by Pamela Leist | Sep 26, 2016 | General, Special Education, Student Education and Discipline
A school district’s authority to discipline a student for off-campus speech is an increasingly relevant concern today for public schools. Inappropriate or offensive speech can cause lasting injury to victims and can trigger significant community backlash and unrest. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently addressed this issue in a case that arose out of Oregon.
The case was filed after a school district suspended a seventh-grade student named C.R. for harassing two other students from school. C.R. and some of his friends had been involved in an escalating series of encounters with two sixth-grade students, a girl and a boy, both disabled, first calling them vulgar names and later increasing to sexual taunting. On the day of the incident at issue, the students were traveling home from school through a public park adjacent to school property, just a few hundred feet from the campus. About five minutes after school let out, C.R. and his friends circled around the two younger students, commenting and questioning them about sexual acts and pornography. A school employee rode by the students on her bicycle, noticed the group, and stopped to help the younger girl and boy. The girl reported that the encounter made her feel unsafe, and the employee walked the two students home.
After investigating the incident, school administrators concluded that C.R. was the “ringleader” of the group and that the conduct fell within the district’s definition of sexual harassment. All of the boys were disciplined. C.R. was suspended for two days, not only because of the harassment but also because he had lied to administrators during the investigation and had disregarded their request to not discuss the interview with his friends.
C.R.’s parents filed a lawsuit a year after the incident, alleging that his First Amendment and due process rights had been violated and that the school lacked authority to discipline him. The school district moved for summary judgment, which was granted by the district court. The parents appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit, which considered the following.
Was C.R.’s conduct sexual harassment? The school had a policy that defined sexual harassment, and the investigation had yielded evidence that C.R.’s behavior fit within that definition. The Ninth Circuit Court noted, “Federal courts owe significant deference to a school’s interpretation of its own rules and policies. … We uphold a school’s disciplinary determinations so long as the school’s interpretation of its rules and policies is reasonable, and there is evidence to support the charge.” Therefore, the court upheld the district’s conclusion that C.R.’s behavior was considered sexual harassment.
Could the school regulate his speech and discipline him? The court first considered whether the school could permissibly regulate the student’s off-campus speech at all, and then considered whether the school’s regulation of the student’s speech complied with the requirements of the First Amendment.
Regulation of students’ on-campus speech is well established as constitutional; however, regulation of off-campus speech is another matter. Following a previous Supreme Court decision (Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)), regulation of student speech is permissible if the speech “might reasonably lead school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities” or if the speech might collide “with the rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone.” Speech that is merely offensive is not sufficient; however, sexually harassing speech is more than that. Sexually harassing speech, the court held, implicates other students’ rights to be secure, threatening their sense of physical, emotional, and psychological security.
The age of the student who is being harassed is also relevant. The Supreme Court has noted that children younger than age 14 are less mature, and therefore overtly sexual speech could be more seriously damaging to them. For this reason, elementary schools may exercise greater control over student speech than secondary schools.
The court held that the school district did indeed have the authority to discipline C.R. for his harassing speech, even if it was off campus, for a number of reasons:
- All of the individuals involved were students
- The incident took place –
- On the students’ walk home
- A few hundred feet from school
- Immediately after school let out
- On a path that begins at the school
- The students were together on the path because of school
Succinctly stated, the court held that “a school may act to ensure students are able to leave the school safely without implicating the rights of students to speak freely in the broader community.”
Were C.R.’s due process rights violated? Again citing previous court decisions, the opinion noted that the Constitution allows informal procedures when a student suspension is 10 days or fewer. The school must provide the student notice of the charges but need not outline specific charges and their potential consequences or notify parents of the charges prior to the suspension. If the student denies the charges, the student then must have an opportunity to explain his side of the story. A school is not constitutionally required to inform the student of the specific rules or policies in question. For these reasons, the court held that the school did not violate C.R.’s procedural due process rights.
C.R. also claimed that his substantive due process rights were violated when the school recorded the reason for suspension as “harassment – sexual,” which allegedly deprived him of a good reputation. The court opined that C.R. did not have a genuine interest in maintaining a good reputation, as he had since stolen supplies from the school, and held that the school may record the reason for suspension, “however unsavory,” so long as it applied appropriate procedural safeguards. Therefore, the school also did not violate his substantive due process rights.
