Career Tech Corner: CTC Options for Acquiring Sites for Instruction

Career Tech Corner: CTC Options for Acquiring Sites for Instruction

by | Apr 14, 2023 | Construction & Real Estate, General, Labor and Employment, School Management

As Career Technical Centers (CTC) offer ever-expanding curricula and training in more advanced and technical fields, there may be a need for new space for hands-on learning and training. Perhaps your district is interested in erecting a lab for manufacturing education, or agricultural space for education in farming technology. 

Under the law, school districts are “bodies politic and corporate” “capable of…acquiring, holding, possessing, and disposing of real and personal property.” Just like any city, local, or exempted village school district, vocational districts can purchase and lease land for the erection of education facilities.  CTCs may also purchase or lease existing buildings and, as needed, renovate such existing spaces for their purposes.  Lease-purchase agreements are also permissible for this purpose. CTCs may also acquire ownership of real property by donation or an exchange agreement. (By law, CTCs have all the authority and powers as city school districts with the exception of certain matters specifically address in the Revised Code pertaining to Chapters 124 (civil service), 3317 (School Foundation Program), 3323 (special education), and 3331 (age and schooling certificates)).  There are other means by which a CTC could acquire property that occur less frequently, are less desired, and are entirely context based. These are adverse possession and appropriation (condemnation). 

There may be instances where a CTC desires to acquire property not to erect a building for use as classroom space but to facilitate the programming of the CTC.  In some instances, this may involve students performing work that is within the scope of their particular program but that also contributes to a private venture.

The applicable statutes refer to a board of education using its powers to acquire property for its own purposes, i.e., for the operations of the district in carrying out its educational mission.  There is not any express authority in those statutes for a board to acquire property for non-school purposes or to effectuate a purely private development.

However, there are some attorney general opinions, addressing CTCs in particular, that have allowed a CTC to engage in a private venture so long as there is some connection to the curriculum.  See 1976 Op. Atty. Gen. No. 76-065 (A CTC may construct and sell single-family residences on school land.  Students erected the homes under supervision as part of the curriculum, and not for pay); 1971 Op. Atty. Gen. No. 71-068 (A school may engage and compete in private enterprise, even at a profit, so long as the program is reasonably necessary to the vocational education curriculum); 1971 Op. Atty. Gen. No. 71-026 (Use of school facilities for serving meals and banquets to community organizations is justified as part of the vocational education curriculum).

1981 Op. Atty. Gen. No. 81-093 opines that a CTC may, pursuant to R.C. 3313.90, enter into an agreement with a nonprofit corporation whereby students of the district would construct a house on property owned by the corporation with materials and equipment furnished at the expense of the corporation, provided that such an agreement is reasonably necessary to fulfill the requirements of the vocational education curriculum.  Additionally, that opinion holds that a board of education of a CTC may, as part of a vocational education program, purchase land, construct residential dwellings thereon, and thereafter sell such realty.

What does this mean for your district?

Your board is vested with broad powers to acquire property using several different means.  The options available should be carefully considered to ensure which is the best approach for any given project or plan. Attorneys at Ennis Britton stand ready to assist you with achieving your goals in this regard.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Recent Federal Changes Impacting Pregnant and Nursing Workers

Recent Federal Changes Impacting Pregnant and Nursing Workers

by | Apr 13, 2023 | General, Labor and Employment, School Management

In an attempt to create new legal protections and remedies for individuals who are pregnant or nursing, Congress recently passed two acts, the Providing Urgent Maternal Protections for Nursing Mothers Act (PUMP Act) and the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA), which will expand the number of nursing and pregnant workers granted protections, including school employees.

Providing Urgent Maternal Protections for Nursing Mothers Act

In 2010, the Break Time for Nursing Mothers Act was signed into law, which required employers to provide nursing mothers a reasonable break time in a private and shielded place to express breast milk for a minimum of one year following the child’s birth. However, these requirements applied only to employees not exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act’s (FLSA) overtime pay requirement.

On December 29, 2022, President Biden signed the PUMP Act into law, which expands the rights granted by the Break Time for Nursing Mothers Act to include exempt employees of covered employers. This change, which adds over nine million workers, will now grant all salaried employees, such as teachers, similar protections.

