Want to Use Cooperative Purchasing Power for Construction Services? Call Your Representatives!

HB 145, 135th  General Assembly

There is legislation currently pending in the House to clarify that ORC 9.48 applies to construction services.  The attorneys here at Ennis Britton frequently hear from superintendents, treasurers, and business managers from around the State that they would like cooperative purchasing to be more accessible for some construction services.  This is an opportunity to do just that, so now is the time to contact your representatives to support this bill.

By way of background, cooperative purchasing is a procurement process whereby large purchasing power is leveraged to secure a wider range of vendors and better prices.  The contracts available through cooperative purchasing are publicly and competitively secured so the individual district taking advantage of an available contract does not have to go through competitive bidding itself.

In 1997, the General Assembly allowed cooperative purchasing for counties and townships. Then, in 2008, cooperative purchasing was expanded to all political subdivisions of the State, including school districts through section 9.48 of the Ohio Revised Code.

9.48 provides that a school district may acquire equipment, materials, supplies, or services through cooperative (joint) purchasing programs operated by any state or national association of political subdivisions.

Unfortunately, The Ohio Attorney General issued an opinion in 2019 that concluded that political subdivisions could not use cooperative purchasing pursuant to Section 9.48 in order to procure construction services because the statute does not use that term. “If the legislature intended to include “construction services” in R.C. 9.48, it could have used language to do so. R.C. 9.48, however, does not contain the terms “construction” or “construction services.” Consequently, we conclude that the General Assembly did not intend to include construction or construction services among the list of items, which a political subdivision may secure under the purchasing authority described in R.C. 9.48.”

While it is true that an Attorney General opinion is not binding law, school districts are cautioned against using this method or procurement to secure construction services. In the absence of any other interpretation, an auditor or grant coordinator could determine that cooperative purchasing under 9.48 is not a valid method of procurement for construction services using this opinion as support.

This bill would clarify that “services” include “construction services.” This change would grant school districts and other political subdivisions more options, flexibility, and control over their purchasing decisions. The Bill, introduced by representatives Thomas Hall and Brian Lampton, was referred to the State and Local Government Committee on April 28, 2023.

What does this mean for your district?

While caution is warranted about RC 9.48, there are other methods through which cooperative purchasing may be used for improvements. If you have a project for which you are thinking of using cooperative purchasing, contact one of the attorneys at Ennis Britton to make sure you stay in compliance.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Court of Appeals Overrules Trial Court in Employee Termination Matter

Court of Appeals Overrules Trial Court in Employee Termination Matter

Matthews v. Springfield-Clark CTC Bd. of Edn., 2023-Ohio-1304.

Springfield Clark CTC terminated a custodial supervisor for a variety of reasons, including, going into his supervisor’s office and reviewing, copying, and removing documents, all of which were supported by video.  The employee had been the subject of prior discipline and had been placed on an improvement plan which was never started.

During the termination process, the employee was given a pre-disciplinary hearing where he was provided with details of all of the allegations.  He was also given an opportunity to provide evidence in his defense.  Following this meeting, the Superintendent recommended termination, and a hearing was held before the Board of Education from which a transcript was created.  The employee did not call any witnesses.   Following the hearing, the Board of Education terminated the employee.

The employee appealed to the Common Pleas Court which overruled the termination.  As the basis for this reversal, the trial court made several findings.  First, the trial court ruled that an employee had a “presumption of innocence” and that the process violated “fundamental fairness” citing that it was the employer’s burden of proving the misconduct.  In support, the trial court cited a passage from the letter from the Superintendent that stated “because the allegation of misconduct has not been disproven” and thus it is “determined to be an act of malfeasance”. 

The trial court also took issue with the fact that the employee’s supervisor did not testify at the hearing, denying the employee his fundamental right of cross-examination.

Lastly, the trial court gave little to no deference to the Board of Education’s findings and decision, despite the wealth of evidence introduced at the hearing regarding past discipline, the video evidence provided, the Superintendent’s testimony, and the lack of credible evidence in the employee’s defense.  Of note, the trial court stated that the Superintendent’s testimony was unreliable hearsay, despite accepting the employee’s introduction of unsupported hearsay testimony. The Board appealed the trial court’s decision.

The Court of Appeals found that all required due process was provided.  He was given a pre-disciplinary hearing where he was presented with all allegations against him.  He was given the chance to call witnesses and to be represented by an attorney.  The Court of Appeals further stated that the standard applied by the trial court of a presumption of innocence was in error, stating the only burden on an employer is to provide evidence sufficient to justify termination.  The trial court’s characterization of the language in the Superintendent’s letter was described as flawed reasoning.

