by Giselle Spencer | Jun 24, 2021 | General
In a lengthy decision, the Supreme Court of the United States found that a Pennsylvania High School overstepped when it suspended a student from the cheerleading squad for using social media to criticize her exclusion from a spot on the varsity team and a private softball team. The High Court found the school’s actions to be a violation of the student’s First Amendment rights. However, the Court stopped well short of declaring that all off-campus speech is protected from school-based regulation.
After discovering that she did not make the varsity squad, and while shopping in a convenience store the following weekend, the student at issue (B.L.) took to social media to express her displeasure with the decision in two brief Snapchat posts – one of which included profanity. The posts were initially shared with her social media friends, who shared the posts with other friends, including the child of the cheerleading squad coach. This upset team members and became a topic of chatter in a class taught by another coach. In response, B.L. was suspended from the JV squad for the upcoming year. This spurred the student and her parents to file suit in Federal Court.
After first granting a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction ordering the student’s reinstatement to the squad, the trial court ultimately ruled in B.L.’s favor, determining that there was no substantial disruption at the school. Further finding that the discipline violated B.L.’s First Amendment rights, the court awarded nominal damages, attorneys fees, and ordered the school to expunge the discipline from her record. The decision was upheld on appeal, with an added pronouncement that schools within the Third Circuit were not free to discipline for off-campus speech, which was partially defined in the opinion as “speech that is outside school-owned, -operated, or -supervised channels.”
The court went on to conclude that, since the speech here occurred off campus, the standard handed down in the oft-referenced case of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District (speech that materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disruption or invasion of the rights of others) did not apply. This very narrow reading of Tinker may have prompted the U.S. Supreme Court to accept review to clarify, among other things, the application of the Tinker standard to student speech that occurs off campus.
In its June 23, 2021 opinion delivered by Justice Breyer, the Supreme Court held that school districts may have a special interest in regulating some off-campus student speech. However, that interest primarily exists only when the Tinker test is applied and in so applying finds that the student speech materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others. However, unrestricted regulation of any speech that may relate to the school is unauthorized. In this case the Court opined that the student’s speech was not disruptive to the school environment and therefore was subject to First Amendment protection.
What this Means for Schools: While the media may portray this case as a victory for the student, in reality it is largely a carefully worded affirmation that, especially in the present technology age, actions away from school may have a disruptive impact at school. Yet the onus remains with the school to show how that disruption is manifested. The Court also affirmed a school’s authority to apply discipline to extracurricular activities only. Districts are advised to review their board policies, codes of conduct and extracurricular guidelines for the necessary support of disciplinary consequences and notice of the possibility of corrective action for violations of school rules.
Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L. ( Slip Opinion No 20-255)
by Erin Wessendorf-Wortman | Jun 7, 2021 | General, School Management
This case arose because a philosophy professor at Shawnee State University (Portsmouth, Ohio) refused to abide by the University’s policy requiring that he refer students with pronouns corresponding to their gender identity. The professor is a devout Christian whose religious convictions influence his thoughts on human nature, marriage, gender, sexuality, morality, politics, and social issues.
At the start of the 2016-17 school year, the University informed its faculty that they were required to refer to students by their preferred pronouns. The professor was informed that he would be disciplined if he refused to use a pronoun that reflects a student’s self-asserted gender identity. In his class that semester, a student requested to be referred to utilizing the female pronouns, and the professor would not oblige. The professor then requested accommodations for his religious and personal views. The student then filed a Title IX complaint against the professor. The professor’s request for religious accommodations were denied by the University, and the Title IX complaint resulted in a conclusion that the professor created a hostile environment for the students in his class; a violation of the University’s nondiscrimination policies, which resulted in discipline.
Then, the professor filed a lawsuit alleging that the University violated his rights under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Ohio Constitution, and his contract with the University.
The Sixth Circuit found that First Amendment free speech rules apply differently when it is government speech. Normally when public employees are speaking pursuant to their official duties, they are not speaking as citizens with First Amendment protections: therefore, the Constitution does not protect their speech/communications from employer discipline. However, in this case, the Sixth Circuit highlighted its belief that professors at public universities retain First Amendment protection- at least when engaged in core academic functions, such as teaching and scholarship.
The Court rejected the argument that “…teachers have no First Amendment rights when teaching, or that the government can censor teacher speech without restriction.” Hardy v. Jefferson Cmty. Coll., 260 F.3d 671, 680 (6th Cir. 2001). The Court recognized the professor’s rights to academic freedom and freedom of expression within this case, including within that academic freedom the choice to use of pronouns to shape classroom discussion. At the university level, this professor was able to make choices regarding gender identity for appropriate classroom discussion in his political philosophy courses.
In summary, the Court remanded the case back to the lower court for the lower court to issue a decision in compliance with the First Amendment rights recognized by the Sixth Circuit.