The PUMP Act, much like the Break Time for Nursing Mother Act, requires employers to provide (1) reasonable break time to express milk, and (2) a private location that is not a bathroom and that is shielded from view and free from intrusion. Additionally, the PUMP Act authorizes an aggrieved employee to bring a claim against an employer who violated the PUMP Act, as well as prohibits that employer from retaliation against the employee as a result of that claim. Furthermore, the PUMP Act has adopted all available remedies under the FLSA, such as reinstatement, promotion, payment of wages lost, and compensatory damages. The U.S. Department of Labor published a fact sheet that lays out additional information regarding the PUMP Act. For example, the fact sheet discusses how an employee may be compensated for break time to pump, whether that be through paid break time or being completely relieved from their duties. The DoL Fact Sheet can be found here.

Pregnant Workers Fairness Act

In addition to the PUMP Act, Congress passed the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA), which will go into effect June 27, 2023. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of Title VII, which is enforced by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), prohibits employers from discrimination on the basis of pregnancy and requires an employer to treat pregnant employees in the same manner as other employees who are similar in their ability or inability to work. While this act does prevent discrimination against pregnant employees, it does not require an employer to comply with any accommodation requirements. This gap between the prohibited discrimination and lack of accommodation requirements has now been filled by the PWFA.

Under the PWFA, Congress has made it unlawful for an employer with 15 or more employees to:

  • Require an employee to accept an accommodation without a discussion about the accommodation;
  • Deny a job or other employment opportunities to a qualified employee or application based on the person’s needs for a reasonable accommodation;
  • Require an employee to take leave if another reasonable accommodation can be provided that would allow the employee to continue working;
  • Retaliate against an individual for reporting or opposing unlawful discrimination under the PWFA; and
    Interfere with any individual’s rights under the PWFA.

These restrictions under the PWFA will protect employees and applicants of covered employers, which include schools, who have “known limitations related to pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” In addition to these restrictions, the PWFA noted that an individual may still be considered a qualified employee if the inability to perform an essential function is for a temporary period, the essential function can be performed in the near future, and the inability to perform the function could be reasonably accommodated.

Recent Litigation Surrounding Pregnancy Discrimination

Congress’ actions come following recent litigation where the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit against a nursing and rehabilitation facility. The EEOC asserted that the facility had established policies requiring employees to inform the company when they were pregnant as well as obtain a note from their doctor releasing them to work without restrictions. The EEOC additionally alleged that the facility denied pregnant employees that had restrictions with reasonable accommodations and went so far as to terminate them, while other employees with similar restrictions were provided accommodations.

The suit, which was brought in June of 2021, came to a close April 12, 2023 with a decision finding in favor of the EEOC. The decision ordered the facility to pay $400,000 split between 11 employees, as well as issued a decree that would prohibit the facility from discrimination on the basis of pregnancy in the future, including denying pregnant employee’s modifications and a requirement that pregnant employees obtain a doctor’s note.

What does this mean for your district? To comply with the PUMP Act and the PWFA, districts should update their reasonable accommodation and nursing employee break policies to reflect the new requirements. Additionally, districts should designate an adequate space for employees to express breast milk that is in compliance with the PUMP Act, meaning the space must be (1) reasonable break time to express milk, and (2) a private location that is not a bathroom and that is shielded from view and free from intrusion.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Update: USDOE New Proposed Rule on Title IX

Update: USDOE New Proposed Rule on Title IX

by | Apr 7, 2023 | General, School Management

On April 6th, the U.S. Department of Education proposed a rule that would build upon Title IX and apply to federally funded K-12 schools. The proposed rule would prohibit a blanket ban or a “one size fits all” policy that bans transgender students from participating on teams consistent with their gender identity. While prohibiting categorical bans, the policy would provide schools some flexibility when determining eligibility criteria. Specifically, the Department proposed that any adopted criteria must be substantially related to the achievement of an important educational objective and minimize harms to students whose opportunity to participate on a team consistent with their gender identity would be limited or denied. 

In a released Fact Sheet, the Department stated that to comply with the above requirements and to ensure fairness and prevent sports-related injuries, a school must look at the sport, the level of competition, and the grade or education level. The Department further clarified that under these eligibility factors, elementary school students would generally be able to participate in school sports according to their gender identity. However, as competition rises in high school level sports, the Department stated schools may assess the sport, level of competitiveness and the age of student more and may limit participation so long as that limit meets the regulation’s requirements.

This proposed rule came on the same day that the U.S. Supreme Court refused to approve West Virginia’s request to enforce a state law that would ban transgender women and girls from participating in school sports teams consistent with their gender identity. The request, which landed itself on the Court’s emergency docket, came after a transgender student who wanted to participate on the girls track team challenged the state law. After a temporary order from the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals which precluded the law from being enforced while the case was being considered, West Virginia’s Attorney General sought emergency relief from the Supreme Court, but the Court refused to grant the relief.