Regarding the lack of testimony and ability to cross-examine, the Court of Appeals specifically stated that cross-examination is not an absolute requirement for due process.

As to the lack of deference, after reviewing the record, the Court of Appeals found the trial court gave no deference to the Board of Education’s credibility decisions and resolution of evidentiary conflicts, instead expressing the court’s view of what the discipline should have been.  Thus, the Court of Appeals found the trial court erred and reversed the decision.

What this means to your district:  It is absolutely pertinent that the appropriate process is followed.  In this instance, that adherence allowed the District to obtain a positive result even after receiving a decision from the trial court that relied on “flawed reasoning.”

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Court Finds Coach Retweeting Book Passage was Fair Use

Bell v. The Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 123 LRP 2649 (E.D. Wis. 12/21/22).

The Eastern District of Wisconsin recently dismissed an author’s copyright infringement claim against a high school basketball coach and school district finding in favor of the school district’s fair use defense.

Dr. Keith Bell, author of the book “Winning isn’t normal” sued a high school basketball coach and school district after the coach retweeted a famous excerpt from the book. Bell alleged that not only did the coach violate the copyright of the book as a whole when he retweeted the passage, but separately violated the copyright of the famous “Winning isn’t normal” passage from within the book as well.

The school district asserted that the retweet was fair use under the Copyright Act of 1976. Fair use, which is a defense to copyright infringement claims, allows for the use of copyrighted work, under certain conditions, without permission of the copyright owner. Under the Copyright Act, a court must consider four factors when applying the fair use doctrine: (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether it’s for commercial or nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for the copyrighted work.

The court found that while the coach’s retweet copied the entirety of a “somewhat creative passage,” his action was balanced against the fact that the passage was freely available on the internet and the author’s website. Additionally, the court noted that while the retweeted passage was the “heart” of the book, the copied passage was a relatively small portion of the book and was entirely noncommercial. Furthermore, the court found that the retweet did no damage to the author’s financial position, and that the retweet may even help the author’s position by increasing the public’s interest in the book as a whole. Thus, the District Court held that the coach’s retweet of the “Winning isn’t normal” passage was fair use and the author’s claim had to be dismissed.

What does this mean for your district? To avoid copyright infringement claims, districts should train their staff on how to avoid using or sharing copyrighted material without permission. With the rise of school districts and district employees using social media, school districts should ensure that any social media training should include what may and may not be shared to avoid copyright infringement claims. Fair use is not as simple as some believe in terms of educational use and so while the coach’s actions were vindicated here, caution is warranted.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The 9th Circuit Rules On Graduation Dress Code

The 9th Circuit Rules On Graduation Dress Code

Waln v. Dysart Sch. Dist., 54 F.4th 1152 (9th Cir. 2022).

In 2019, Dysart School District prohibited a student from decorating her graduation cap. The school district had a graduation policy that prohibited students from decorating their graduation caps; however, the student had requested a religious exemption. The student, a member of the Sisseton Wahpeton Oyate tribe of the Sioux Nation, wanted to decorate her cap with an eagle feather that had been blessed in a religious ceremony and was to be worn “in times of great honor.” The district, however, rejected her request. When the student showed up to graduation with the decorated cap, school officials did not let her inside the venue. However, school officials permitted other students into the venue who had decorated caps that also violated the dress code. For example, the district allowed one student who decorated their cap with a breast cancer sticker inside the venue.

The student subsequently brought claims against the district, alleging that the district violated her freedom of speech and religion. Specifically, the student claimed that prohibiting her from wearing the non-secular decorated graduation cap, while other secular decorated caps were permitted, violated the free exercise and speech clause of the United States Constitution.

The Ninth Circuit first analyzed the free exercise claim. The court noted that if the district did not enforce the policy to exclude a student’s secular message, such as the breast cancer sticker, then, without some appropriate justification, the district could not enforce its policy against the plaintiff. The court thus held that because the school district did not apply the policy “to the same degree” towards all students but rather executed the policy in a “selective manner,” the district potentially violated the free exercise clause of the U.S. Constitution.

The Ninth Circuit then turned to the free speech claim. The court emphasized that school districts may not engage in viewpoint discrimination, which occurs when the government restricts speech on the basis of the specific “ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker.” The court ultimately found that the school’s general policy of prohibiting decorated caps was not viewpoint discrimination. The court held that on its face, the policy is viewpoint neutral because “it prohibits all speech from all students on all graduation caps at the ceremony.” However, even if a policy is viewpoint neutral on its face, it can still violate the Constitution when not applied uniformly. Because the school district, in this case, applied the viewpoint neutral policy in a selective way, the school did infringe on the student’s freedom of speech.

