by Jeremy Neff | Jun 4, 2021 | General, Legislation
In early February, the Ohio House introduced HB 1. This bill, often referred to as the Cupp-Patterson Plan, proposes a significant overhaul of the State’s school funding system. Chief among its objectives is developing a per-pupil funding amount that reflects actual costs, moving away from caps and guarantees, committing to a longer-term plan, and accounting for localized needs. The plan was developed during the prior session of the General Assembly and seemed poised for serious action before COVID-19 disrupted the legislative agenda.
HB 1 has enjoyed broad support among education groups, including disparate groups such as the Ohio School Boards Association and the Ohio Education Association. After it fizzled in the last session, it was widely expected to be a major part of budget debates during the first year of the current session. Not surprisingly, under Speaker Bob Cupp (the “Cupp” of “Cupp-Patterson”) the House passed its budget proposal, HB 110, with HB 1 largely incorporated. The 70-27 vote on April 21 was somewhat bipartisan with 12 Democrats joining the Yeas and 6 Republicans joining the Nays.
Like the House, the Senate is dominated by the Republican Party, but this has not resulted in easy passage of HB 110 and Speaker Cupp’s school funding reform plan. The school funding plan under consideration in the Senate moves away from the six year phase-in of the House plan, and instead provides initially larger increases in per-pupil expenditures with no commitment to longer-term increases. Notably, the Senate plan abandons the highly localized per pupil funding calculations of HB 1, and instead determines a single base cost to apply throughout the state.
Statements from leading Senators indicate a concern that the House plan would lead to unsustainable funding increases. Of particular concern to these Senators is the use of teacher salary increases as part of the calculation in base costs. They argue that increases in pay even since development of the formula mean that costs have already increases by hundreds of millions of dollars. Supporters of the House plan point to a dramatically improved state economy and tax revenues well above estimates as reasons to support an increased commitment to K-12 education. Instead, the Senate budget plan currently proposes a 5% reduction in income taxes.
Both the House and Senate budget plans move to a direct funding system for various school choice programs. This would eliminate the current process that often requires funding to be directed to school districts only to be deducted when a family uses a voucher or enrolls in a charter school. The Senate plan proposes a significant increase in voucher funding and the elimination of some restrictions on the opening of charter schools.
What this means for your District:
Joint testimony from the Ohio School Boards Association, Ohio Association of School Business Officials, and the Buckeye Association of School Administrators has urged adoption of the House plan as part of HB 110. Among other reasons, they point to the longer-term commitments and growth in K-12 funding offered by the House plan. They also point to the extensive efforts to gather stakeholder input to develop the original Cupp-Patterson Plan. Finally, they identify the process of developing an actual input/cost-based approach to identifying appropriate per-pupil funding as critical.
The current state budget expires at the end of June. In most budget years this means the General Assembly passes the new budget during a late night session on or about June 30. However, it must be noted that the current state budget was not passed until nearly two weeks into July 2019 (after a temporary measure was passed to keep the government open). The time is now to share your views on the school funding reform plan, school choice funding, and other matters relevant to K-12 education. Current legislative activity is in the Senate. It is anticipated that in late June there will be a flurry of activity in both chambers as differences between House and Senate budget bills are resolved.
by Ryan LaFlamme | Apr 9, 2021 | General, Labor and Employment, Workers’ Compensation
Creveling v. Lakepark Industries, Inc., 2021-Ohio-764
The Sixth Appellate District Court of Appeals has rendered a decision denying an employee’s claims of workers’ compensation retaliation and disability discrimination, among some other related claims.
The employee at issue was a tool and die maker. He was injured while using a machine that had rotating parts which caught the glove he was wearing and mangled his right hand, resulting in an amputation of his middle and ring finger. The Employer contacted OSHA to begin an investigation and filed a workers’ compensation claim on the employee’s behalf. The employee was eventually released to full duty by his doctor and the employer reinstated him as a tool and die maker.
Employees were trained extensively not to use gloves while using rotating equipment and the employer investigated the employee’s conduct in this regard and imposed a three-day suspension without pay. The employee admitted that he violated the policy and also executed an employee corrective action warning him that any further violations would result in his dismissal. The first day back from the suspension, the employee was witnessed wearing gloves while operating a rotating machine. The employee was reported to management and was terminated for violating the policy and the employee corrective action. The employee conceded that he had violated the corrective action.
The employee sued the employer for workers’ compensation and disability discrimination as well as wrongful termination, an intentional tort related to maintenance of the equipment, and loss of consortium on behalf of his wife.
Ohio law provides that “no employer shall discharge, demote, reassign, or take any punitive action against any employee because the employee filed a claim or instituted, pursued or testified in any proceedings under the workers’ compensation act for an injury or occupational disease which occurred in the course of and arising out of his employment with that employer.”
