IDEA, Child Find, and Evaluations

During Ennis Britton’s October 2017 Special Education Symposium, participants around the state were given the opportunity to submit questions on note cards. Because of time constraints and the large response, our Special Education Team was not able to address all of these questions during the presentations. In the coming months we will address some of these questions through blog posts and a new feature called “Special Education Spotlight” in the School Law Review newsletter.

One participant asked how to respond to a parent who asks for her child to be evaluated under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) when the district does not suspect a disability but the parent has a private evaluation that concludes the student has a disability.

This scenario brings at least two parts of IDEA into play. The first is the issue of child find. A district has an obligation to “find,” or identify, all children within its territory that are potentially eligible under IDEA or Section 504. This is an affirmative obligation, meaning that each district must take active steps to identify such children – it is not enough to wait for parents to ask for an evaluation. That said, a parent certainly has a right to ask for an evaluation. In such a case, the district should respond in writing to the request using a Prior Written Notice form (PR01), either agreeing to proceed with an evaluation or refusing to do so.

A district should be cautious about refusing to evaluate a child when, as is the case in this scenario, an outside evaluator has identified the child as having a disability. Even when a school has not observed anything to suggest that a child has a disability, it is possible that he or she does. For example, a child might have ADHD but not exhibit characteristics at school due to effective medication. Such a child may still be eligible under Section 504 because the law requires districts to factor out mitigating measures such as medication in making eligibility determinations.

Second, assuming the district in this scenario proposes to evaluate the child, the parent consents, and the evaluation is completed, the IEP team may need to consider the private evaluation shared by the parent as part of the evaluation process. This is required whenever a parent acquires an independent educational evaluation (IEE) that meets a district’s reasonable criteria (credentials of the evaluator, validity of the evaluations, etc.). The good news is that in this scenario, absent an order from a court or hearing officer, the district is not required to pay for the IEE because the parent did not disagree with a district evaluation at the time the IEE was acquired.

Even when an IEE meets a district’s reasonable criteria, the law does not require absolute deference by the IEP team to the opinions of an outside expert. In fact, the law gives the IEP team the ultimate discretion as to how much weight to give to the IEE. The specific regulatory language requires the IEP team to “consider” the IEE. This means that the team reviews the information, holds it up against other information the team has about the child, and engages in meaningful discussion of the information. It does not mean that the team adopts all findings or directions of an outside evaluator because he or she is an “expert” or holds some sort of advanced degree. Remember, while outside opinions can be helpful, in most circumstances the outside evaluator will have spent at most a few hours with the child in a clinical setting. The IEP team will typically have weeks, if not months or years, of experiences with the child in an authentic setting. School personnel should neither be intimidated nor diminish their own expertise when presented with an IEE.

In the end, if a parent has sought an outside evaluation before asking the school to conduct an evaluation, and the school does not suspect a disability, this may be a sign of further disputes to follow. An early conversation with a member of Ennis Britton’s Special Education Team may be beneficial as you respond to scenarios such as this.

Supreme Court’s Special Education Decision

Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District

On March 22 the U.S. Supreme Court published an opinion in a significant special education case. Issuing out of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Colorado, Endrew v. Douglas poses the question of what level of educational benefit public schools must provide to students with disabilities in order to satisfy the requirement of a free appropriate public education (FAPE) according to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).

The Supreme Court last heard arguments on this topic in the 1982 case Board of Education v. Rowley, in which the Court determined that an individualized education program (IEP) must be “reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.” Since that time, federal courts across the country have issued differing opinions on the level of educational benefits that students must receive, with the majority of circuits requiring “merely more than de minimis” or “some benefit” (including the Tenth Circuit, where this case originated from). Only three circuits (one of which is the Sixth Circuit, which includes Ohio) have held to a higher standard – “meaningful benefit.”

The Supreme Court’s March 22 opinion expands upon the FAPE standard set forth in Rowley:

To meet its substantive obligation under the IDEA, a school must offer an IEP reasonably calculated
to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.