What this means for your District
While this case deals with speech from a university professor, and not that of a K-12 educator, it is a good case to be aware of when faced with situations that may arise from staff members who refuse to refer to a transgender student with the student’s preferred pronouns or nicknames. Schools are required to recognize the academic freedoms that exist for educators- but how this will be balanced against the needs of minor students in the future will be one to watch. In this case, the Court was not remotely persuaded by the arguments of the University that a hostile environment was created by the professor’s actions against the transgender students in his class, because the Court was not presented with any evidence or arguments that the student(s) was denied any educational benefits or opportunities.
Meriwether v. Hartop, (C.A. 6, 2021) 992 F.3d 492
by Jeremy Neff | Jun 4, 2021 | General, Legislation
In early February, the Ohio House introduced HB 1. This bill, often referred to as the Cupp-Patterson Plan, proposes a significant overhaul of the State’s school funding system. Chief among its objectives is developing a per-pupil funding amount that reflects actual costs, moving away from caps and guarantees, committing to a longer-term plan, and accounting for localized needs. The plan was developed during the prior session of the General Assembly and seemed poised for serious action before COVID-19 disrupted the legislative agenda.
HB 1 has enjoyed broad support among education groups, including disparate groups such as the Ohio School Boards Association and the Ohio Education Association. After it fizzled in the last session, it was widely expected to be a major part of budget debates during the first year of the current session. Not surprisingly, under Speaker Bob Cupp (the “Cupp” of “Cupp-Patterson”) the House passed its budget proposal, HB 110, with HB 1 largely incorporated. The 70-27 vote on April 21 was somewhat bipartisan with 12 Democrats joining the Yeas and 6 Republicans joining the Nays.
Like the House, the Senate is dominated by the Republican Party, but this has not resulted in easy passage of HB 110 and Speaker Cupp’s school funding reform plan. The school funding plan under consideration in the Senate moves away from the six year phase-in of the House plan, and instead provides initially larger increases in per-pupil expenditures with no commitment to longer-term increases. Notably, the Senate plan abandons the highly localized per pupil funding calculations of HB 1, and instead determines a single base cost to apply throughout the state.
Statements from leading Senators indicate a concern that the House plan would lead to unsustainable funding increases. Of particular concern to these Senators is the use of teacher salary increases as part of the calculation in base costs. They argue that increases in pay even since development of the formula mean that costs have already increases by hundreds of millions of dollars. Supporters of the House plan point to a dramatically improved state economy and tax revenues well above estimates as reasons to support an increased commitment to K-12 education. Instead, the Senate budget plan currently proposes a 5% reduction in income taxes.
Both the House and Senate budget plans move to a direct funding system for various school choice programs. This would eliminate the current process that often requires funding to be directed to school districts only to be deducted when a family uses a voucher or enrolls in a charter school. The Senate plan proposes a significant increase in voucher funding and the elimination of some restrictions on the opening of charter schools.
What this means for your District:
Joint testimony from the Ohio School Boards Association, Ohio Association of School Business Officials, and the Buckeye Association of School Administrators has urged adoption of the House plan as part of HB 110. Among other reasons, they point to the longer-term commitments and growth in K-12 funding offered by the House plan. They also point to the extensive efforts to gather stakeholder input to develop the original Cupp-Patterson Plan. Finally, they identify the process of developing an actual input/cost-based approach to identifying appropriate per-pupil funding as critical.
The current state budget expires at the end of June. In most budget years this means the General Assembly passes the new budget during a late night session on or about June 30. However, it must be noted that the current state budget was not passed until nearly two weeks into July 2019 (after a temporary measure was passed to keep the government open). The time is now to share your views on the school funding reform plan, school choice funding, and other matters relevant to K-12 education. Current legislative activity is in the Senate. It is anticipated that in late June there will be a flurry of activity in both chambers as differences between House and Senate budget bills are resolved.
by Ryan LaFlamme | Apr 9, 2021 | General, Labor and Employment, Workers’ Compensation
Creveling v. Lakepark Industries, Inc., 2021-Ohio-764
The Sixth Appellate District Court of Appeals has rendered a decision denying an employee’s claims of workers’ compensation retaliation and disability discrimination, among some other related claims.
The employee at issue was a tool and die maker. He was injured while using a machine that had rotating parts which caught the glove he was wearing and mangled his right hand, resulting in an amputation of his middle and ring finger. The Employer contacted OSHA to begin an investigation and filed a workers’ compensation claim on the employee’s behalf. The employee was eventually released to full duty by his doctor and the employer reinstated him as a tool and die maker.
