by Bronston McCord | Dec 8, 2017 | Legislation, School Management
The Senate Education Committee has announced a fourth hearing on Senate Bill 216 to be held on Wednesday, December 13, at 9:45 a.m. in the North Hearing Room of the Senate Building in Columbus. The time of the meeting has been changed to allow for a longer meeting, as a large volume of testimony is expected. A number of school superintendents have provided testimony at previous hearings. It is rumored that the Education Committee Chair, Sen. Peggy Lehner, is opposed to at least some of the bill provisions. If the bill is not referred out of the Senate Education Committee before their December break, there might be closed, interested party meetings (instead of open hearings in committee) into January.
How to Provide Testimony
Anyone who is interested in providing testimony for next week’s hearing, whether oral or written or both, may do so by completing and sending an Education Witness Slip and written testimony to kate.rossman@ohiosenate.gov no later than 24 hours prior to the committee hearing. The committee is anticipating a large volume of testimony, so requests will be granted on a first-come, first-served basis. Oral testimony will be limited to 5 minutes (2–3 pages written).
First Hearing
The first hearing was held on October 18. The sponsor of the bill, Sen. Matt Huffman, introduced the bill to the Education Committee. He noted that burdensome paperwork and tedious tasks distract teachers and superintendents from their primary role of educating students. Sen. Lehner said that although a number of things may be cumbersome, there may be valid reasons to keep them, such as the Kindergarten Readiness Assessment (KRA).
Second Hearing
At the second hearing on November 8, several superintendents and other supporters of the bill provided testimony that the proposed changes will remove “unnecessary burdens” that draw attention away from teaching and learning. School leaders and teachers argued that they can more effectively educate students without the overwhelming number of regulations that dictate how schools should be run. Specific provisions supported:
- College Credit Plus – specifically, the cost of textbooks
- Teacher licensure – narrow grade bands make it difficult to fill substitute and regular positions
- Testing changes
Third Hearing
The third hearing, on December 6, was for opponent and interested party testimony. At this hearing, State Superintendent Paolo DeMaria called the bill “a step backward” and “a reactive approach.” He testified as an interested party, noting that he had considered each provision of the bill and whether it would benefit students. He opposed many of the changes in the bill, including the following:
- Eliminating the KRA
- College Credit Plus and requiring ODE to study the effectiveness of CCP
- Changes to substitute teacher licensure
- Eliminating number of excused absences from “excessive absences”
- Eliminating the student growth measure from OTES
- Changes to grade bands for licensure
In all, 13 individuals provided testimony at the third hearing, mainly in opposition to removing the KRA and the licensure grade band changes. Several others were prepared to provide testimony, but because of the length of the meeting, they were asked to come back for the fourth hearing.
Overview of SB 216
For an overview of SB 216, introduced on October 10 by Ohio Sen. Matt Huffman, refer to our previous blog post, Unboxing the Education Deregulation Bill: What’s Inside SB 216.
by Pamela Leist | Mar 24, 2017 | Board Policy & Representation, General, Legislation, School Management
Senate Bill 199, which was passed during the lame duck session and signed by the governor in December, significantly expands the rights of certain individuals to possess weapons on public school grounds.
State law generally prohibits an individual from conveying or possessing a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance in a school safety zone (R.C. 2923.122). R.C. 2901.01 defines a school safety zone to include a school, school building, school premises, school activity, and school bus. Violators may be charged with misdemeanor or felony criminal offenses.
There are a few exceptions to this prohibition, including one that grants a school district board of education the authority to issue written permission for an individual to possess a weapon on school grounds. Additional, narrowly tailored exceptions apply for police officers, security personnel, school employees, and students under certain circumstances. The new law further expands these exceptions in three key areas.
First, the bill specifically authorizes an individual to possess a concealed handgun in a school safety zone as long as the individual either remains in a motor vehicle with the gun or leaves the gun behind in the locked vehicle. For this exception to apply, the individual must have an active concealed-carry permit or must be an active-duty member of the armed forces who is carrying a valid military identification card and documentation of successful completion of firearms training (the training must meet or exceed requirements for concealed permit holder training).