Workers’ compensation retaliation, like other discrimination and retaliation claims are subject to a burden-shifting analysis by the Court. The employee bears the burden to establish a “prima facie” case by showing that (1) the employee filed a workers’ compensation claim, or instituted, pursued, or testified in a workers’ compensation proceeding; (2) the employer discharged, demoted, reassigned, or took punitive action against the employer; and (3) a causal link exists between the employee’s filing or pursuit of a workers’ compensation claim and the adverse action by the employer.
If the employee can establish a prima facie case, the employer must show a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action. If the employer meets this burden, it goes back to the employee to establish that the reasons provided by the employer are merely a pretext. To do so, the employee must be able to shoe that the reasons given by the employer (1) had no basis in fact; (2) did not actually motivate the discharge; or (3) was insufficient to motivate the discharge.
The Court rejected the employee’s argument that because he was fired within 7 days of returning to work, it was sufficient to establish retaliatory motive. The Court reasoned that the firing and the employer’s knowledge of the claim were not sufficiently close enough in time to establish that proximity alone constituted evidence of retaliatory intent. Moreover, the Court found that the act of returning to work is not protected activity.
The Court also rejected evidence that the employer had a hostile attitude towards the employee based on a couple off-color remarks that were made upon his return such as “I guess you are left-handed now.” Such isolated comments, however, out of context, and in the absence of other evidence, are insufficient to establish a causal link between termination and the filing of a workers’ compensation claim.
The Court also rejected the employee’s argument that because the employer had failed to discipline other employees prior to his injury for wearing gloves, that its action to do so after the injury is evidence of a retaliatory motive. The Court found that the employee himself had not been declined for doing so prior to his injury and that he was unequivocally prohibited from doing so after his injury, before he was terminated for once again violating the policy.
The Court denied the employee’s disability discrimination law, which was made on similar factual allegations as the retaliation claim. However, here, the Court found that the employee was unable to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because he did not have a disability due to his two fingers being amputated. The Court found that the employee did not establish that the amputation caused him a substantial limitation of a major life activity. The Court recognized that he had some difficulty in adjusting to writing and other tasks with his right hand after the amputation, but he was still able to perform his work as a tool and die maker and could not establish that he was substantially limited in the performance of any major life tasks as compared to most people in the general population.
The Court also found that the employee could not have been regarded as having a disability by the employer because the employee lobbied to return to, and succeeded in securing, his former position of employment. Finally, the Court held that even if the employee could establish that he was disabled, there was insufficient evidence to find that he was terminated on account of his disability.
What this means for your District:
It is possible to terminate an employee for acts which lead to a workers’ compensation claim. A termination does not end the claim itself, just the employment relationship. Termination should be supported by an articulable violation of policy or directive or you may risk losing the burden shifting analysis. Here, the employer did not have a perfect set of facts because there was a history of non-enforcement of the policy until after the injury and there were some snide remarks made to the employee about his injuries. However, because the employer provided training, complied with its legal requirements, and kept the discipline focused on the employee’s violation of the policy and the corrective action, those little factual hiccups were not sufficient to establish a retaliatory or discriminatory motive behind the discipline action.
by Kyle Wheeler | Mar 1, 2021 | Board Policy & Representation, COVID-19 (Coronavirus), General, School Management
Earlier this month, a judge in Hamilton County sided with the Board of Education of the Cincinnati Public School District (“Board”) when she denied the Cincinnati Federation of Teachers’ (“Union”) motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction that sought to delay the return to in person learning. Cincinnati Fed. of Teachers v. Bd. of Education of the School District of Cincinnati, No. A2100376 (Feb. 1, 2021).
This case was the result of the Board voting to resume in-person instruction beginning February 1, 2021. As a result, the Union filed a motion for a temporary restraining order on the basis that the Board’s decision to resume in-person instruction violated provisions of their collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”). In particular one of the provisions of the CBA provides that the Board and the Union will cooperate with one another in making reasonable provisions for the health and safety of its teachers. Additionally, the CBA provides that if a teacher believes that they are being required to work under unsafe or unhealthy conditions beyond the normal hazards of the job, then they have a right to file a grievance. In return, the Board argued that the court should dismiss the case because it lacked jurisdiction and because the Board had the express authority to make decisions regarding in-person instruction.
In reaching its decision, the court looked to § 4 of the Norris-Laguardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 104, which generally prevents courts from granting injunctive relief involving labor disputes. However, an exception to this general rule applies if the controversy involves a labor dispute, an evidentiary hearing is held, the underlying dispute is subject to the arbitration procedure of the collective bargaining agreement, and the basis for injunctive relief are satisfied.