Employees were trained extensively not to use gloves while using rotating equipment and the employer investigated the employee’s conduct in this regard and imposed a three-day suspension without pay. The employee admitted that he violated the policy and also executed an employee corrective action warning him that any further violations would result in his dismissal. The first day back from the suspension, the employee was witnessed wearing gloves while operating a rotating machine. The employee was reported to management and was terminated for violating the policy and the employee corrective action. The employee conceded that he had violated the corrective action.
The employee sued the employer for workers’ compensation and disability discrimination as well as wrongful termination, an intentional tort related to maintenance of the equipment, and loss of consortium on behalf of his wife.
Ohio law provides that “no employer shall discharge, demote, reassign, or take any punitive action against any employee because the employee filed a claim or instituted, pursued or testified in any proceedings under the workers’ compensation act for an injury or occupational disease which occurred in the course of and arising out of his employment with that employer.”
Workers’ compensation retaliation, like other discrimination and retaliation claims are subject to a burden-shifting analysis by the Court. The employee bears the burden to establish a “prima facie” case by showing that (1) the employee filed a workers’ compensation claim, or instituted, pursued, or testified in a workers’ compensation proceeding; (2) the employer discharged, demoted, reassigned, or took punitive action against the employer; and (3) a causal link exists between the employee’s filing or pursuit of a workers’ compensation claim and the adverse action by the employer.
If the employee can establish a prima facie case, the employer must show a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action. If the employer meets this burden, it goes back to the employee to establish that the reasons provided by the employer are merely a pretext. To do so, the employee must be able to shoe that the reasons given by the employer (1) had no basis in fact; (2) did not actually motivate the discharge; or (3) was insufficient to motivate the discharge.
The Court rejected the employee’s argument that because he was fired within 7 days of returning to work, it was sufficient to establish retaliatory motive. The Court reasoned that the firing and the employer’s knowledge of the claim were not sufficiently close enough in time to establish that proximity alone constituted evidence of retaliatory intent. Moreover, the Court found that the act of returning to work is not protected activity.
The Court also rejected evidence that the employer had a hostile attitude towards the employee based on a couple off-color remarks that were made upon his return such as “I guess you are left-handed now.” Such isolated comments, however, out of context, and in the absence of other evidence, are insufficient to establish a causal link between termination and the filing of a workers’ compensation claim.
The Court also rejected the employee’s argument that because the employer had failed to discipline other employees prior to his injury for wearing gloves, that its action to do so after the injury is evidence of a retaliatory motive. The Court found that the employee himself had not been declined for doing so prior to his injury and that he was unequivocally prohibited from doing so after his injury, before he was terminated for once again violating the policy.
The Court denied the employee’s disability discrimination law, which was made on similar factual allegations as the retaliation claim. However, here, the Court found that the employee was unable to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because he did not have a disability due to his two fingers being amputated. The Court found that the employee did not establish that the amputation caused him a substantial limitation of a major life activity. The Court recognized that he had some difficulty in adjusting to writing and other tasks with his right hand after the amputation, but he was still able to perform his work as a tool and die maker and could not establish that he was substantially limited in the performance of any major life tasks as compared to most people in the general population.
The Court also found that the employee could not have been regarded as having a disability by the employer because the employee lobbied to return to, and succeeded in securing, his former position of employment. Finally, the Court held that even if the employee could establish that he was disabled, there was insufficient evidence to find that he was terminated on account of his disability.
What this means for your District:
It is possible to terminate an employee for acts which lead to a workers’ compensation claim. A termination does not end the claim itself, just the employment relationship. Termination should be supported by an articulable violation of policy or directive or you may risk losing the burden shifting analysis. Here, the employer did not have a perfect set of facts because there was a history of non-enforcement of the policy until after the injury and there were some snide remarks made to the employee about his injuries. However, because the employer provided training, complied with its legal requirements, and kept the discipline focused on the employee’s violation of the policy and the corrective action, those little factual hiccups were not sufficient to establish a retaliatory or discriminatory motive behind the discipline action.
by Kyle Wheeler | Mar 1, 2021 | Board Policy & Representation, COVID-19 (Coronavirus), General, School Management
Earlier this month, a judge in Hamilton County sided with the Board of Education of the Cincinnati Public School District (“Board”) when she denied the Cincinnati Federation of Teachers’ (“Union”) motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction that sought to delay the return to in person learning. Cincinnati Fed. of Teachers v. Bd. of Education of the School District of Cincinnati, No. A2100376 (Feb. 1, 2021).
This case was the result of the Board voting to resume in-person instruction beginning February 1, 2021. As a result, the Union filed a motion for a temporary restraining order on the basis that the Board’s decision to resume in-person instruction violated provisions of their collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”). In particular one of the provisions of the CBA provides that the Board and the Union will cooperate with one another in making reasonable provisions for the health and safety of its teachers. Additionally, the CBA provides that if a teacher believes that they are being required to work under unsafe or unhealthy conditions beyond the normal hazards of the job, then they have a right to file a grievance. In return, the Board argued that the court should dismiss the case because it lacked jurisdiction and because the Board had the express authority to make decisions regarding in-person instruction.