The U.S. Department of Education had suggested in a court brief that school districts offer a program “aimed at significant educational progress in light of the child’s circumstances.” While the Supreme Court adopted “appropriate” instead of “significant” as the standard, its unanimous decision confirms that a standard requiring nothing more than a minimal educational benefit is too low.

The Court’s holding does not overrule the Rowley decision. Instead, in clearly rejecting other, higher standards, and declining the low standard adopted by the lower court, the High Court underscored Rowley’s emphasis on individualized benefits based on each child’s potential progress. Although the family sought imposition of a standard that was “substantially equal to the opportunities afforded children without disabilities,” such as attaining self-sufficiency and contributing to society in equal ways, the Court rejected that idea as “entirely unworkable” and noted that it would be “plainly at odds” with Rowley. The 1982 Rowley case also considered but rejected similar language regarding reaching the maximum potential of each student. Higher standards such as this would significantly increase costs to districts for the more than six million students with disabilities.

Although “progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances” is worded differently from the Sixth Circuit’s standard of a “meaningful benefit,” in practice it should be similar. As our circuit has held the highest standard throughout the country, districts that have held to this standard in their IEPs will likely not see a significant change in their IEPs and services. The Supreme Court’s decision may have a greater effect on special education programs in circuits whose standard has previously been lower, such as the Tenth Circuit’s standard of merely more than the minimum.

Even with the Supreme Court’s decision, this is not the end of the saga for Endrew F. Now the case goes back to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals to issue a ruling consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision to reject the previous, lower standard that the circuit had used.

Supreme Court to Decide Level of Educational Benefit for Students with Disabilities

On January 11, the U.S. Supreme Court heard arguments in one of the most significant special education cases in past three decades. In the 1982 case Board of Education v. Rowley, the Supreme Court determined that an individualized education program (IEP) must be “reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.” Since then, federal courts have weighed in on educational benefits, some determining that a minimum standard, de minimis, is enough, while others, including the Sixth Circuit (Deal v. Hamilton Bd. of Ed., No. 03-5396, 6th Cir. 2004), have held that a meaningful educational benefit is needed. With federal circuits divided on this federal issue, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case at hand. The question before the Court is as follows:

What level of educational benefit must school districts confer on children with disabilities to provide them with the free appropriate public education guaranteed by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)?

Endrew F., who goes by the name Drew, is a student with autism in Colorado. He was placed on an IEP from preschool through fourth grade. His proposed IEP for fifth grade contained goals that his parents say too closely resembled the goals from previous years. Dissatisfied with the progress Drew was making in public school, his parents withdrew him and enrolled him in private school.

Drew’s parents filed a complaint with Colorado’s Department of Education, claiming that Drew had been deprived of a free appropriate public education (FAPE). The parents also claimed that Drew had made academic, social, and behavioral progress in private school. They asked to be reimbursed for the cost of his private schooling, per IDEA, which provides for reimbursement of private school tuition and related expenses if a public school cannot meet the educational needs of a student with a disability. Drew’s parents and the school district argued their case in an administrative hearing, then in a federal district court, and finally on appeal in the Tenth Circuit Court. All of the rulings were in favor of the school district, finding that the public school had provided Drew with FAPE, that he had made “some academic progress” which was “more than de minimis,” and that his IEP was “substantively adequate.”

IDEA grants students with disabilities with the right to receive “appropriate” special education and related services at public expense. The IEP must be designed to provide for this “appropriate public education” under IDEA. However, IDEA does not define the term “appropriate,” nor does it define the required level of educational benefit.

Clearly, the law requires that special education be designed to each child’s individual needs and that schools provide services to benefit special education students. How far schools must go to benefit students, however, remains unclear.

The 1982 Rowley case involved a deaf student who was an excellent lip reader. Her parents asked for an interpreter, but the school said she was doing well enough that she didn’t need one. Her parents contended that she was not reaching her full potential, but the Supreme Court held that a school is not required to maximize each student’s potential. After the Rowley decision in 1982, many federal courts used the analogy that schools provide the educational equivalent of “a serviceable Chevrolet” but not a “Cadillac.”