Next, the new law expands the right of law enforcement officers to carry a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance in a school safety zone at any time regardless of whether the officer is on active duty. The prior version of the law limited such rights to law enforcement officers who were on active duty only.
Finally, the new law now permits the possession and use of an object indistinguishable from a firearm during a school safety training.
The law became effective March 21, 2017. School districts should review board policies that regulate use and possession of weapons on school grounds and should contact legal counsel with questions about how the law will impact district operations.
by Pamela Leist | Jan 14, 2016 | Board Policy & Representation, Construction & Real Estate, School Finance, School Management
On December 30th, 2015, the Ohio Supreme Court unanimously declared that real property owned by a public school district board of education is tax exempt regardless of whether it is currently used for school purposes. Ennis Britton Shareholder Gary Stedronsky represented the Talawanda City School District Board of Education at all levels of appeal, including before the Supreme Court.
The case involved a provision in Ohio law that generally exempts real property owned by a public school district from property taxes, which is codified in Ohio Revised Code section 3313.44. In this case, the Talawanda City School District Board of Education (the “Board”) purchased 154 acres of land to build a new high school. A portion of this land was not needed for the high school and was leased by the Board to a farmer.
In January of 2010, the Board filed an application to exempt all 154 acres from real property taxes. The Tax Commissioner approved the exemption application for all but the portion of the land that was leased to the farmer. The Tax Commissioner concluded that the pecuniary benefit realized by the farmer disqualified the land from tax exemption because the property was not being used for school purposes.
The Board appealed the Tax Commissioner’s decision to the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”), which affirmed the Tax Commissioner’s decision. The Board further appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court was tasked with deciding whether the BTA decision was supported by the language in Ohio Revised Code section 3313.44. The applicable version of section 3313.44 simply states: “Real or personal property owned by or leased to any board of education for a lease term of at least fifty years shall be exempt from taxation.” The Board argued that this statute requires that a board of education merely own real property in order for it to qualify for tax exemption. In other words, there is no requirement in the statute that the property must be used for school purposes in order for the tax exemption to apply.
The Ohio Supreme Court agreed with the Board’s argument and concluded that the property that was leased to the farmer was exempt from taxation regardless of the specific use of the property. The Supreme Court acknowledged that past interpretations by the Tax Commissioner may have correctly interpreted an implied use restriction in the prior version of the statute. However, the Court recognized that the General Assembly chose not to include such a restriction when the statute was amended in 2010 even though it had authority to do so. Therefore, the Court held that the statute does not include an implied use restriction and the Board’s property is entitled to tax exemption even though it was leased to a farmer.
The Court also dismissed the Tax Commissioner’s argument that the Board’s request for tax exemption must be denied on grounds that the Board overstepped its legislative authority by leasing the land to a farmer for a commercial purpose. The Court held that a Board of Education’s property is entitled to tax exemption as long as it meets the conditions of the exemption statute in Ohio Revised Code section 3313.44, which merely requires ownership.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court decision clarifies that a board of education is entitled to a property tax exemption for all real property owned by the board of education regardless of how the property is currently being used. This decision is very favorable to school districts and will be used in the future to support applications for tax exemptions.
Talawanda City School District Board of Edu. v. Testa, Tax Commissioner (Ohio 2015), Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-5450.
by Gary Stedronsky | Jan 12, 2016 | Labor and Employment, School Management
The U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments on January 11th in an important case that could eliminate union “fair share fees” and make every state in the country a “right to work” state.
The case was initially filed in California and involves a group of teachers who decided not to join the teachers’ union. It is interesting to note that the case has almost no factual record. This is because the teachers admitted that the lower courts did not have the authority to decide in their favor in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977). They requested that the lower courts rule against them so the case could be presented directly to the Supreme Court.