In reaching its decision, the court looked to § 4 of the Norris-Laguardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 104, which generally prevents courts from granting injunctive relief involving labor disputes. However, an exception to this general rule applies if the controversy involves a labor dispute, an evidentiary hearing is held, the underlying dispute is subject to the arbitration procedure of the collective bargaining agreement, and the basis for injunctive relief are satisfied.
In evaluating the union’s claim, the court relied on previous Supreme Court precedent which held that a union’s claim that a board failed to provide them with notice and opportunity to discuss the closure of a facility fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State Employment Relations Board (“SERB”). State ex rel. Wilkinson v. Reed, 99 Ohio St.3d 106 (2003). The court in this particular case analogized the union’s failure to cooperate claim to the claim in Reed. Thus, the court concluded that SERB had exclusive jurisdiction to the claim and it therefore was not subject to the arbitration process. Because they were not subject to the arbitration process, the union’s claim did not meet the exception to the general rule that prevents courts from granting injunctive relief in a labor dispute.
The teachers in this case also filed a grievance due to their belief that they were being required to work under conditions which were unsafe or unhealthy. Though the arbitration process with respect to this grievance was proceeding, the union asked the court to issue a status quo injunction while the grievance was being resolved. In evaluating this claim, the court looked to a particular section of the CBA which stated that the Board is invested with the governmental authority and control of Cincinnati Public Schools. The provision further stated that the Board’s authority includes the authority to make rules, regulations and policies that are necessary for the government of schools, the employees, and their students.
This court further noted that the Ohio legislature has vested superintendents and boards of education with almost unlimited reasonable authority to manage and control the schools within their districts. Courts will not interfere with grant of discretionary power, so long as it is exercised in good faith and is not a clear abuse of discretion. Here, the court determined that the return to in-person instruction clearly fell within the authority granted to the Board. Thus, the court concluded that the claims brought by the Union were not arbitrable and the court could not issue an injunction.
What this means for your district?
Ohio superintendents and boards of education have the ultimate decision-making authority in determining whether their schools return to in-person instruction. Courts recognize that Ohio has granted superintendents and boards of education with almost unlimited authority to manage and govern the schools within their districts. So long as boards and superintendents exercise this power reasonably and in good faith without violating the laws of the state of Ohio, courts will seldom interfere.
by Gary Stedronsky | Feb 22, 2021 | General, Student Education and Discipline
Written by: Liz Hudson
The U.S. Supreme Court recently agreed to hear a First Amendment case about student social media use related to extracurricular activities. In June, 2020, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court’s ruling in favor of a student who was removed from the cheer team after making offensive social media posts.
Frustrated with her lack of advancement on the cheer squad, the freshman student posted to Snapchat “F*** school f*** softball f*** cheer f*** everything” to her 250 followers.When peers on the cheer team reported the message to a coach, the student was removed from the team, but later told she could try out again the following year. Her parents filed suit in a federal court on her behalf arguing that MAHS violated her First Amendment rights.
The school district contends that U.S. Supreme Court precedent justified its disciplinary action, especially a school’s prerogative to discipline students’ use of vulgar or plainly offensive speech established in Fraser.1 School policy elevated expectations of behavior for student athletes, preventing them from tarnishing the school’s image. Furthermore, cheer team rules discouraged “foul language” and required students to act with respect for the school, coaches, and others on the team. Negative internet posts about cheer were also prohibited.
The Third Circuit decided for the student because the Snapchat post was off-campus speech, and, thus, Fraser did not apply. It refused to give schools discretion to regulate vulgar speech in extracurricular activities while outside of school. The court also extended previous precedent — ultimately concluding that Tinker, which allows schools to discipline disruptive speech, “does not apply to off-campus speech.” The court determined that students’ vulgar social media posts about school or school activities fall outside parameters of school discipline. Though the court recognized possible discipline for violent posts, it punted that question to another day.
On January 8, 2021, The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case. The question certified by the Court was:
“Whether Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), which holds that public school officials may regulate speech that would materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school, applies to student speech that occurs off campus.”
Legal arguments have yet to be filed, and oral arguments have not been scheduled. Look for updates from Ennis Britton as this case progresses.
What does this mean for your district?
Schools struggle to determine appropriate student social media regulation, and courts have offered conflicting First Amendment guidance. While the Third Circuit decision is not binding for schools in Ohio, the Supreme Court decision will be, and Ohio schools will have to abide by it when it is issued. In the meantime, Ohio schools should consider using restraint when disciplining students for social media posts outside of school, even those that could potentially disrupt the education environment or extracurricular activities.