The level of educational benefit therefore remains unclear and undefined, which results in inconsistent federal court decisions. The standards in federal court range from merely more than a minimum benefit, to some benefit, to a meaningful benefit. The Endrew v. Douglas case currently in the Supreme Court goes beyond the two extremes of minimum benefit and maximum potential and focuses specifically on the level of educational benefit required of schools under IDEA.

The Supreme Court requested input from the federal government, which urged the Court to reverse the Tenth Circuit’s ruling, noting that it “is not consistent with the text, structure, or purpose of the IDEA … and it has the effect of depriving children with disabilities of the benefits Congress has granted them by law.”

A report summarizing the January 11 Supreme Court arguments notes that one thing was relatively clear: “The justices were dissatisfied with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit’s ruling that school districts can satisfy federal education law as long as they offer a student with a disability an educational program that provides him or her with a benefit that is more than merely de minimis, or non-trivial.” The justices were also concerned with imposing additional costs on school districts by requiring them to provide increased services and creating educational standards without being educational experts. They considered the idea of flexibility in IDEA, possibly tailoring special education to the student rather than to the grade level.

Counsel for the U.S. Solicitor General argued that IDEA requires a program “aimed at significant educational progress in light of the child’s circumstances,” which led to discussion among the justices about the right words and adjectives to describe the standard. While Justice Sotomayer thought that IDEA “provides enough to set a clear standard,” Justice Roberts concluded the law has “really nothing concrete” for courts to review.

Neal Katyal, the attorney for the school district, argued that the level of “some benefit” is the same as “more than merely de minimis,” and this is the level he was advocating. Justice Breyer noted that IDEA has been amended so that an IEP is designed for students to “make progress in general education” and concluded that “some benefit” along with “make progress” equals more than a minimum standard. Katyal noted that the more-than-minimum standard has worked for many years, and Justice Ginsburg hinted that this standard had no precedent for the Court and could be replaced with something more stringent.

The U.S. Department of Education proposed a standard that school districts offer a program “aimed at significant educational progress in light of the child’s circumstances,” which the justices seemed to regard as most consistent with existing law.

Drew has garnered support from organizations such as the National Center for Learning Disabilities and the Parents Education Network in addition to more than a hundred members of Congress. Without taking sides, the National Association of State Directors of Special Education filed a legal brief saying that schools already provide a “meaningful benefit”through IEPs.

Although a decision is not expected until this spring or summer, this case is likely to have significant impact on special education programs throughout the country.

OCR Says Websites Lack 504/ADA Accommodations

Over the past year, the U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) has shown an increased focus on public school district websites. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) require that public school district websites be accessible to individuals with disabilities. After investigating a number of complaints, OCR ultimately concluded that school website content is often inaccessible to individuals with disabilities, particularly blind and visually impaired users, deaf or hard-of-hearing users, and users with disabilities that affect motor control and their ability to use a mouse.

In February and March of 2016, OCR reviewed complaints filed against 11 different educational organizations in the United States and in one U.S. territory, raising website accessibility issues under Section 504 and the ADA. Section 504 and the ADA require public school districts to provide individuals who have qualified disabilities with equal access to programs, services, and activities unless doing so would fundamentally alter the nature of the programs. OCR has indicated on numerous occasions that accommodations must be made to district websites and other online resources in accordance with Section 504 and the ADA.

The most common problems OCR identified with websites are as follows:

  • Images with no accompanying text descriptions, or “alt tags”
  • Navigation that requires the use of a mouse
  • Videos that lack accompanying audio, transcript, or closed captioning
  • Color combinations that make text difficult to read

On June 29, 2016, OCR announced that it had reached voluntary agreements with all 11 organizations, which now have 18 months to resolve the issues under the terms of the agreements. The agreements contained mandates such as development of corrective action plans, completion of a thorough audit to ensure access and functionality, adoption of policies and procedures to ensure accessibility to all content added in the future, and posting notices to disabled individuals that contain information on how an individual can request access to online information or inaccessible content, among other things.