What does this mean for your district? There is still a lot to be decided on this topic, both from a regulatory standpoint as well as with case law. The U.S. DOE proposed changes will be published to the Federal Register, where it will be open for 30 days of public comment. Following the 30 days the rule may be altered or published depending on comments received. As written, the regulations will require deliberation before restrictions or bans are put in place, and will make restrictions or bans in less competitive activities (e.g. younger students, junior varsity) more difficult to support. This level of local control will ensure that this sometimes divisive topic remains something districts will continue to have to work through. As for the Supreme Court Decision, the general trend in sports-related cases still points toward discouraging bans on transgender athletic participation. Decisions like this case might present a legal barrier for Ohio’s most recent legislative efforts to address transgender athletic participation. Stay tuned for future updates.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Lack of Fire Extinguisher in Science Classroom Could Be a Physical Defect Affecting Immunity

Lack of Fire Extinguisher in Science Classroom Could Be a Physical Defect Affecting Immunity

by | Feb 14, 2023 | General, School Management

In a 4-3 decision rendered on December 28, 2022, the Supreme Court of Ohio ruled that the absence of a fire extinguisher in a science classroom “could be a physical defect such that an exception to immunity exists under R.C. 2744.02(B)(4).” 

 The case of Doe v. Greenville City Schools arose from an accident within a science class.  The plaintiffs alleged that the school district “negligently caused their injuries when they suffered severe burns in December 2019 after a bottle of isopropyl alcohol caught fire and exploded in a science class.” The complaint further alleged that the school district “failed to provide proper safety equipment, ‘especially, but not limited to, a fire extinguisher inside the classroom,’ failed to ensure that there were proper safety features and protocols in place, [and] failed to properly supervise and protect them…”

 The Supreme Court held that the allegations should survive a motion to dismiss.  Discussing the standard, the Supreme Court explained, “R.C. 2744.02(B)(4) requires that two separate elements be met—the injuries at issue must be caused both (1) by a political subdivision employee’s negligence and (2) by a physical defect within or on the grounds of buildings that are used in connection with the performance of a governmental function.

Noting that the term “physical defect” is not statutorily defined, the Supreme Court acknowledged a split among Ohio courts of appeals as to whether the lack of a safety feature could constitute a “physical defect.”  The Supreme Court agreed with the courts that have held that the lack of safety equipment or other safety features could amount to a physical defect. Thus, “the absence of a fire extinguisher or other safety equipment within a science classroom could be a physical defect such that an exception to immunity could exist under R.C. 2744.02(B)(4).”

 As a result of this decision, another exception to the immunity statute has been recognized by the Supreme Court.   Please contact one of our attorneys is you would like to further discuss this case and its implications.

A link to the decision can be found here.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Court Finds in Favor of Professor Who Refuses to Utilize Student’s Preferred Gender Pronouns

by | Jun 7, 2021 | General, School Management

This case arose because a philosophy professor at Shawnee State University (Portsmouth, Ohio) refused to abide by the University’s policy requiring that he refer students with pronouns corresponding to their gender identity. The professor is a devout Christian whose religious convictions influence his thoughts on human nature, marriage, gender, sexuality, morality, politics, and social issues.

At the start of the 2016-17 school year, the University informed its faculty that they were required to refer to students by their preferred pronouns. The professor was informed that he would be disciplined if he refused to use a pronoun that reflects a student’s self-asserted gender identity. In his class that semester, a student requested to be referred to utilizing the female pronouns, and the professor would not oblige. The professor then requested accommodations for his religious and personal views.  The student then filed a Title IX complaint against the professor. The professor’s request for religious accommodations were denied by the University, and the Title IX complaint resulted in a conclusion that the professor created a hostile environment for the students in his class; a violation of the University’s nondiscrimination policies, which resulted in discipline. 

Then, the professor filed a lawsuit alleging that the University violated his rights under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Ohio Constitution, and his contract with the University. 

The Sixth Circuit found that First Amendment free speech rules apply differently when it is government speech. Normally when public employees are speaking pursuant to their official duties, they are not speaking as citizens with First Amendment protections: therefore, the Constitution does not protect their speech/communications from employer discipline. However, in this case, the Sixth Circuit highlighted its belief that professors at public universities retain First Amendment protection- at least when engaged in core academic functions, such as teaching and scholarship. 