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit upheld the summary judgment that the district court had previously granted.
C.R. v. Eugene School District 4J, No. 13-35856 (9th Cir. 2016)
by Erin Wessendorf-Wortman | Aug 17, 2016 | Student Education and Discipline
In December 2015, the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) reauthorized the McKinney-Vento Education for Homeless Children and Youths program. Updated guidance was released by the U.S. Department of Education to help school districts understand the amendments to the McKinney-Vento Act, which will take effect October 1, 2016. These changes include the following:
- Greater emphasis on identifying homeless children and youths, requiring that state and local education agencies provide training for staff members to best meet the unique needs of homeless students.
- A focus on ensuring that eligible homeless students have access to academic and extracurricular activities, including magnet schools, summer school, career and technical education, advanced placement, online learning, and charter school programs.
- Ensuring that homeless children and youths remain in their school of origin, which is defined as the school the student attended when permanently housed. The student must be able to remain at this school for the duration of homelessness, or until the end of the school year during which they become permanently housed once more.
- Dispute resolution procedures which now address eligibility issues, school choice, and enrollment. In the event of a dispute between a parent, guardian, or youth and the local educational agency, the student must be immediately enrolled in the school in which he or she sought placement. The student must also be provided transportation to or from the school of origin for the duration of the dispute, at the request of the parent, guardian, or local liaison representing an unaccompanied youth.
- New authority for local liaisons to confirm the eligibility of homeless children and youths for programs offered through the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.
This guidance and the amended McKinney-Vento Act aim to equip schools with the necessary tools they need to best serve homeless students and ensure that they continue to receive an education. More information and advice for helping homeless students can be found in a fact sheet released by the U.S. Department of Education. If you have questions on how these changes can be implemented within your school district, please contact an Ennis Britton attorney.
by Erin Wessendorf-Wortman | Aug 12, 2016 | Board Policy & Representation, Student Education and Discipline
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits discrimination against students on the basis of sex for schools that receive federal funding. More recently, the definition of “sex” discrimination was expanded by federal regulatory agencies. In April 2014, the U.S. Department of Education Office for Civil Rights (OCR) indicated that Title IX’s sex discrimination prohibition extends to discrimination “based on gender identity or failure to conform to stereotypical notions of masculinity or femininity.” In this guidance, OCR informed school districts that discrimination against students who identify as being transgender, whether in the curricular setting or in extracurricular activities, is prohibited.
This guidance was later reinforced when the U.S. Department of Education and the U.S. Department of Justice issued joint guidance in May 2016 stating that both federal agencies will treat a student’s gender identity as the student’s sex for purposes of enforcing Title IX.
Therefore, according to the Education and Justice Departments’ interpretation and application of Title IX, school districts need to provide accommodations for transgender students. Ennis Britton has advised that decisions regarding transgender students be made on a case-by-case basis and in a team environment, wherein the parents, student, and administration may discuss the transition process for that student and the appropriate accommodations.
However, on August 3, 2016, the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) issued an order that has caused a number of school districts to question their compliance with the Education and Justice Departments’ previous guidance. The SCOTUS order has temporarily stopped the enforcement of a lower federal court order that directed a school district in Virginia to permit a transgender male to use the boys’ bathroom at his school. Gloucester County Sch. Bd v. G.G., 579 U.S. ___ (2016).
The SCOTUS order did not reverse or overrule the guidance, interpretation, or application of Title IX that is being promulgated and enforced by the U.S. Departments of Education and Justice. Rather, the SCOTUS order maintained the status quo for that student and that Virginia school while the case plays out in the lower courts.
Caution should be exercised in reading too much into this SCOTUS order for a number of reasons. First, the deciding vote of Justice Breyer was a “courtesy.” His vote should not be preliminarily construed to be in alignment with four other justices as it relates to accommodations of transgender students in schools. Second, this order does not put a hold on the guidance set forth by the U.S. Departments of Education and Justice. The order applies to the one student involved, G.G., and to the Virginia school seeking to deny the student accommodations within its buildings. Finally, the guidance from the Education and Justice Departments still exists and can be expected to be enforced.