Interestingly, the University of Montana conducted a student survey after receiving an OCR complaint in 2012 about web accessibility from students enrolled in online coursework. The survey results indicated that many of the complaints were caused by a misunderstanding or lack of awareness about available accessibility options. So, along with other ameliorative measures, the university invested resources to educate its student body about web accessibility. The university reached a formal resolution with OCR in 2014.

Catherine E. Lhamon, OCR’s Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, weighed in on the matter when she stated, “As schools, school districts, states, and territories turn to the Internet as a way to provide relevant and up-to-date information to their audiences in a cost-effective manner, they must make sure they are not inadvertently excluding people with disabilities from their online programs, services, and activities.”

OCR’s recent action on this important accommodations issue highlights the need for public school districts to conduct a formal review of website and social media programs to determine whether content is indeed accessible to individuals who suffer from disabilities. Along the same line, districts should regularly assess all types of technology use during school and extracurricular activities to further consider whether the chosen technologies interfere in any way with a disabled individual’s ability to access programs or participate in school activities. Board policies should be reviewed as part of this process. School districts are encouraged to consult with legal counsel to discuss the implications of this important topic and obtain resources that may further assist with compliance under Section 504 and the ADA.

Court Weighs School’s Regulation of Off-Campus Speech

A school district’s authority to discipline a student for off-campus speech is an increasingly relevant concern today for public schools. Inappropriate or offensive speech can cause lasting injury to victims and can trigger significant community backlash and unrest. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently addressed this issue in a case that arose out of Oregon.

The case was filed after a school district suspended a seventh-grade student named C.R. for harassing two other students from school. C.R. and some of his friends had been involved in an escalating series of encounters with two sixth-grade students, a girl and a boy, both disabled, first calling them vulgar names and later increasing to sexual taunting. On the day of the incident at issue, the students were traveling home from school through a public park adjacent to school property, just a few hundred feet from the campus. About five minutes after school let out, C.R. and his friends circled around the two younger students, commenting and questioning them about sexual acts and pornography. A school employee rode by the students on her bicycle, noticed the group, and stopped to help the younger girl and boy. The girl reported that the encounter made her feel unsafe, and the employee walked the two students home.

After investigating the incident, school administrators concluded that C.R. was the “ringleader” of the group and that the conduct fell within the district’s definition of sexual harassment. All of the boys were disciplined. C.R. was suspended for two days, not only because of the harassment but also because he had lied to administrators during the investigation and had disregarded their request to not discuss the interview with his friends.

C.R.’s parents filed a lawsuit a year after the incident, alleging that his First Amendment and due process rights had been violated and that the school lacked authority to discipline him. The school district moved for summary judgment, which was granted by the district court. The parents appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit, which considered the following.

Was C.R.’s conduct sexual harassment? The school had a policy that defined sexual harassment, and the investigation had yielded evidence that C.R.’s behavior fit within that definition. The Ninth Circuit Court noted, “Federal courts owe significant deference to a school’s interpretation of its own rules and policies. … We uphold a school’s disciplinary determinations so long as the school’s interpretation of its rules and policies is reasonable, and there is evidence to support the charge.” Therefore, the court upheld the district’s conclusion that C.R.’s behavior was considered sexual harassment.

Could the school regulate his speech and discipline him? The court first considered whether the school could permissibly regulate the student’s off-campus speech at all, and then considered whether the school’s regulation of the student’s speech complied with the requirements of the First Amendment.

Regulation of students’ on-campus speech is well established as constitutional; however, regulation of off-campus speech is another matter. Following a previous Supreme Court decision (Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)), regulation of student speech is permissible if the speech “might reasonably lead school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities” or if the speech might collide “with the rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone.” Speech that is merely offensive is not sufficient; however, sexually harassing speech is more than that. Sexually harassing speech, the court held, implicates other students’ rights to be secure, threatening their sense of physical, emotional, and psychological security.

The age of the student who is being harassed is also relevant. The Supreme Court has noted that children younger than age 14 are less mature, and therefore overtly sexual speech could be more seriously damaging to them. For this reason, elementary schools may exercise greater control over student speech than secondary schools.