It was somewhat surprising that the Supreme Court even agreed to hear the appeal because it previously approved fair share fees in the Abood decision. We thought this might be an indication of the Court’s willingness to overturn its Abood decision and prohibit mandatory fair share fees. Our initial thinking was further bolstered yesterday by the tough questions posed by the Court to the union at oral argument. For instance, Justice Kennedy, who often serves as a swing vote, said:
“The union basically is making these teachers compelled riders for issues on which they strongly disagree. Many teachers think that they are devoted to the future of America, to the future of our young people, and that the union is equally devoted to that, but that the union is absolutely wrong in some of its positions. And agency fees require, as I understand it, correct me if I’m wrong, agency fees require that employees and teachers who disagree with those positions must nevertheless subsidize the union on these very points.”
Ohio law (R.C. 4117.09) permits fair share fees if the public employer and union have agreed in a collective bargaining agreement to require fair share fees as a condition of employment. A ruling in this case against the union will have huge implications for Ohio’s public sector unions. If the Court rules in the favor of the non-union teachers, it would declare that it is unconstitutional for a state to allow public sector unions to charge a mandatory fair share fee to non-members. This would likely mean that non-members could not be forced to pay a fair share fee if they do not agree to pay the fee, which would obviously have a negative impact on the revenue of unions and could lead to more resentment from union members against non-members (or so-called “free riders” as they are often referred to).
A decision in this case is expected later this summer. We will continue to monitor any developments and will update our clients as soon as the decision is announced.
Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association (Case No. 14-915).
UPDATE:
The U.S. Supreme Court announced on March 29th, 2016 that it was deadlocked with a 4-4 decision on a case brought before it to challenge the practice of public employer unions collecting fair share fees.
Initially filed in California by a group of teachers who decided not to join the union, the case served as a direct challenge to a well-recognized U.S. Supreme Court decision from 1977, Abood v. Detroit Board of Edn., which declared fair share fees legal.
Many interpreted the Supreme Court’s decision to hear the case as an indication that Abood may be overruled given the Court’s more conservative composition. However, the death of Antonin Scalia, who presumably would have provided the swing vote to overturn Abood, passed away before the decision was rendered.
A split decision in this case means that, at least for now, Abood remains good law and the practice of fair share fees will continue. This is a decisive victory for unions across the nation, although representatives from both sides have indicated that they may request a rehearing on the matter.
by Pamela Leist | Nov 3, 2015 | Board Policy & Representation, General, School Management
The Ohio Attorney General’s office recently issued an opinion that concluded a deputy sheriff who is employed in classified service may simultaneously serve as a member of a city or local school district board of education with a few limitations. The opinion was released on October 27th, 2015. The question of law turned on an interpretation of Ohio Revised Code §124.57(A), which states that an officer or employee in the classified service of the state or a public municipality is prohibited from 1) receiving any contribution for a political party or candidate for public office; 2) being an officer in any political party; or 3) taking part in politics other than to vote.
In analyzing the issue, the drafter of the opinion relied on a seven-question test to determine whether the two public positions were compatible. The test includes the following:
1. Is either of the positions considered classified employment within the terms of R.C. §124.57?
2. Do the empowering statutes of either position limit employment in another public position or the holding of another public office?
3. Is one position subordinate to, or in any way a check upon the other?
4. Is it physically possible for one person to discharge the duties of both positions?
5. Is there an impermissible conflict of interest between the two positions?
6. Are there local charter provisions, resolutions, or ordinances which are controlling?
7. Is there a federal, state, or local departmental regulation applicable?
The first question about whether a deputy sheriff serves as classified staff was answered in the affirmative, unless the deputy is assigned special duties which alter his or her status as a classified employee. In analyzing the second question, since a board of education member is elected in a nonpartisan election, and no other laws expressly prohibit a sheriff from serving as a board member or vice versa, the Attorney General opined that a deputy sheriff may lawfully run for the position subject to a few limitations discussed more fully below. And, in review of the third question, the opinion concluded that the deputy’s position in particular was not really subordinate to the board of education even when that deputy served as the district’s DARE officer, since the county sheriff and not the board generally determined specific duties and assignments. The opinion quickly dispensed with any concerns about whether an individual could physically perform the duties of both jobs under the fourth question, again affirming there was no issue as long as the deputy was able to serve on the board through use of leave or some other means when he/she was simultaneously assigned to active duty as a deputy.