School districts should consult legal counsel in determining how best to maneuver the legal, social, and political landscapes when considering if and how to accommodate transgender students within their schools. Special consideration should be given to the fact that without a stay on the guidance or a statement otherwise from OCR, OCR will continue to enforce its interpretation of Title IX, which will include seeking to halt federal, Title IX funds for non-compliant school districts.
by Giselle Spencer | Jul 1, 2016 | Student Education and Discipline
A U.S. District Court in Massachusetts has allowed a legal claim against city and school administrators for peer-on-peer sexual harassment under Title IX. Several of the plaintiff’s other claims were dismissed, but the Title IX harassment claim was allowed to proceed. The case will be pursued in the U.S. District Court.
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits sex discrimination and harassment in education:
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.
In Harrington v. City of Attleboro, student Noelle Harrington alleges years of sexual harassment from school bullies and, along with her mother, is suing the school district. Harrington attended Brennan Middle School in Attleboro from 2008 to 2010, where she first experienced harassment from a student who repeatedly called Noelle offensive names related to her sex and to sexual stereotyping. Two other students joined in the name calling as well. The bullying escalated to a physical assault, resulting in bruising, a sprained ankle, and a fractured wrist. The Harringtons had notified school principals, assistant principals, and the school psychologist and were told that the problems would be dealt with. They also contacted the Attleboro Police Department, who said that this was a school issue and did not intervene.
The name calling and comments continued when Noelle went to Attleboro High School in 2010. As a matter of school policy, documentation of the boys’ conduct was not transferred from the middle school. Noelle was placed in classrooms with the same boys, and the harassment continued by them and other students as well. In January 2012 the school prepared a “Safety Plan” for Noelle, giving her the right to report harassment to administrators, to access the nurse “in times of stress,” and to leave class early in order to avoid the students in the hallways. In February 2012, the student who had physically assaulted Noelle in middle school followed her from the library to her home. When her mother told a school administrator, she was told that the school would not address this conduct because it occurred outside of school and off the school property. Also that month students shined a laser pointer into Noelle’s eyes. She went to the nurse, who contacted Noelle’s mother. The Harringtons again contacted the police department and were told that the school police officer would have to handle the complaint. The Harringtons allege that the school police officer failed to respond to their complaint. The Harringtons then informed school administrators that they wanted to transfer Noelle to another school but allege that the school did not assist in placing Noelle elsewhere. When Noelle posted on Facebook about suicide, her mother consulted a crisis team, who instructed Noelle not to return to the high school. Noelle was registered at a treatment center for psychotherapeutic care. Her mother withdrew her from school on March 1, 2012.
Harrington v. City of Attleboro is a Title IX claim on the basis of sexual harassment – which includes sexual stereotyping – in education. To state a claim under Title IX for student-on-student sexual harassment, a plaintiff must show the following elements:
- He or she was subject to “severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive” sexual harassment by a peer.
- The harassment caused the plaintiff to be deprived of educational opportunities or benefits.
- The funding recipient (the school) knew of the harassment.
- The harassment took place in school programming or activities.
- The school was deliberately indifferent to the harassment such that the response, or lack of a response, was unreasonable given the nature of the known circumstances.
In allowing this claim to proceed, the US District Court acknowledges that the Harringtons have a plausible Title IX claim. Allegations for sex-based discrimination must show that the harassment was because of the person’s sex. The court noted that the students’ conduct was severe, not just “tinged with offensive sexual connotations,” and appears to be based on sexual stereotyping, such as appearance, mannerisms, and sexual preference.
The standard of deliberate indifference is stringent and requires more than allegations that a school should have done more. However, the First Circuit has suggested that a school’s failure to take additional measures after its initial measures were ineffective might constitute deliberate indifference. In Harrington v. City of Attleboro, the district court allowed this Title IX claim because the Harringtons’ allegations suggest that the school “failed to take additional reasonable measures after it learned that its initial remedies were ineffective.”
What This Means to Your District
The standard of deliberate indifference is not simply a standard of doing nothing to prevent discrimination or harassment. A school may take action yet the action not be found reasonable given the known circumstances. As the known circumstances increase and intensify, the action the school takes should increase and intensify accordingly. Ennis Britton attorneys are available for consultation with Title IX issues as with other school-related issues.