The court held that the school district did indeed have the authority to discipline C.R. for his harassing speech, even if it was off campus, for a number of reasons:

  • All of the individuals involved were students
  • The incident took place –
    • On the students’ walk home
    • A few hundred feet from school
    • Immediately after school let out
    • On a path that begins at the school
  • The students were together on the path because of school

Succinctly stated, the court held that “a school may act to ensure students are able to leave the school safely without implicating the rights of students to speak freely in the broader community.”

Were C.R.’s due process rights violated? Again citing previous court decisions, the opinion noted that the Constitution allows informal procedures when a student suspension is 10 days or fewer. The school must provide the student notice of the charges but need not outline specific charges and their potential consequences or notify parents of the charges prior to the suspension. If the student denies the charges, the student then must have an opportunity to explain his side of the story. A school is not constitutionally required to inform the student of the specific rules or policies in question. For these reasons, the court held that the school did not violate C.R.’s procedural due process rights.

C.R. also claimed that his substantive due process rights were violated when the school recorded the reason for suspension as “harassment – sexual,” which allegedly deprived him of a good reputation. The court opined that C.R. did not have a genuine interest in maintaining a good reputation, as he had since stolen supplies from the school, and held that the school may record the reason for suspension, “however unsavory,” so long as it applied appropriate procedural safeguards. Therefore, the school also did not violate his substantive due process rights.

Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit upheld the summary judgment that the district court had previously granted.


C.R. v. Eugene School District 4J, No. 13-35856 (9th Cir. 2016)

Changes to Medicaid in Schools Plan Coming August 1, 2016

On January 27, 2016, the Director of the Department of Medicaid and ODE’s Director of the Office for Exceptional Children hosted a webinar that detailed the Medicaid billing changes coming to school districts as a result of changes to the Affordable Care Act (ACA) made in 2012, but only recently being applied to Ohio’s Medicaid Schools Plan (MSP).

Previously, in an October 2015 letter, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) found that Ohio’s MSP is out of compliance with its own state plan and the federal regulations because claims lack an appropriate prescription or referral from a medical practitioner. CMS is the federal entity that provides states with federal funds for Medicaid services, including the MSP. CMS concluded that claims filed under the MSP that do not contain this requirement after August 1, 2016 (the deadline set in the letter for full compliance) will not be reimbursable by Medicaid.

The Ohio Department of Medicaid was working with CMS to obtain an exemption or waiver of the requirements of the ACA as it relates to the MSP, but was unable to do so. The result of this unsuccessful negotiation has significant implications for all schools that provide services to students with disabilities pursuant to an IEP and eligible for Medicaid claim reimbursement.

If the State of Ohio is not in compliance with the ACA requirements, CMS will begin deferring IEP claims and Ohio could lose federal financial participation for Medicare through CMS. In fact, the federal regulations that require a prescription for services are not new requirements. Federal regulations state that Ohio’s State Medicaid Plan must require, among other things, all providers to be enrolled as participating providers, and that all claims for payment for services contain the national provider identifier (NPI) of the physician or professional referring or ordering the services. The change in the federal regulations occurred in 2012; however, Ohio’s noncompliant practice and procedure did not come to the attention of CMS until October.

The specific services for which a prescription, referral or order will be required from a medical provider are audiology, speech/language pathology, physical therapy, and occupational therapy. The provider may order multiple services if those services are in the IEP: for example, speech pathology and audiology or a combination of any of the services that requires a prescription. ODE reiterated during the webcast that services in the IEP must be delivered and cannot be denied, changed or modified based on the ability/inability to submit claims for reimbursement to Medicaid for services through the MSP.

A “provider” was defined in the January 27th webcast conducted by the Department of Medicaid Services and ODE as; a physician (MD or DO) an advanced practice nurse (APN), or a physician assistant (PA). School nurses who are RNs or LPNs are ineligible to order, refer or prescribe for these services. School therapists with a national provider number may not prescribe, order or refer the services either. School therapists will, however, continue to evaluate and provide services to students with disabilities, and document services for Medicaid school reimbursement.