The Court rejected the argument that “…teachers have no First Amendment rights when teaching, or that the government can censor teacher speech without restriction.” Hardy v. Jefferson Cmty. Coll., 260 F.3d 671, 680 (6th Cir. 2001). The Court recognized the professor’s rights to academic freedom and freedom of expression within this case, including within that academic freedom the choice to use of pronouns to shape classroom discussion. At the university level, this professor was able to make choices regarding gender identity for appropriate classroom discussion in his political philosophy courses. 

In summary, the Court remanded the case back to the lower court for the lower court to issue a decision in compliance with the First Amendment rights recognized by the Sixth Circuit. 

What this means for your District

While this case deals with speech from a university professor, and not that of a K-12 educator, it is a good case to be aware of when faced with situations that may arise from staff members who refuse to refer to a transgender student with the student’s preferred pronouns or nicknames. Schools are required to recognize the academic freedoms that exist for educators- but how this will be balanced against the needs of minor students in the future will be one to watch. In this case, the Court was not remotely persuaded by the arguments of the University that a hostile environment was created by the professor’s actions against the transgender students in his class, because the Court was not presented with any evidence or arguments that the student(s) was denied any educational benefits or opportunities. 

Meriwether v. Hartop, (C.A. 6, 2021) 992 F.3d 492

Ohio Court Denies Temporary Restraining Order to Halt Return to In-Person Instruction

by | Mar 1, 2021 | Board Policy & Representation, COVID-19 (Coronavirus), General, School Management

Earlier this month, a judge in Hamilton County sided with the Board of Education of the Cincinnati Public School District (“Board”) when she denied the Cincinnati Federation of Teachers’ (“Union”) motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction that sought to delay the return to in person learning. Cincinnati Fed. of Teachers v. Bd. of Education of the School District of Cincinnati, No. A2100376 (Feb. 1, 2021).

This case was the result of the Board voting to resume in-person instruction beginning February 1, 2021. As a result, the Union filed a motion for a temporary restraining order on the basis that the Board’s decision to resume in-person instruction violated provisions of their collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”). In particular one of the provisions of the CBA provides that the Board and the Union will cooperate with one another in making reasonable provisions for the health and safety of its teachers. Additionally, the CBA provides that if a teacher believes that they are being required to work under unsafe or unhealthy conditions beyond the normal hazards of the job, then they have a right to file a grievance. In return, the Board argued that the court should dismiss the case because it lacked jurisdiction and because the Board had the express authority to make decisions regarding in-person instruction.

In reaching its decision, the court looked to § 4 of the Norris-Laguardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 104, which generally prevents courts from granting injunctive relief involving labor disputes. However, an exception to this general rule applies if the controversy involves a labor dispute, an evidentiary hearing is held, the underlying dispute is subject to the arbitration procedure of the collective bargaining agreement, and the basis for injunctive relief are satisfied.

In evaluating the union’s claim, the court relied on previous Supreme Court precedent which held that a union’s claim that a board failed to provide them with notice and opportunity to discuss the closure of a facility fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State Employment Relations Board (“SERB”). State ex rel. Wilkinson v. Reed, 99 Ohio St.3d 106 (2003). The court in this particular case analogized the union’s failure to cooperate claim to the claim in Reed. Thus, the court concluded that SERB had exclusive jurisdiction to the claim and it therefore was not subject to the arbitration process. Because they were not subject to the arbitration process, the union’s claim did not meet the exception to the general rule that prevents courts from granting injunctive relief in a labor dispute.

The teachers in this case also filed a grievance due to their belief that they were being required to work under conditions which were unsafe or unhealthy. Though the arbitration process with respect to this grievance was proceeding, the union asked the court to issue a status quo injunction while the grievance was being resolved. In evaluating this claim, the court looked to a particular section of the CBA which stated that the Board is invested with the governmental authority and control of Cincinnati Public Schools. The provision further stated that the Board’s authority includes the authority to make rules, regulations and policies that are necessary for the government of schools, the employees, and their students.

This court further noted that the Ohio legislature has vested superintendents and boards of education with almost unlimited reasonable authority to manage and control the schools within their districts. Courts will not interfere with grant of discretionary power, so long as it is exercised in good faith and is not a clear abuse of discretion. Here, the court determined that the return to in-person instruction clearly fell within the authority granted to the Board. Thus, the court concluded that the claims brought by the Union were not arbitrable and the court could not issue an injunction.

What this means for your district?

Ohio superintendents and boards of education have the ultimate decision-making authority in determining whether their schools return to in-person instruction. Courts recognize that Ohio has granted superintendents and boards of education with almost unlimited authority to manage and govern the schools within their districts. So long as boards and superintendents exercise this power reasonably and in good faith without violating the laws of the state of Ohio, courts will seldom interfere.