In evaluating the union’s claim, the court relied on previous Supreme Court precedent which held that a union’s claim that a board failed to provide them with notice and opportunity to discuss the closure of a facility fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State Employment Relations Board (“SERB”). State ex rel. Wilkinson v. Reed, 99 Ohio St.3d 106 (2003). The court in this particular case analogized the union’s failure to cooperate claim to the claim in Reed. Thus, the court concluded that SERB had exclusive jurisdiction to the claim and it therefore was not subject to the arbitration process. Because they were not subject to the arbitration process, the union’s claim did not meet the exception to the general rule that prevents courts from granting injunctive relief in a labor dispute.
The teachers in this case also filed a grievance due to their belief that they were being required to work under conditions which were unsafe or unhealthy. Though the arbitration process with respect to this grievance was proceeding, the union asked the court to issue a status quo injunction while the grievance was being resolved. In evaluating this claim, the court looked to a particular section of the CBA which stated that the Board is invested with the governmental authority and control of Cincinnati Public Schools. The provision further stated that the Board’s authority includes the authority to make rules, regulations and policies that are necessary for the government of schools, the employees, and their students.
This court further noted that the Ohio legislature has vested superintendents and boards of education with almost unlimited reasonable authority to manage and control the schools within their districts. Courts will not interfere with grant of discretionary power, so long as it is exercised in good faith and is not a clear abuse of discretion. Here, the court determined that the return to in-person instruction clearly fell within the authority granted to the Board. Thus, the court concluded that the claims brought by the Union were not arbitrable and the court could not issue an injunction.
What this means for your district?
Ohio superintendents and boards of education have the ultimate decision-making authority in determining whether their schools return to in-person instruction. Courts recognize that Ohio has granted superintendents and boards of education with almost unlimited authority to manage and govern the schools within their districts. So long as boards and superintendents exercise this power reasonably and in good faith without violating the laws of the state of Ohio, courts will seldom interfere.
by Gary Stedronsky | Feb 22, 2021 | General, Student Education and Discipline
Written by: Liz Hudson
The U.S. Supreme Court recently agreed to hear a First Amendment case about student social media use related to extracurricular activities. In June, 2020, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court’s ruling in favor of a student who was removed from the cheer team after making offensive social media posts.
Frustrated with her lack of advancement on the cheer squad, the freshman student posted to Snapchat “F*** school f*** softball f*** cheer f*** everything” to her 250 followers.When peers on the cheer team reported the message to a coach, the student was removed from the team, but later told she could try out again the following year. Her parents filed suit in a federal court on her behalf arguing that MAHS violated her First Amendment rights.
The school district contends that U.S. Supreme Court precedent justified its disciplinary action, especially a school’s prerogative to discipline students’ use of vulgar or plainly offensive speech established in Fraser.1 School policy elevated expectations of behavior for student athletes, preventing them from tarnishing the school’s image. Furthermore, cheer team rules discouraged “foul language” and required students to act with respect for the school, coaches, and others on the team. Negative internet posts about cheer were also prohibited.
The Third Circuit decided for the student because the Snapchat post was off-campus speech, and, thus, Fraser did not apply. It refused to give schools discretion to regulate vulgar speech in extracurricular activities while outside of school. The court also extended previous precedent — ultimately concluding that Tinker, which allows schools to discipline disruptive speech, “does not apply to off-campus speech.” The court determined that students’ vulgar social media posts about school or school activities fall outside parameters of school discipline. Though the court recognized possible discipline for violent posts, it punted that question to another day.
On January 8, 2021, The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case. The question certified by the Court was:
“Whether Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), which holds that public school officials may regulate speech that would materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school, applies to student speech that occurs off campus.”
Legal arguments have yet to be filed, and oral arguments have not been scheduled. Look for updates from Ennis Britton as this case progresses.
What does this mean for your district?
Schools struggle to determine appropriate student social media regulation, and courts have offered conflicting First Amendment guidance. While the Third Circuit decision is not binding for schools in Ohio, the Supreme Court decision will be, and Ohio schools will have to abide by it when it is issued. In the meantime, Ohio schools should consider using restraint when disciplining students for social media posts outside of school, even those that could potentially disrupt the education environment or extracurricular activities.
by Gary Stedronsky | Jan 15, 2021 | General, Labor and Employment
The Ohio Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Appellate District recently addressed a dispute between the Portage County Educators Association for Developmental Disabilities-Unit B, OEA/NEA and the Portage County Board of Developmental Disabilities. During a labor dispute, members of the union picketed on sidewalks outside the private residences of six Board members and outside the employer of one Board member. The State Employment Relations Board (SERB) determined that was an unfair labor practice based on language in R.C. 4117.11(B)(7), which makes picketing related to a labor relations dispute at the residence or place of private employment of any public official an unfair labor practice.