However, when analyzing the fifth question in the test, the opinion concluded there was the potential for a number of conflicts of interest to arise when the individual carried out his or her duties as deputy and board member. First, there is a potential conflict of interest in preparation of and submission of budgets to the county commissioner, since the county sheriff and the board of education may compete for limited funds. This conflict could be avoided as long as the member did not appear before the county commissioner for budget matters on behalf of either organization. Second, the attorney general also recognized a potential conflict in the event both the sheriff and the board of education sought levies. However, the opinion recognized that the chance for conflict was low, and further could be avoided as long as the individual did not participate in any board member discussions, deliberations, and votes concerning the levy. Third, the opinion notes there is a potential conflict when the deputy is required to investigate an employee or member of the board of education, which can be avoided by reassigning the investigation to another deputy or another law enforcement agent. Fourth, there could be a conflict when contracts are negotiated between the board and the sheriff’s office. Again as long as the deputy refrains from any board deliberations about the contract, and as long as the deputy is not assigned to serve the board through the contract, the conflict is avoidable. Finally, the deputy may avoid any conflict with regard to allocation of trust fund grants such as through the D.A.R.E. program as long as the deputy is not a part of the internal control policy that determines how money is allocated.
The answers to the sixth and final questions in the test mentioned above were in the negative, since there were no applicable state or local regulations that applied in this case. Therefore, as long as the deputy avoided the potential conflicts mentioned above, the attorney general concluded that the positions of deputy sheriff and board of education member were compatible. In closing, however, the author of the opinion recognized that it may be impossible to consider all possible conflicts that could arise. Should the board member find that he or she must frequently refrain from deliberations, it is possible the member will eventually have a duty to resign from one position.
Click here to review the opinion in full.
Ohio Attorney General Opinion No. 2015-032.
by Giselle Spencer | Sep 25, 2015 | Board Policy & Representation, Construction & Real Estate, General, Labor and Employment, Legislation, School Finance, School Management, Special Education, Student Education and Discipline
As with most other provisions of the budget bill (Am. Sub. HB 64) some significant provisions impacting Ohio school districts go into effect on September 29, 2015, including the following:
- The maximum amount of a scholarship awarded under the Autism or Jon Peterson scholarship programs increases to $27,000 (up from $20,000).
- School districts must offer real property it intends to sell first to a “high performing community school,” then to other community and college preparatory boarding schools located in the district.
- ODE, in conjunction with an Ohio educational service center association and an Ohio gifted children’s association, must complete and submit a feasibility study for establishment of sixteen regional community schools for gifted children.
- The State Board must develop rules waiving any additional coursework requirements for renewal of an educator license for teachers who are consistently high performing.
- The duration of a pupil activity permit for individuals holding a valid educator license is changed from three (3) years to the same number of years as the educator license.
- The State Board of Education will develop a standards based framework for the evaluation of school counselors. Furthermore, all school districts must adopt a counselor evaluation policy by September 30, 2016, that conforms to the framework and will be implemented beginning in the 2016-2017 school year (will include annual evaluations with ratings of accomplished, skilled, developing, and ineffective just like OTES).
- The alternative teacher evaluation framework is revised to decrease SGM to 35%, maintain the performance rating at 50%, and authorize school districts to determine the appropriate measure or combination of measures for the remaining 15%.
- Exemplary community schools may now operate a preschool program for general education students.
- School districts may enroll under interdistrict open enrollment policies an adjacent or other district student who is a preschool child with a disability. ODE will deduct $4,000 from the resident district and pay that same amount to the enrolling district.
- School districts cannot appropriate monies to purchase an assessment developed by PARCC for use as the state elementary or secondary achievement assessments. Additionally testing for the 2015-2016 school year is reduced.
- Safe harbor provisions in effect during the 2014-2015 school year for state report cards are extended by two years.
- School districts may now enter into a contract with a health care provider for the provision of health care services for students.
- The new requirements for issuance of diplomas to home school students and students from non-chartered nonpublic schools are now in effect.
STEM schools can now enroll out-of-state students.
- Schools may install security doors or barricades as part of an emergency management plan.
- The filing date for financial disclosure statements with the Ohio Ethics Commission is May 15 (instead of April 15).