Harrington v. City of Attleboro, — F.Supp.3d –, (D. Mass. 2016) 2016 WL 1065804
by Jeremy Neff | Jun 27, 2016 | Legislation, Student Education and Discipline
Efforts to reform truancy policy in Ohio have resulted in House Bill 410, which would eliminate suspension or expulsion of students as a punishment for excessive absence. The bill, which was passed in the House and now awaits action in the Senate Education Committee, would take effect in the 2017–2018 school year. HB 410 represents a shift away from zero-tolerance approaches to unexcused absences by removing “excessive truancy” from district policy regarding violent, disruptive, or inappropriate behavior.
Boards would need to adopt or amend existing policy to address student absences. Schools would be required to set up absence intervention teams – a district or school administrator, a teacher, and the parent or guardian of the child – aimed at finding solutions to get students to class via “absence intervention plans.” The bill suggests that the team collaborate with school psychologists, counselors and social workers, as well as public agencies and nonprofit organizations, which can provide additional assistance.
Schools would be required to report to the Department of Education any cases of habitual truancy, which has been redefined by the bill in terms of hours missed instead of days missed. The student would be assigned an intervention team, which must also be reported to the Department of Education. Though the bill is aimed at avoiding court interactions, juvenile court may issue an order to require that a child attend a certain number of consecutive hours unless the student has a legitimate excused absence.
For schools, a comparison for the absence intervention plan and the new protocol for truants is perhaps the implementation of a section 504 plan. Likely, the intervention team will conduct an equivalent to a functional behavioral analysis and come up with modifications in accordance. In contrast to IEPs, which are detailed, goal oriented, and have numerous methods for enforcement by the ODE, the solutions of the intervention team are not nearly as rigidly enforced by the language of the bill.
Should a child fail to complete the absence intervention plan laid out by the intervention team, the school can file a complaint to adjudicate the student as unruly. At that point, this complaint would be held in abeyance until the child either completes or fails to comply with a court diversion program. A child who fails to complete the program could be adjudicated as a delinquent child because of chronic truancy. The consequences for the parent or guardian of a chronic truant include a minor misdemeanor charge if the court finds that their actions in any way contributed to the behavior. In addition, they must pay a surety bond of $500.
The practical implications of these changes would likely place a burden on schools. Further constraints would be imposed on their staffing, who must participate in the intervention teams at additional expense. School budgets would be forced to accommodate in-school suspensions in place of expulsions or out-of-school suspension, which would require an extra classroom and teacher. However, the bill provides for no funding to implement these changes. The new approach to truancy will undoubtedly present a challenge to districts but aims to be a more effective means of addressing student absences.
by Megan Bair | Feb 3, 2016 | Board Policy & Representation, Student Education and Discipline
The Thomas Moore Law Center, on behalf of John and Melissa Wood and their minor daughter, filed suit against the Charles County Public School District Board of Education and the High School Principal and Vice-Principal alleging that the La Plata High School “promoted Islam” by implementing a pro-Muslim lesson plan in its World History class. The Woods claim that the school concealed that it promoted Islam by leaving the topic out of a course syllabus and that students were forced to use a separate textbook for the segment on Islam but were not permitted to take it home. To that end, the Woods allege that their daughter was forced to profess and to write out the Shahada, the Islamic creed, in worksheets and quizzes.
By way of background, the lawsuit alleges that after the Woods learned of the Islamic subject matter being taught, Mr. Woods immediately contacted the school to voice his objections and to obtain an alternative assignment for his daughter. He maintains that the school ultimately refused to allow his daughter to “opt-out” of the assignments and subsequently enforced its “No Trespass” policy on him so that he was no longer permitted to enter onto school premises.
In a January statement, President and Chief Counsel of the Thomas More Law Center Richard Thompson said the school “forced Wood’s daughter to disparage her Christian faith by reciting the Shahada, and acknowledging Mohammed as her spiritual leader.”
“The Woods believe that it is a sin to profess commitment in word or writing to any god other than the Christian God,” the Thomas Moore Society says on its website. “Thus, they object to their daughter being forced to deny the Christian God and to her high school promoting Islam over other religions.”
The Woods seek a court declaration that the Defendants violated their constitutional and statutory rights, a temporary and permanent injunction barring Defendants from endorsing Islam or favoring Islam over Christianity and other religions, and from enforcing the no trespassing order issued against Mr. Wood.