The union argued that the statute was an unconstitutional restriction on speech because the picketing in question took place on public sidewalks and streets. Those are quintessential public forums where speech enjoys a great deal of protection.
The court of appeals needed to first determine if the unfair labor practice statute was “content-based” or “content-neutral.” Content-neutral restrictions enjoy intermediate scrutiny and are presumed valid. Content-based restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny review and are presumed invalid. In this case, the court found that the statutory restriction was content-based because it prohibited picketing in certain locations only when that picketing was related to a labor relations dispute.
Given the determination that the statute was a content-based restriction on speech, the presumption of unconstitutionality could only be overcome by a showing that the regulation is (a) necessary to serve a compelling state interest; and (b) narrowly tailored to achieve that interest by the least restrictive means. Ultimately, the court found that SERB failed to show that the statute served a compelling state interest or that it was narrowly tailored. As a result, the court held that the statutory language was unconstitutional, and the union did not commit an unfair labor practice.
What this means for your District?
Picketing outside the homes or places of employment of school board members is permissible in certain counties in Ohio. The Eleventh Appellate District has jurisdiction over Ashtabula, Geauga, Lake, Portage and Trumbull Counties. This decision is binding in those counties. The Eighth Appellate District, which serves Cuyahoga County, previously reached the same conclusion in 1998. At least in those counties, an unfair labor practice will not be found if union members picket on public streets or sidewalks in front of board of education members’ homes or places of employment.
The Seventh Appellate District reached the opposite conclusion in 2016. Given the conflict among these courts, it is not clear throughout Ohio whether it is an unfair labor practice to picket outside the homes or places of employment of public officials. It is possible that this decision will be appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court where a definitive answer can be had. We will certainly update our clients if this case is appealed and decided by the Ohio Supreme Court.
by Gary Stedronsky | Oct 14, 2020 | Construction & Real Estate, COVID-19 (Coronavirus), General
The COVID-19 pandemic has impacted our lives and businesses in ways we never envisioned. The real estate market has certainly not been spared. Office space, hotels, restaurants and retail establishments have been particularly hard hit. Demand for office space is likely to decline given our adaptation to working at home. As of July 30th, the American Hotel and Lodging Association reported that more than half of hotel rooms were empty across the country with many hotels being completely closed.1 Many of our favorite restaurants and retail establishments have also been forced to close during the pandemic. All of this is likely to affect real estate values for years to come.
Starting in January, property owners will have the option to file complaints with their county boards of revision seeking to lower the county auditor’s value assigned to their properties (and their tax bills). We anticipate that many property owner’s will take advantage of this opportunity. However, their complaints may be premature. That is because real estate taxes are paid one year in arrears. Thus, any complaint filed next year is for valuation during the 2020 tax year. By law, boards of revision must establish value next year as of January 1, 2020. As of that date, the COVID-19 pandemic had not greatly impacted our lives or the real estate market. Nonetheless, many property owners will not realize this distinction and will file anyway.
County boards of revision understand and appreciate this aspect of the law. However, the individuals who sit on those boards, which sometimes include elected officials, are often empathetic toward property owners who face significant challenges with their commercial businesses or properties. For that reason, it is not uncommon for boards of revision to grant relief even though they technically should not do so under law. They are easily able to do so when property owners are unopposed.
Faced with similar issues during the great recession, the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals made it clear that general references to decreased real estate values will not be enough to sustain a reduction in property value. In Price v. Summit County Board of Revision, 2012 WL 440783 (February 7, 2012), a property owner sought to reduce the value of his properties due to the recession and foreclosure crisis. The BTA rejected his request because it “has consistently rejected the notion that real property values must necessarily rise or fall commensurate with some preconceived notion of ‘historical trending’ or inflationary/deflationary rates.”
To help ensure county boards of revision uphold the law, school districts are advised to strongly consider filing counter-complaints against requests for reduction that appear unwarranted. Under R.C. 5715.19, boards of education are entitled to notice of all valuation complaints that seek to decrease the value of real property by $50,000 or more. Boards of education have the option to file counter-complaints contesting those decrease requests within 30 days of receipt of that notification.
What this means for your district?
Decreases in value through the county board of revision process directly impact the tax revenue received by school districts. Any decrease in valuation will result in a refund issued to the property owner. Those refunds are directly taken from school funding via the county treasurer settlement statements. We anticipate that school districts will face many decrease complaints next year, some of which are sure to be unwarranted. Ennis Britton attorneys can help school districts determine when it is appropriate to file counter-complaints to contest unwarranted decrease complaints to help maintain the tax valuation of the district.
1https://www.ahla.com/covid-19s-impact-hotel-industry
