal of limited non-teaching contracts. The agreement also included a general statement that the contract “supersedes” all applicable state law.
While arbitration hearing dates were being scheduled, the union’s attorneys filed a declaratory judgment action in court that was decided in favor of the Board on the basis that because the contract did not address the issue of non-renewal, state law applies.
The Court of Appeals of Ohio’s Fifth District agreed with the trial court, rejecting the union’s claim that a general statement in the contract that the collective bargaining agreement “supersedes applicable state law” somehow preempted the application of Ohio’s non-renewal statutes. The Court stated that such overrides can only occur “when a provision specifically addresses a matter and evinces a clear intent to override the statutory law relating to that matter.”
As such, since the contract made no specification about the issuance, sequence, renewal, or non-renewal of limited non-teaching contracts, there was no discernible conflict between the labor agreement and the statutes, therefore, “both R.C. 3319.081 and 3319.083 apply in the case.”
What This Decision Means for Your District
This is a strong decision for the proposition that statutory rights can only be superseded by express language in a collective bargaining agreement. This works both ways and districts should take great care in drafting contract proposals that conflict with existing state laws, particularly as they relate to employee rights.
Along those same lines, it is very important that district administration carefully review non-teaching labor agreements relative to the issue of non-renewal given the recent amendments that now extend limited contracts from three years (1, 2, continuing) to seven years (1, 2, 2, 2, continuing). If you have addressed non-renewal in your non-teacher agreement, you will need to verify that you will also be able to take advantage of these additional years before continuing contract status is granted. You should also anticipate proposals from non-teacher unions attempting to restrict the extension of limited contract status.
United Elec. Radio & Machine Workers of Am. v. Highland Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. 2018 Ohio 5307 (Fifth District Court of Appeals, Morrow County, December 14, 2018).