Thus, the Ninth Circuit ultimately determined that the school district’s actions were likely a violation of the free exercise and speech clauses of the Constitution, holding that “general applicability requires, among other things, that the laws be enforced evenhandedly.” The case was remanded to the trial court.

What does this mean for your district? There remains support for the conclusion that a court would find that a policy that bans all decorations from all caps is viewpoint neutral and thus not an infringement on students’ first amendment rights. However, if your district intends to have such a policy, officials should be trained to apply the policy evenhandedly in order to refrain from violating a student’s rights.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Court of Appeals Holds that a Township’s Email Lists are Not Public Records

Court of Appeals Holds that a Township’s Email Lists are Not Public Records

Hicks v. Union Twp., 2023-Ohio-874

The Twelfth District Court of Appeals (Brown, Butler, Clermont, Clinton, Fayette, Madison, Preble, Warren) recently ruled in a public records case that a township’s email and mail lists, used by the township for the publication of newsletters and other communications, were not public records because the lists did not “document the activities or operations of the office.”

The requester asked for the “the full email list used for township newsletters” and “the full mail list used for township newsletters.” After several exchanges between the requester and the township, during which the requester was repeatedly told that the lists were not public records and would not be produced, the requester filed suit, pro se.

The requester argued, in essence, that the township uses the lists to and keep citizens informed of the activities of the office.  Thus, according to the requester, the lists document the functions and activities of the township.

The Court of Claims appointed a special master and the case was unsuccessfully referred to mediation.

The township administrator testified via affidavit that a third-party vendor facilitates the mailing of the newsletter and the mailing lists for the newsletter. The township also provides an opportunity for interested persons to subscribe and receive the newsletter electronically. On the township website, subscribers are asked to enter their names and email addresses to receive the newsletter.  The township maintains the list, but it is used only for the administrative purpose of issuing the electronic newsletter.

The requester submitted an affidavit of a former township administrator, but it largely focused on the content and development of the newsletter over time. The affidavit confirmed how the lists were maintained.  Based on the affidavit, the requester argued that the “requested information is essential to the ability of Requester to understand and form a critique of a specific function of the government, staffed and paid for with tax dollars.” The requester indicated he desired to obtain the lists to “evaluate the conduct of the newsletter program.” For example, the requester indicated he wished to learn to whom the newsletter was being sent  (residences and businesses, or only residences), if there were any citizens being omitted, if there was an overlap of individuals receiving the newsletter by mail and email, how “well-saturated” the email list was, and whether the emails included “valid or bot accounts.”

The Court of Appeals reasoned that while the lists did constitute “documents, devices or items” which are “kept” by the Township, the third prong of the analysis, (i.e., that the record document the “organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities” of the public office) was not met. The Court looked to precedents which held that simply because an item is received and kept by a public office does not transform it into a record.  Home addresses have been analyzed in other contexts, such as requests for personnel files.  The Ohio Supreme Court has held that “at best, home addresses represent contact information used as a matter of administrative convenience,” and that they “reveal little or nothing about the employing agencies or their activities.” 

 Furthermore, the Court found that the recipients of the newsletters, (who could be anyone, not just citizens) were not part of the decision-making process surrounding the newsletter and they do not assist the township in the performance of its functions.  The Court applied essentially the same analysis to the hard copy mailing list.

What this Means for Your District

Not every record in the possession of the school district is a public record. The document must meet all three parts of the test in order to be a public record. Careful analysis is always required however. It would not be wise to categorically deny a request for a distribution list, for example, without first considering the nature of the list, what it is used for, how the persons on the list are placed there and for what purpose. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Fourth Round of Direct Certification with Medicaid States Selected

Fourth Round of Direct Certification with Medicaid States Selected

The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) recently announced that 14 new states, including Ohio, have been selected to participate in the Direct Certification with Medicaid Demonstration Projects for the 2023-2024 school year. With the 2023-2024 addition, a total of 39 states are now eligible to participate. The demonstration of Direct Certification with Medicaid for Free and Reduced-Price Meals (DCM-F/PR) authorizes states and school districts to use information from Medicaid data to identify eligible students to receive free or reduced lunches. The program allows students to be certified for free or reduced meals without household applications. In the 2019-2020 school year more than 1.2 million students were certified for free meals, and 240,000 students were certified for reduced-price meals.

To learn more about the program visit the USDA website.

What this means for your District: School districts will want to be on the watch for information from the USDA in how the Medicaid system will “talk” to the USDA’s system for reporting students who are eligible for free or reduced-price meals.